From the Seats to the Streets: MoveOn.org and the Mobilization of Online Progressive Activists by Eaton, Marc Andrew
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Sociology Graduate Theses & Dissertations Sociology
Spring 1-1-2011
From the Seats to the Streets: MoveOn.org and the
Mobilization of Online Progressive Activists
Marc Andrew Eaton
University of Colorado at Boulder, marc_eaton@hotmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/socy_gradetds
Part of the Social Psychology Commons, and the Sociology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Sociology at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Graduate
Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eaton, Marc Andrew, "From the Seats to the Streets: MoveOn.org and the Mobilization of Online Progressive Activists" (2011).
Sociology Graduate Theses & Dissertations. Paper 5.
  
FROM THE SEATS TO THE STREETS: MOVEON.ORG AND THE MOBILIZATION OF 
ONLINE PROGRESSIVE ACTIVISTS 
by 
MARC ANDREW EATON 
B.A., Western Washington University, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment 
of the requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Sociology 
2011
  
 
This thesis entitled: 
From the Seats to the Streets: MoveOn.org and the Mobilization of Online Progressive Activists 
written by Marc Andrew Eaton 
has been approved for the Department of Sociology 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Dr. Patricia A. Adler (Chair) 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Dr. Leslie Irvine 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Dr. Tom Mayer 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Dr. Bryan Taylor 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Dr. Daniel Cress 
 
 
Date ______________ 
 
The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we 
find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards 
of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. 
 
 
 
IRB Protocol # 0406.13 
 iii 
 
Eaton, Marc Andrew (Ph.D., Sociology) 
 
From the Seats to the Streets: MoveOn.org and the Mobilization of Online Progressive Activists 
 
Thesis directed by Professor Patricia A. Adler 
 
 
 
 I examine how the progressive organization MoveOn.org uses the internet to organize 
citizens for both online and offline activism. The data are drawn from four years of online and 
offline participant observation in MoveOn, sixty interviews with members and staff, sixteen 
informal interviews with congressional office workers, five interviews with leaders of other 
online activist organizations, and hundreds of documents. This study connects MoveOn’s 
national-level strategic decision-making to the everyday realities of participation by MoveOn 
members, and contextualizes this within the media-driven contemporary American culture. First, 
I describe how MoveOn attempts to create a sense of community among members, and show 
how members react to these attempts. Next, I trace members’ paths to and through MoveOn, and 
explain how their participation affected their self-identities. Then, I reveal how members’ 
interpretations of MoveOn’s organizational identity are influenced by portrayals of MoveOn in 
the news and by the organization itself. Following this, I show how MoveOn’s strategy is 
fundamentally tied to the news cycle, and discuss how it stages and scripts its offline actions to 
maximize media attention. Finally, I investigate MoveOn’s effectiveness by focusing on its 
political advocacy, election work, message framing, and development of an online organizing 
model. I conclude by discussing how these empirical findings illuminate sociological 
understandings of the self, identity, community, media, and social movements. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 I grab my coat and gloves, and head out into the dark. It’s 6:30am, Election Day 2004. 
The polls open in a half-hour and, although it is only fifteen degrees Fahrenheit at the moment, I 
am committed to watching the polls for MoveOn until 7:00pm tonight, confirming that each and 
every one of the voters I contacted during my months of get-out-the-vote work make it to the 
polls. I drive the short distance to my local polling location, a red brick elementary school, and 
meet with Kathy, another local MoveOn volunteer who has agreed to help me. Despite having 
never met, Kathy kindly brings me a piping hot coffee, which I eagerly accept. For the next 
twelve hours, Kathy and I alternate shifts sitting outside the polling location in the frigid 
weather, asking voters if they had pledged to MoveOn that they would vote for John Kerry, and 
checking their names off of a list of local voters contacted by MoveOn volunteers in our 
neighborhood.  
  The day drags on. The sun comes out, but it does not chase away the biting cold. First 
my feet and then my hands become numb, and I retreat briefly to my apartment to warm up. 
While enjoying a bowl of hot soup for lunch, I hear on the radio that John Kerry is leading in 
early exit polls. This news sends a jolt of renewed energy through me, and I spend the afternoon 
going door to door, trying to track down voters who had not yet appeared at the polling location 
that Kathy and I had staked out before dawn.  
The sun sets and I return to the polling location, now the sole holdout at our temporary 
encampment. I count the minutes until 7:00pm finally arrives, and load our small MoveOn sign, 
chair, and table into the trunk of my car. Without hesitation, I drive downtown to meet with other 
MoveOn volunteers at an Italian restaurant for what I assume will be a victory party. As I walk 
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in, the solemn tone and emotionless statistics scrolling across the flatscreen televisions above the 
bar tell me all I need to know: we’re going down. I stay for nearly an hour, hoping that, by some 
miracle, the tide will turn and Kerry will somehow pull out a come-from-behind victory, but it is 
not to be. Tired, depressed, and alone, I retreat to my apartment. I crawl in bed, feeling like I 
have done all I can to prevent Bush from getting reelected, and realizing that this knowledge 
does nothing to erase the shock and sadness I feel. 
 Flash forward two years. I am rushing to the temporary phone banking office MoveOn 
set up in my city. I park the car in a newly built mixed-use neighborhood, where utilitarian 
looking condominiums mingle with oddly out of place small businesses. The whole 
neighborhood looks as though the suburbs somehow mated with an industrial park. Up the stairs 
I go, holding my breath as I pass briskly by the scented soap shop located below MoveOn’s 
temporary office. On the way up the stairs, I navigate around other MoveOn volunteers sitting on 
the steps, leaning into their cell phones to hear the voters on the other end of their conversations 
over the voices echoing off the white cinder block walls of the stairwell. “That’s a good sign,” I 
think, knowing that this spillover must mean the office is crowded.  
Indeed, as I step into the office on the second floor, I see at least thirty volunteers 
crowded around the folding tables lent by local MoveOn members, each pressing a cell phone to 
one ear while jamming a finger into the opposite ear to hear the voters above the din. The room 
seems bright on this cold but clear November day, Election Day 2006. It is probably just the sun 
reflecting off of the barren white cinder block walls, but perhaps this brightness also results from 
my own reflection upon how very different things were only two years ago, when I felt as though 
I was toiling away in complete isolation from other progressives. Today, volunteers flow in 
faster than the field organizers can print voter contact lists, and the excitement of perceived 
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momentum drives one volunteer to say to no one in particular, “I think we’re going to do it!” I 
grab a handful of voter contact lists from Andy, a field organizer who is desperately printing 
more call sheets to feed volunteers’ insatiable appetites, and settle in between a graying woman 
in a knitted sweater and a large 40-something man in a plaid flannel shirt. Both are engrossed in 
conversations with voters, and barely glance up as I slide into my seat and begin what will be a 
four-hour calling shift. 
After the polls have closed, I meet Andy and two other field organizers at a local bar, 
where we gather around a small television in the corner and watch the election results so intently 
you would have thought we were watching the Apollo Moon landing. We share hugs, backslaps, 
and several pitchers of beer as it begins to dawn on us that the Democratic landslide we 
envisioned is indeed becoming a reality. We cheer when Rick Santorum, a conservative 
Republican senator from Pennsylvania, is defeated by Bob Casey, a Democratic candidate for 
whom our office had been calling for the past five days. We cheer again when Claire McCaskill, 
another Democrat supported by MoveOn, takes a Missouri Senate seat. Each of us feels a sense 
of personal responsibility for these victories, as though our calls were the deciding factors in 
these campaigns. Progressives have come a long way from two years ago, and tonight we’re 
going to celebrate. 
Two years later, the scene is much the same. I am standing in an enclosed patio area 
behind a rundown tavern, whose exposed brick and concrete walls clash with the large flatscreen 
televisions and mirrored shelving that adorn the bar. With me are seven of my fellow MoveOn 
organizers: three paid field organizers, and four volunteer regional coordinators like myself, each 
wearing our MoveOn and Obama paraphernalia. People are lined up three deep at the bar, 
waving $20 bills at the bartender as he mixes cocktails with robotic efficiency. My friends and I 
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are counting down the minutes until polls close on the West Coast, and watching CNN broadcast 
live images of the enormous gathering of Obama supporters at Grant Park in Chicago. I feel a 
particular affinity for that crowd, having dedicated every available moment over the past eight 
months to MoveOn’s recruitment efforts for the Obama campaign, as did all of my companions. 
“Three…Two…One!” the crowd chants as the polls finally close. A split second of 
hesitation hangs in the air as “Barack Obama Elected President” flashes onto CNN’s screen, and 
then the crowd absolutely erupts in cheers. Almost instinctively, I begin hugging friends and 
strangers alike. Tears steam down the cheeks of the field organizers as they hold tightly onto one 
another, the way exhausted but elated marathoners might after crossing the finish line. We share 
a moment of pure joy and hope as we realize how far MoveOn, the progressive movement, and 
the nation have come from only four years ago. 
This research captures one small slice of this period in American history. Through my 
participation in MoveOn, I experienced and witnessed some of the most exciting political 
struggles that have occurred in this country since the upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Moreover, I had an insider’s perspective on one of the most influential political organizations of 
the past two decades. In many ways, my trajectory from perceived isolation and depression in 
2004 to joy and hope in 2008 reflected the experiences of many progressives. It likewise 
reflected MoveOn’s ten-year transformation from a promising but unproven organization run by 
political novices to a well-oiled progressive powerhouse. Although my research could not 
possibly capture all aspects of MoveOn’s rise to political power, it provides a rare glimpse into 
the inner workings of this organization. In doing so, it illuminates the processes by which an 
internet-based organization like MoveOn can mobilize thousands—and sometimes even 
hundreds of thousands—of ordinary Americans for both online and offline activism. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This research compliments other studies of MoveOn. Scholars, journalists, and political 
commentators share a consensus that MoveOn was “the first important online progressive 
organization” (Feld and Wilcox 2008:xi), and continues to be at the forefront of the progressive 
movement (Bai 2007a; Carty and Onyett 2006; Hamm 2008; Heaney and Rojas 2007; Jacobs 
2005; Rheingold 2004). Heaney and Rojas (2007) single out MoveOn as a leading mobilizer of 
“movement-partisans,” people who have partisan (in this case, Democratic) leanings but choose 
to act through outsider organizations rather than the party structure. Indeed, MoveOn is one of 
the most highly linked-to sites within the progressive web sphere (Farrall and Delli Carpini 2004; 
Hara and Estrada 2005). Kern (2004) and Bruno (2009) note MoveOn’s ability to create an “echo 
chamber” in relation to its issues by creating buzz through innovative use of the internet and 
member-driven content, like its “Bush in 30 Seconds” and “Obama in 30 Seconds” ad contests in 
2004 and 2008, respectively. 
 Central to MoveOn’s mobilization strategy is its e-mail list, which it continually builds by 
choosing hot-button political issues (Bai 2007a; Hurowitz 2007; Pariser 2004; Welch 2003). As 
Peter Schurman, former executive director of MoveOn, said, “MoveOn typically won’t engage 
on an issue until it’s close to a tipping point where engaging a large number of our members can 
really make the decisive difference” (Welch 2003:11). MoveOn makes it easy for “members” 
(people on its e-mail list) to act on these issues through e-petitions, online donations, online 
event locating programs, and other internet-based tools that streamline activism and lower the 
threshold for participation (Rohlinger and Brown 2009; Hara 2008; Toensing and El-Amine 
2003). MoveOn also builds this list through “viral marketing” (Fine 2006), encouraging 
members to forward videos, petitions, and other information to friends and family. It keeps 
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members engaged by frequently asking for feedback and constantly sending new solicitations for 
action. If they have the time and desire, members can climb MoveOn’s “ladder of engagement,” 
moving first from online petitions to attendance at offline events, and eventually to leadership 
positions in MoveOn’s council system or get-out-the-vote programs (Karpf 2009). 
 MoveOn has created the definitive model for a new generation of internet-based activist 
organizations. The low threshold for membership creates a huge pool of members with broad 
interests, thus giving MoveOn the ability to truly be a multi-issue organization. At the same time, 
the low cost of e-mail facilitates frequent communication, which helps create a sense of 
community among members (as I discuss in Chapter Four). In addition, the speed of e-mail 
means MoveOn can activate members when issues are “hot.” This broad membership base and 
ability to mobilize on a variety of hot-button issues means MoveOn can raise large sums of 
money very quickly by pooling small contributions (Karpf 2009). Furthermore, by combining 
well-cited political information and opportunities for action within its e-mail messages, MoveOn 
is helping to create a more informed and engaged population, which in turn facilitates more 
dialogue within the democratic “public sphere” (Carty 2008; Fine 2006; Rohlinger and Brown 
2009). 
INTERNET ACTIVISM AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
 Speculation about the effects of the internet upon democratic participation began in the late 
1980s, when Downing (1989) suggested that the internet would help activists gather information, 
communicate with one another, and mobilize on a global scale. Later research has largely 
supported these claims (Bennett 2003; Danitz and Stroebel 2001; Gillan 2009; Gurak and Logie 
2003; Myers 1994; Pickerill 2003; Van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, and Rucht 2004; see Garrett 
2006 for a review). A primary example of this new model of activism is the Zapatista movement, 
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a Mexican guerrilla movement that has used the internet to publicize its struggle against the 
Mexican government. The Zapatistas have circumvented traditional media and spread their 
message by using e-mail to contact sympathetic activists outside of Mexico, who then relay their 
messages to alternative media outlets and other activist groups (Russell 2001). Other movements, 
including the anti-globalization movement, the anti-war movement, and even the strategic voting 
movement (i.e., “Nader traders” during the 2000 election) have utilized the cheap, instantaneous, 
and global reach of the internet to advance their causes (Bennett 2003; Carty 2002; Earl and 
Schussman 2003; Gillan 2009; Kahn and Kellner 2004; Moore 2003; Schussman and Earl 2004; 
Van Aelst and Walgrave 2002; Vegh 2003). 
 However, many of the same scholars who pointed out these democratizing effects warned 
that the lack of face-to-face communication inherent to internet-based activism could undermine 
movement solidarity, reduce collective identity formation, and thereby make it easier for activists 
to withdraw from the movement (Diani 2000; Stoecker 2002). They are also concerned that the 
ease of online participation facilitates knee-jerk emotional reactions rather than activism based 
on informed opinions (Bennett 2003; Chadwick 2006; Danitz and Stroebel 2001; Gillan 2009; 
Howard 2003; Klotz 2007; Pickerill 2003; Van de Donk et al. 2004). Several researchers argue 
that the internet is not revolutionary in any way, but merely “allows [people] to do the same 
thing in a different way” (Hill and Hughes 1998:44; Margolis and Resnick 2000; Scott and Street 
2000). Earl and Kimport (2008), for example, found that online activist websites relied upon 
familiar tactics (petitions, boycotts, letter-writing campaigns) and targeted traditional actors 
(corporations and government bodies, especially legislatures). Similarly, Galusky (2003) and 
Pickerill (2003) revealed that online activist organizations often use traditional top-down 
communication models that do not facilitate formation of grassroots social networks. 
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Researchers studying the effects of the internet upon mainstream political participation 
have found a similar variety of effects. Some commentators argue the internet will revolutionize 
grassroots organizing (Plouffe 2009; Trippi 2004) and accelerate the pace of the issue attention 
cycle (Bimber 2000). Others argue that e-mail and websites offer little to no improvement in 
voter mobilization compared to mass mailings or phone calls (Bimber 2001; Nickerson 2007; 
Scheufele and Nisbet 2002). Chadwick (2006) and Klotz (2007) caution that e-petitions may 
actually harm the democratic process by creating a system of “plagiarized participation” (Klotz 
2007), wherein people lobby their representatives using prefabricated demands. This leads to 
“thin citizenship” (Howard 2003), in which people respond to political urges but do not form 
their own informed opinions about issues. It also decreases the effectiveness of citizen input by 
overwhelming legislators with thousands of identical statements (Chadwick 2006). The overall 
trend in studies of the relationship between the internet and mainstream political participation 
mirrors research on online activism: the internet may make processes of communication and 
mobilization cheaper and easier, but by itself it has limited influence on who gets involved, why 
they get involved, and whether they become integrated into communities of like-minded activists 
(Agre 2002; Hill and Hughes 1997; Jackson and Lilleker 2007; Johnson 2001; Johnson and Kaye 
2003; Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Weber, Loumakis, and Bergman 2003).  
Nearly all of this research has examined online activism “from on high,” as an object of 
analysis rather than a subjective experience. Where my research advances knowledge of 
MoveOn in particular and internet-based activism more generally is in the latter realm. I explore 
the interactive meaning-making and identity-altering experiences of participating in this form of 
activism. More specifically, I examine community construction, identity development, 
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organizational identity framing, strategic dramaturgical displays of protest, and various measures 
of effectiveness. 
COMMUNITY AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
 Wellman said community consists of “networks of interpersonal ties that provide 
sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging, and social identity” (2001:228). 
Traditionally, community was rooted in face-to-face interactions in the context of a place-based 
sense of belonging (Durkheim [1893] 1997; Tönnies [1877] 2001). With the rise of technologies 
that allowed communication in absence of physical co-presence, people were able to imagine 
they belonged to communities that were based on perceived commonalities in nationality or 
beliefs (Anderson 1983). Although—as will be discussed below—advocates of online 
community are excited by the possibility of technologically-mediated imagined communities, 
some scholars decry the loss of traditional forms of community and consequent decline in certain 
types of civic engagement.  
 Putnam (2000) traces in detail the decline in popularity of fraternal groups, bowling 
leagues, and other organizations within the United States that help to create community bonds. 
He argues that the loss of such groups has caused a reduction in “social capital,” which he 
defines as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them” (2000:19). Social capital can be broken down into two types: “bridging social capital,” 
which links people to diverse groups outside of their immediate social circles, and “bonding 
social capital,” which consists of feelings of solidarity and reciprocity among members of a 
social group. In the absence of community organizations that foster both types of social capital, 
Putnam (2000) believes that people have become less willing to engage in civic activities like 
voting, volunteer work, and participating in political organizations. In place of this community-
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based participation, “tertiary organizations” have emerged that simply ask members to send 
money to support professional lobbying groups, instead of encouraging active participation in the 
political process (Putnam 2000). 
 Theda Skocpol’s (2003) analysis of Americans’ participation in volunteer organizations 
largely supports this argument. Skocpol claims that the voluntary organizations that flourished 
during the period between the U.S. Civil War and the 1960s were crucibles of social capital that 
taught important civic leadership skills, fostered connections between members of different 
social classes, and provided a sense of belonging and real political clout to otherwise 
disempowered individuals. These organizations faded as youth in the 1960s and 1970s instead 
joined the civil rights, anti-war, and feminist movements, among others. By the mid-1970s, these 
organizations began transforming into professionalized advocacy organizations that only asked 
members to donate, not participate. Like Putnam, Skocpol is critical of these organizations 
because they replaced community-based civic engagement with impersonal, mass mail-based 
organizations in which members were treated “not as fellow citizens but as consumers with 
policy preferences” (Skocpol 2003:211). 
 These critiques are valid in their own right, but they largely ignore the communities and 
forms of engagement that have emerged on the internet1. Online communities first developed in 
the late 1980s among the first generation of tech-savvy internet users (Rheingold 1993). 
Currently, there is essentially limitless potential for online social networking through sites like 
MySpace and Facebook (Lenhart and Madden 2007). Scholars are split, however, on whether 
online social connections can provide the same level of social capital and sense of belonging that 
members experience in traditional face-to-face communities. Rheingold (1993) championed the 
                                                
1 Putnam does briefly address the potential impact of the Internet upon community formation, but he suspects that 
the ability to shop around for groups of like-minded others will lead to what he calls “cyberbalkanization” (2000, 
p.177). 
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internet as a new “electronic frontier” for establishing communities, and suggested that it “has 
the capacity to... revitalize citizen-based democracy” by allowing people to inform themselves 
and create communities of interest that are unbounded by geography (1993:14). Along these 
lines, Pliskin and Romm (1997) found that striking Israeli university employees established 
feelings of solidarity over e-mail despite geographic separation, and hypothesized that such 
feelings were possible because e-mail provided an “illusion of closeness” that counteracted their 
physical isolation from one another. Scott and Johnson (2005) similarly concluded that the 
internet could support sustainable communities as long as members were able to communicate. 
On the other hand, several researchers argue that online communities provide “convenient 
togetherness without real responsibility” (Fernback 2007:63). In other words, people use online 
communities to fulfill their own desires for expression and connection, but do not experience 
feelings of caring and responsibility toward other group members (Wellman 2001; Wellman et 
al. 1996; Wellman et al. 2001).  
 Many studies of online communities show that these communities are strengthened when 
participants are able to establish offline connections. Wellman et al. (2003) found that residents 
of “Netville,” a pseudonymous town with high-speed internet, used the internet to extend face-
to-face social networks and integrated online discussions into their daily lives. In separate 
studies, Baker and Ward (2002) and Fox and Roberts (1999) both concluded that online 
communities thrived only when they were rooted in offline communities in which members were 
bonded by geography or common experiences. Futrell and Simi (2004) also showed how 
participation on White Power internet discussion boards reinforced feelings of solidarity that 
emerged in the context of offline participation in movement music festivals and other White 
Power activities.  
 12 
 Together, these studies underscore the continued importance of offline social networks for 
community development and maintenance, even when the internet is the primary site of 
interaction. Moreover, they show that the distinction between “real” and “virtual” communities is 
becoming less valid as online and offline communities become increasingly enmeshed 
(Bakardjieva 2003; Fernback 2007; Fox 2004; Gochenour 2006; Wellman 2001; Wellman and 
Gulia 1999). My study of MoveOn adds to this body of research by showing how MoveOn 
attempts to create a sense of community among members through its online communications and 
invitations for offline activism. 
SELF AND IDENTITY 
 Along with examining community construction in MoveOn, I trace the ways that 
participation affects the identities of those involved. This analysis is rooted in a symbolic 
interactionist approach to the self and identity. From this perspective, the self is shaped through 
social interactions in which an individual comes to an understanding of his or her “self” by 
learning to take on other’s perspectives, and by recognizing that this “self” is defined in 
relationship to the society in which he or she lives (Cooley 1902; James [1890] 1983; Mead 
[1934] 1962). Blumer (1969) proposed that all meaning, including one’s sense of self, was 
negotiated through interactions with others in social situations. Like Cooley (1902), Blumer 
believed that self-definitions were fundamentally shaped by people’s interpretations of other’s 
perceptions of them. Stryker agreed with this basic premise, but focused more on how the self 
was made up of various role-based identities. According to Stryker (1980), identities are rooted 
in “structured role relationships” and ordered in a “hierarchy of identity salience.” He defined 
identity salience as “the probability, for a given person, of a given identity being invoked in a 
variety of situations” (1968:560). Stryker claimed that highly salient identities were central to a 
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person’s sense of self, and as a result people would seek roles that reinforced their most salient 
identities. 
Many scholars have used the symbolic interactionist perspective to examine self and identity 
as they relate to their subfields of interest. Within the subfield of social movement research, 
Gecas’ (2000) concept of “value identity” is particularly relevant. Gecas defined value identities 
as self-definitions that “characterize the moral or political or philosophical stand that persons 
take and in terms of which define themselves” (2000:98). He argued that value identities were 
based on ideologies that, when internalized as personal values, “give meaning, purpose, and 
direction to individuals” (2000:98). According to Gecas, social movement participation supports 
value identities by giving people opportunities to act on their values. Through participation, 
people begin to identify their values as integral parts of their overall self-concepts. This is 
particularly true if participation enhances members’ senses of self-efficacy and authenticity, 
which Gecas described as “the motivation to perceive oneself as a causal agent in one’s 
environment” and “the individual’s strivings for… congruence between their self-values and 
their behavior,” respectively (2000:101). 
Although Gecas proposed this concept in a volume dedicated to the examination of self and 
identity in social movements (Stryker, Owens, and White 2000), it has yet to be integrated into 
scholarly examinations of the role of identity in movements. Much of this research has focused 
instead on how socially based identities like “woman” or “queer” serve as a basis for community 
building and social or political challenges (Freeman 1973; Gamson 1995; Taylor 1989; Taylor 
and Whittier 1992). Others have conceptualized processes of “identity talk” (Hunt and Benford 
1994) and “identity work” (Snow and Anderson 1987; Snow and McAdam 2000), in which 
activists use the “vocabularies of motive” (Benford 1993; Mills 1940) provided by movement 
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organizations to construct personal identities that are consistent with the collective identities and 
goals of the organizations in which they are participating (Armato and Marsiglio 2002; Broad 
2002; Einwohner 2002; Kiecolt 2000; McCorkel and Rodriquez 2009; Stryker 2000). 
My study of identity transformation in MoveOn expands upon this research by showing how 
social movement participation helps individuals develop identities as activists. I draw upon the 
insights of Blumer (1969), Stryker (1968, 1980), and Gecas (2000) to outline processes of 
activist identity construction and reinforcement among MoveOn members. The few sociological 
examinations of activist identity that exist show that activist identity is highly salient among 
movement participants, and is a good indicator of long-term commitment to activism (Bobel 
2007; Downton and Wehr 1998; McAdam 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989). This analysis of 
activist identity is especially relevant in light of the contemporary trend toward “personalized 
politics,” wherein activists see the individual as the “locus of political responsibility and 
efficacy” rather than the community (Lichterman 1996:34). People who take this personalized 
approach view commitment as adherence to a set of values, not a specific social group or 
organization. In personalized politics, the roles people fulfill in movements are important to their 
identities only to the extent that the roles allow them to express and act upon their individual 
value commitments (Lichterman 1996; King 2004). Such an individual-focused approach is 
common among participants in internet-based movement organizations, who are usually 
physically isolated from one another and spread across vast geographical distances (Earl and 
Schussman 2003; Shumate and Pike 2006; Stoecker 2002; Wall 2007).  
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 
 I also explore how organizational identity is shaped through a social movement 
organization’s interactions with antagonistic groups and news outlets. This process of identity 
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framing has generally been studied under the conceptual umbrella of collective identity (for a 
review, see Polletta and Jasper 2001). Taylor and Whittier (1992:105) defined collective identity 
as “the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, 
and solidarity.” In short, it is the sense of “we” that develops among movement participants. This 
sense of togetherness is based upon distinction from an out-group, consciousness of group 
members’ common interests and struggles, and negotiation of the meaning of the collective 
identity among movement participants and between the movement and outsiders (Groch 1994; 
Mansbridge and Morris 2001; Melucci 1989, 1996; Taylor and Whittier 1992). 
 It is this negotiated construction of collective identity that is of most interest to me. In 
particular, I am interested in the strategic framing of identity in the context of a movement 
organization’s relationship to antagonists and news outlets. These groups compete for 
interpretive dominance on what Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) referred to as “identity fields.” 
Identity fields include organizations that are allied with a social movement group, organizations 
that are antagonistic, and various audiences that are relatively neutral in relation to the 
movement’s goals. Social movement organizations strategically frame their collective identities 
to appeal to these audiences, and revise these identity frames on the basis of reactions from 
audience members and antagonists (Bernstein 1997; Einwohner 2002, 2006; Jasper 1997; Simi 
and Futrell 2009). Movement leaders may frame collective identities more conservatively when 
they rely upon powerful mainstream institutions for resources (Gamson 1996). In such 
circumstances, collective identity is framed through a top-down, managerial process that is 
similar to corporate branding and marketing (Dacin and Brown 2006; Johnston, Laraña, and 
Gusfield 1994; Smith 2001). If a movement organization is unable to exert sufficient influence 
over how it is framed in the public eye, it can “lose ownership” over its collective identity and be 
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framed negatively by opponents and news outlets (Adair 1996).  
 Researchers have typically characterized the relationship between social movement 
organizations and the news media as symbiotic, in that movements need the media to publicize 
their issues and actions, and the media need conflict and action to fill their news reports (Gamson 
and Modigliani 1989; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 1980; Molotch 1988). However, these 
studies have focused overwhelmingly on how a movement’s issues are framed by the media, 
rather than examining how the media frames its identity. I bring together research on collective 
identity and media-movement dynamics to analyze the media’s role in framing MoveOn’s 
organizational identity. Organizational identity was originally defined by Albert and Whetten 
(1985) as consisting of the features seen as the central, enduring, and distinctive elements of the 
organization. Unfortunately, Albert and Whetten did not specify whether organizational identity 
was defined by outsiders’ or insiders’ perceptions of these features, so organization studies 
scholars have spent the last quarter century refining this concept. These researchers tend to 
portray organizational identity construction as “a process of reciprocal sensemaking” (Ginzel, 
Kramer, and Sutton 2004) between organizational members, leaders, and audiences (Brown, 
Dacin, Pratt, and Whetten 2006; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Elsbach and Kramer 2004; Hatch 
and Schultz 1997, 2002). As would be expected, this research draws heavily on symbolic 
interactionism. 
 Brown et al. (2006), for example, build off of Cooley’s (1902) “looking-glass self” in 
describing the relationship between organizational identity, image, and reputation. In their 
analysis, organizational leaders convey a favorable “intended image” to stakeholders and other 
outsiders, and then adjust organizational identity frames on the basis of public response to this 
conveyed image. Likewise, Hatch and Schultz (1997, 2000, 2002) adapt Mead’s ([1934] 1962) 
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“I” and “Me” to the construction of organizational identity. They explain that organizational 
identity is defined through “a dynamic set of processes by which an organization’s self is 
continually socially constructed from the interchange between internal and external definitions of 
the organization” (Hatch and Schultz 2002:1004). In Chapter Six, I use the insights of this 
symbolic interactionist work on organizational identity framing to trace the dynamic processes 
by which MoveOn’s organizational identity is framed and reframed by various news outlets. I 
focus on organizational identity instead of collective identity because I found in my research that 
competing public definitions of MoveOn usually revolved around the symbolic value of the 
organization itself, not the characteristics of its members. 
FRAMING AND THE NEWS MEDIA 
 MoveOn also relied upon the news media to convey its messages about issues to the public. 
This process involves issue framing on the part of both the social movement organization and the 
news outlets covering its issues. Research on social movement framing is rooted in Goffman’s 
(1974) discussion of frames as cognitive lenses of interpretation. Early works on framing took 
this cognitive approach, focusing on, for example, how the development of an “injustice frame” 
preceded decisions to participate in collective action (Gamson 1992).  Snow, Rochford, Worden, 
and Benford (1986) expanded this approach into an analysis of how social movements convinced 
individuals that their interests and values were congruent with the movement’s goals. Snow and 
Benford (1992:137) defined a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses 
the ‘world out there’,” again emphasizing the cognitive structure of a frame rather than the 
interpretive process of framing.  
 In time, though, scholarly attention shifted to framing processes. Framing involves the 
construction of “interpretive schema” that are designed to accomplish three goals: diagnosis of 
 18 
the problem and its cause; prognosis of what could happen and what actions need to be 
undertaken to solve the problem; and motivation of movement adherents and the public to 
actually take remedial action (Snow and Benford 1988). Decisions about how best to frame an 
issue are made in the context of a “discursive field,” the set of individuals and groups that are 
making claims about a given issue at a particular time (Steinberg 1998; Snow 2006). Frames are 
adapted in relation to claims made by challengers, actions undertaken by the movement, outside 
events that change the credibility of certain claims, the audience(s) targeted by the messages, and 
the response of the audience(s) to the movement’s frames (Benford and Hunt 2003; Ellingson 
1995; Evans 1997; Kubal 1998; McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004).  
 Movement organizations enter into “framing contests” (Ryan 1991) in which they try to 
advance their arguments about issues in the face of competing arguments from 
countermovements and official (often government) accounts. This contest is especially tricky 
because mainstream news outlets tend to grant more validity to official frames, which often 
contradict a movement’s frames and simultaneously portray the movement as extremist or 
marginal (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991). To increase the likelihood of chances of favorable coverage, 
social movement organizations frame issues in ways that correspond to “news values,” including 
conflict, drama, newness, and emphasis on extreme cases or severe consequences (Rucht 2004). 
They also build off of “culturally resonant” story lines, such as rags to riches tales, hero/villain 
dichotomies, or standing up for “American values” (liberty, freedom, individual rights, etc.) 
(Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; McCarthy 1994; Ryan 1991). 
These frames make a movement’s argument more understandable to outsiders and cater to news 
outlets’ desire for conflict, thus increasing the chance that the movement’s issue frames will be 
reported by news outlets (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson 1992; Molotch 1988; Ryan 
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1991).  
 Movement organizations must also pay attention the “issue attention cycle” (Downs 1972). 
The issue attention cycle includes five phases: first, an issue rises to public awareness; next, the 
public becomes alarmed and tries to solve the problem; third, the complexity of the problem 
frustrates and discourages the public; fourth, the issue recedes from public attention; and finally, 
it is replaced by another issue and the cycle starts over. Movements can most effectively 
influence this cycle either by bringing issues to public attention in the first place, or by framing 
problems and solutions in ways that inspire public action while the issue is still prominent. This 
ability to influence the issue attention cycle is a critical aspect of social movement framing, 
because it maximizes a movement’s chances to affect public opinion and policy decisions, and 
also provides a window of opportunity for recruitment (Gitlin 1980). To seize this opportunity, 
movements select tactics that catch media attention and thereby give them a chance to spread 
their preferred issue frames (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). Media coverage increases when 
protests are large, organized by local activists, located close to news outlets or on a reporter’s 
“beat,” involve conflict, and occur on significant dates (e.g., September 11th) or at times of the 
day when news outlets were looking to fill “newsholes” (i.e., before the evening news) 
(McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; Rucht 2004). However, 
overreliance on confrontational and/or illegal tactics tends to result in negative media coverage, 
in which the protesters are portrayed as villains (Gitlin 1980; Kruse 2001). 
 In this study, I focus on how MoveOn approached offline protest as a dramaturgical 
performance, and show how each “media event,” as MoveOn referred to offline actions, was a 
carefully orchestrated attempt to maximize favorable media coverage at the most opportune 
moment in the issue attention cycle, when an issue was first entering public attention. I show 
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how issue framing occurred both in the messages displayed at these events and through the 
“presentation of self” (Goffman 1959) that was implicit in MoveOn’s choice of tactics. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES 
 Ultimately, the purpose of these protest events and, indeed, every action taken by a social 
movement organization is to successfully influence public opinion and government policies. 
Traditionally, social movement success was defined in terms of “collective goods,” the extent to 
which a movement brought forth benefits for the social group it claimed to represent. These 
collective goods were originally defined in economic terms (Olson 1965), but over time other 
benefits, such as legitimate access to the political process, were included under the umbrella of 
collective goods. Gamson ([1975] 1990), for example, defined success as the achievement of 
“new advantages,” such as passage and enforcement of legislation, and “acceptance,” in which 
government leaders recognized a movement organization as a legitimate representative for an 
aggrieved constituency. This study greatly influenced the direction of scholarly analysis of social 
movement success, which is still overwhelmingly concerned with political outcomes of protest.  
 More recent studies have focused on outcomes ranging from broad changes in political 
access to passage of specific policies (for a review, see Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, and Su 2010). 
Broad changes in access include granting women the right to vote (Banaszak 1996), and 
extending fundamental civil and voting rights to African-Americans (McAdam 1999). More 
often, movements push for mid-level policy outcomes that affect rights or legal protections for 
certain groups, but do not fundamentally change who is enfranchised. Examples of such mid-
level policy outcomes include protection of women’s rights to legal and safe abortions 
(Staggenborg 1991), decriminalization of sodomy (Kane 2003), and state-level bans on same-sex 
marriage (Fleischmann and Moyer 2009). Low-level policy changes affect only one 
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circumscribed group, such as homeless people (Cress and Snow 2000), and are often offered by 
authorities as concessions to mollify the protesting group (Piven and Cloward 1977). MoveOn 
tends to focus on mid-level policy changes, ranging from universal health care to increased 
federal funding of alternative energy research and development. 
 Along with policy outcomes, MoveOn has worked to elect movement allies to positions of 
power in the United States government. By helping these people get elected, the hope is that they 
will advance the progressive movement’s issues out of both personal commitment to the issues 
and a sense of obligation to those who helped them get elected. Movements ranging from the 
civil rights movement (Andrews 2001; McAdam 1999) to the Christian Right (Lichtman 2008) 
have pursued such an approach. It assumes a “political mediation” model of movement 
effectiveness, which proposes that movements are indirectly effective in politics through the 
ways they influence electoral outcomes (Amenta and Caren 2004; Amenta et al. 2010). This 
influence can be exerted by engaging in disruptive protests during election season, thereby 
bringing issues to public attention and forcing candidates to take positions on these issues (Piven 
and Cloward 1977; Fording 2001). It may also be exerted more directly, by organizing 
movement activists to work for ideologically allied candidates or, similarly, to mobilize against 
ideological opponents (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Skocpol 2003). MoveOn has engaged 
in both styles of electoral activism in order to elect ideological allies and exert mediated 
influence on political decisions. 
 Research on movement outcomes has been dominated by analyses of policy and elections. 
Earl (2004), however, argues that movements’ attempts to shape public opinion and media 
narratives should also be examined as indicators of success in their own right, rather than steps 
on the pathway to policy or electoral success. Indeed, successful injection of preferred issue 
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frames into media narratives about an issue can shift public opinion toward a movement’s 
position (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991). Media messaging outcomes have been neglected as foci for 
evaluating success, but I attempt to redress this omission in Chapter Eight by examining 
MoveOn’s deliberate attempts to shape media coverage of its issues.   
 Lastly, some researchers examine the consequences movements have for one another 
(Whittier 2004). In general, these consequences fall into three categories: spillover effects, spin-
off effects, and movement/countermovement effects. Movement spillover occurs when an “early 
riser” movement establishes organizational structures, issue frames, collective identities, tactics, 
and even ideologies that influence later movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994). A common 
example of spillover is the civil rights movement’s establishment of a rights “master frame” 
(Snow and Benford 1992) and a non-violent civil disobedience approach that influenced the 
framing and tactics of many other movements during the 1960s and 1970s (McAdam 1986). 
Spin-off effects occur when members of a movement feel that their concerns are not being 
sufficiently addressed within the confines of that movement, and break off to create a new 
movement that directly addresses their concerns (McAdam 1995). The feminist and gay rights 
movements, for example, were fed at least in part by angry rejections of the misogynistic and 
homophobic atmosphere that permeated the male-dominated organizations of the New Left 
(D’Emilio 1983; Minkoff 1997). Finally, movements that experience some success and public 
exposure can inspire countermovements that hope to prevent or reverse changes supported by the 
original movement. Movements and countermovements often contribute to each other’s growth, 
as people feel compelled to choose sides and experience a greater sense of solidarity while under 
attack (Lo 1982; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Mottl 1980; Zald and Useem 1987). In Chapter 
Eight, I discuss how each of these social movement outcomes has played out over MoveOn’s 
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history. 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 In the chapters that follow, I give an insider’s account of participation in MoveOn, and 
explore the organization’s relationship to the media, to other movement groups, and to the 
electoral and legislative processes. In Chapter Two, I review MoveOn’s history, political 
philosophy, and organizational structure. This chapter provides a foundation of understanding 
that informs all other chapters. Chapter Three is dedicated to discussion of my methods of data 
collection and analysis. In Chapter Four, I describe how MoveOn attempted to create a sense of 
community among members through the rhetoric in its e-mails, and explore whether members 
actually felt a sense of connection to one another. Chapter Five expands upon my analysis of 
members’ experiences in MoveOn by showing how participation led to activist identity 
development among some members, and allowed others to reinforce existing activist identities. 
Chapter Six focuses on how MoveOn’s organizational identity was framed and reframed by 
competing news outlets. In Chapter Seven, I trace the dramaturgical processes by which 
MoveOn’s offline actions were scripted and staged in order to convey specific messages to the 
news media during strategic moments in the issue attention cycle. The last substantive chapter, 
Chapter Eight, includes analyses of MoveOn’s effectiveness in influencing policy outcomes, 
elections, media narratives about issues, and models of online political activism. Finally, in 
Chapter Nine I explain the theoretical significance of my research. 
 24 
CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING MOVEON IN CONTEXT 
 
 MoveOn cannot be truly understood without examining the historical context in which it 
emerged, and the political and organizational philosophies that underlie its actions. This chapter 
first describes the history and philosophy behind MoveOn, and then provides an overview of the 
organization and its members. This background information sets the foundation for later chapters 
by explaining MoveOn’s emergence and clarifying terminology used throughout this text. 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR MOVEON’S EMERGENCE 
 Four moments in American political history are particularly relevant in setting the context 
for MoveOn’s emergence: the Progressive era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the civil rights and New Left movements in the 1960s, the consequent conservative 
backlash in the 1970s and 1980s, and finally the emergence of the progressive “netroots” in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century.  
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
 For roughly thirty years beginning around 1890, a group of social activists took it upon 
themselves to improve the conditions of the urban poor in the United States. Calling themselves 
“Progressives2,” this group of highly educated and relatively wealthy citizens sympathized with 
the plight of the workers who immigrated to Northern cities after the Civil War. These workers 
endured long hours in dangerous factories, and lived in rundown tenement buildings that lacked 
basic sanitation. Often motivated by a sense of Christian duty, Progressives fought to improve 
the lives of workers and their families. Muckraking progressive journalists uncovered the 
exploitation and corruption of many industries with exposés like Upton Sinclair’s (1906) account 
                                                
2 I capitalize “Progressive” here to distinguish the Nineteenth Century movement from the current “progressive” 
movement, of which MoveOn is a part. 
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of the Chicago meatpacking plants, The Jungle. Physicians tried to eradicate diseases and 
lobbied for clean drinking water, and educators opened more public schools so poor children 
could have access to education. Progressives also set up “settlement houses” in poor 
communities, such as Hull House in Chicago, where they provided free education and many 
other services for the poor (Link and McCormick 1983). Over its thirty years of existence, the 
Progressive movement helped pass labor laws protecting women and children, developed some 
of the first citizen-run interest groups in the nation, and lobbied alongside the suffrage movement 
to give women the right to vote (Link and McCormick 1983). 
 The current progressive movement not only shares a name with the earlier Progressive 
movement; it also shares a fundamental worldview. Like the earlier movement, today’s 
progressives believe that those who have the privilege of education and relative wealth should 
use these assets to improve the lives of the less fortunate. The current progressive movement is 
largely populated by well-educated white middle-class Americans, but these people direct their 
energies toward issues that are of concern to a majority of Americans, such as access to 
affordable health care or ending the Iraq war. While the current iteration of the progressive 
movement focuses more on partisan politics and certain “pet” issues like clean energy that are 
frequently advocated for by middle-class social movements (Melucci 1989), it nonetheless shares 
the earlier movement’s emphasis on expanding rights and freedoms to disadvantaged groups. 
Perhaps most importantly, the current progressive movement shares the underlying belief that 
social progress is achievable through a combination of grassroots efforts to uplift disempowered 
groups and coordinated lobbying for policy changes at the national level. This dual-pronged 
approach is still very much evident in today’s progressive movement. 
THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT  
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 During the period between the Progressive era and the civil rights movement, labor unions 
were at the forefront of mobilization on the left. Unions demanded greater protections and 
compensation for workers, but did not focus on advancing the rights of the entire citizenry. To 
the extent that a more fundamental critique existed, it was based upon a Marxist philosophy that 
challenged the unequal power structure inherent to industrial capitalism. This critique rang true 
for many industrial laborers, but failed to appeal broadly to middle-class Americans, who were 
reluctant to criticize a capitalist system from which they benefitted. Movements that called for 
the expansion of human and civil rights through political reforms rather than revolutionary action 
appealed much more to this segment of the population (Eder 1985; Kriesi 1989).  
 Whether intentionally or not, the civil rights movement appealed to the sensibilities of 
these middle-class Americans. It called upon Americans to uphold the fundamental rights 
promised in our founding documents, and framed racism as a betrayal of the nation’s basic 
principles. This appeal to rights inspired thousands of idealistic young people, both black and 
white, to participate in the movement. Many of these newly minted activists were college 
students who grew up in idyllic suburban neighborhoods while the dark cloud of impending 
nuclear war hung overhead. They rejected the pro-Communist sentiments of many of their 
parents, but were similarly revolted by the venomous anti-Communism of people like Senator 
Joseph McCarthy. Many were inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s call to “a new generation 
of Americans” to “ask what you can do for your country” (Gitlin 1987; Kennedy 1961). Through 
their participation in the civil rights movement, these young people learned the philosophy and 
practice of non-violent civil disobedience, which they brought back to communities and 
campuses across the country (McAdam 1999). 
 From this newfound political consciousness sprouted an assortment of youth-driven social 
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movements, which I refer to for brevity’s sake as New Left movements. The term “New Left” 
was coined by the Students for a Democratic Society to distinguish the emerging pro-democracy 
left from the pro-Communist Old Left (Gitlin 1987). The New Left advocated “participatory 
democracy,” the principle that the informed citizenry of the United States should get involved in 
the shaping of public policy at all levels (Gitlin 1987; O’Neill 2001). Through direct action 
tactics—at first non-violent and, later, more militant—the New Left opposed America’s 
militaristic foreign policy, consumer culture, racism, sexism, homophobia, and other issues 
(D’Emilio 1983; Freeman 1973; Gitlin 1987). 
 Over time, the New Left began to fracture. Radical groups like the Weathermen advocated 
militant revolution, while more moderate elements called for non-violent reform. The militant 
groups eventually self-destructed under the weight of paranoia and increasingly strident demands 
for ideological purity, or were systematically undermined through federal counterintelligence 
programs (Ayers 2001; Gitlin 1987). By the mid-1970s, the remaining moderate groups 
transformed into institutionalized lobbying organizations that shied away from structural 
critiques of capitalism in favor of advocacy for single issues like abortion. They also replaced 
direct action and participatory democracy with insider lobbying tactics and a “paper 
membership” that was asked to do little more than respond to mass-mailed donation solicitations 
(Skocpol 2003). 
 MoveOn and other progressive organizations looked to these groups for inspiration, both 
positive and negative. On the positive side, MoveOn adapted the mass-mailed donation 
solicitation model to the internet, where it has proven to be even more effective. Likewise, 
MoveOn is similarly motivated by a desire for reform rather than revolution, and leverages its 
large membership to lobby politicians at the national level. On the other hand, MoveOn has 
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consciously and consistently created opportunities for its members to actively participate in this 
process, both online and offline. Moreover, MoveOn positions itself as a multi-issue organization 
to counter the tendency among progressive groups to become balkanized by single-issue 
concerns. Nonetheless, without the lifelong activists and reform-minded lobbying organizations 
that emerged from the New Left movement, MoveOn would not have had an experienced activist 
base from which to recruit or an organizational model to adapt for its purposes. 
THE CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH 
 In some ways, the conservative “countermovement” that arose in response to the New Left 
was even more important to MoveOn’s emergence (Lo 1982; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; 
Mottl 1980; Zald and Useem 1987). This countermovement developed in the aftermath of the 
1964 presidential election, in which Lyndon Johnson overwhelmingly defeated Republican 
candidate Barry Goldwater (Lichtman 2008; Lux 2009). After this landslide, conservatives 
decided that they would regain power by capitalizing on white Americans’ fears of racial 
integration and moderates’ concerns about the anti-war and hippie movements. Conservatives 
adopted a strategy to persuade “Dixie Democrats” to vote Republican by abandoning efforts to 
recruit Black voters and stoking fears that the civil rights movement would lead to increased 
Black-on-White violence. In 1968, Richard Nixon successfully appealed to moderates and 
conservatives by running on a “law and order” platform that portrayed New Left activists as 
Communists and criminals (Lichtman 2008).  
 Concurrent with this resurgent Republican political power was the rise of the Christian 
Right. Anti-abortion activists mobilized in the wake of the Roe vs. Wade decision legalizing 
abortion in 1972, and “pro-family” organizations led by Phyllis Schlafly, Anita Bryant, and 
James Dobson opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, homosexuality, and abortion (Hopkins 
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and Reicher 1997; Lichtman 2008; McCaffrey and Keys 2000; Vanderford 1989). At the same 
time, Christian organizations like the Moral Majority injected religious arguments into political 
debates, and encouraged ministers to use the pulpit as a political platform (Lichtman 2008). 
These groups found their political messiah in Ronald Reagan, who vocally opposed the New Left 
movements during his tenure as governor of California. His avowed Christianity and anti-
abortion stance made him a hero to social conservatives, while his business-friendly, “trickle-
down” theory of economics appealed to fiscal conservatives (Lichtman 2008; Lux 2009). This 
mixture of social and fiscal conservatism set the tone for the conservative movement for the 
following decades. 
 In the 1990s, conservative radio personality Rush Limbaugh and Speaker of the House 
Newt Gingrich became the new leaders of the movement. Limbaugh’s radio show reached 
twenty million listeners per week by the mid-1990s, and Reagan declared him “the number one 
voice for conservatism in our country” (Lichtman 2008:389). Gingrich led the conservative 
movement from within the Republican Party, most notably by leading the development of the 
“Contract With America,” which pledged to lower taxes, reform welfare, and impose tougher 
crime laws. This led to the “Republican Revolution” of 1994, when Republicans gained sixty-
two seats in Congress, mostly in the South. Gingrich also spurred on the investigations that 
eventually led to the Clinton impeachment hearings of 1998 and 1999 (Lichtman 2008).  
 Twenty years after its initial victory with Ronald Reagan, the conservative movement 
returned to the White House in 2000 with the election of George W. Bush. Bush represented the 
culmination of the movement’s efforts: as an evangelical Christian and a pro-business economic 
conservative, he opposed to abortion, gay marriage, and other such issues, while favoring 
financial deregulation and tax cuts for the wealthy. Following 9/11, his doctrine of pre-emptive, 
 30 
unilateral military strikes and support for increased domestic intelligence gathering under the 
Patriot Act appealed to conservative “hawks” who rallied under the banner of the “War on 
Terror” (Lichtman 2008). 
 Of course, Bush’s actions incensed progressives, many of whom had become complacent 
during the Clinton years. The increasingly polarized political atmosphere led to hatred and 
distrust on both ends of the political spectrum, but it also fueled voter turnout and campaign 
volunteering among both party loyalists and movement activists (Dodson 2010; Layman, Carsey, 
and Horowitz 2006). In fact, the conservative rise to power directly led to the formation of 
MoveOn, in that (as I will discuss later) MoveOn was originally created in response to 
congressional efforts to impeach President Clinton. MoveOn thrived in the increasingly polarized 
political atmosphere, and pioneered new ways to channel progressives’ anger into online and 
offline activism. 
THE PROGRESSIVE “NETROOTS” MOVEMENT 
 The term “netroots” was coined by progressive blogger Jerome Armstrong in 2002, in 
reference to the progressive online activist community (Armstrong and Zuniga 2006). 
Armstrong’s blog, MyDD, was an early leader in the progressive blogosphere, along with 
Markos Moulitsas Zuniga’s Daily Kos, which became the leading progressive blog by the mid-
2000s (Armstrong and Zuniga 2006; Bai 2007a). The netroots are comprised of a loosely 
connected network of political bloggers and online activist organizations that provide political 
commentary and opportunities for ordinary citizens to get involved in activism. Although the 
term originally referred to progressive online activism, with the rise of the right-wing 
blogosphere and internet-based activist organizations that (as I discuss in Chapter Eight) mimic 
MoveOn’s model of online activism, the netroots now include voices from across the political 
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spectrum. For my purposes, though, I focus here only on the progressive netroots. 
 Through blogs, progressives inform themselves about the hot issues of the moment and 
share their opinions in an environment that is supportive but also intellectually challenging. This 
helps them deepen their understanding and come to some informal agreement about appropriate 
ways to frame issues. Meanwhile, online activist organizations like MoveOn give people—
indeed, many of the same people—opportunities to engage in activism. Quick and easy forms of 
activism, such as online petitions or donations, are nearly omnipresent. These organizations also 
use the internet to mobilize people for offline events like candlelight vigils and grassroots 
campaign work for Democratic candidates (Armstrong and Zuniga 2006). The progressive 
netroots serve as a “virtual clubhouse” (Bai 2007a) where like-minded people can connect 
despite being physically separated (Kerbel 2009). Until the internet provided the tools with 
which to form online progressive communities, many people endured under a cloud of perceived 
ideological isolation (Postmes and Brunsting 2002). By facilitating interaction and dialogue 
between progressives during the first decade of the twenty-first century, the netroots emboldened 
the movement at a time when public dissent from the president’s pro-war agenda was seen as 
unpatriotic (Armstrong and Zuniga 2006; Kerbel 2009). 
MOVEON’S POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES 
 MoveOn’s underlying political and organizational philosophies reflected its status as a 
leader of the progressive netroots. Its approach to politics emphasized reform-oriented grassroots 
activism that was issue-focused rather than exclusively partisan in nature. Moreover, MoveOn’s 
organizational philosophy was deeply influenced by the decentralized, multivocal structure of the 
internet. 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: PRAGMATIC PROGRESSIVISM 
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 MoveOn’s approach to activism was based on a philosophy I refer to as pragmatic 
progressivism3. Pragmatism is a distinctly American philosophy that judges the value of ideas by 
how successfully they can be implemented in the real world. Thus, a pragmatic approach to 
politics would judge the value of a political idea by how it could actually be implemented to 
improve citizens’ daily lives, not by some sense of intrinsic value located in the idea itself 
(Feffer 1993). For example, pragmatists would argue that a law that sets a timetable for 
withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is ultimately more valuable than adherence to general 
proclamations about the need for world peace, because it puts forth an implementable plan of 
action, not merely an idealistic principle. Early pragmatists like William James and George 
Herbert Mead, were connected to the first Progressive movement and, of course, developed 
foundational social psychological analyses that inspired the development of symbolic 
interactionism. The Progressive movement found in pragmatists a shared affinity for empirically 
grounded knowledge, and likewise believed that philosophical truisms about the inherent value 
of each human life were only useful if they oriented peoples’ actions toward improving the lives 
of those around them (Feffer 1993). 
 As I mentioned above, the current progressive movement is inspired in part by the earlier 
Progressives’ efforts to use knowledge to help the downtrodden in the face of corporate 
dominance and government corruption. At the same time, progressives learned from the 
dissolution of the New Left movements that taking ideological stances without developing 
pragmatic strategies for implementing changes will eventually fracture a social movement 
(Ayers 2001; Gitlin 1987; O’Neill 2001). Indeed, several of the veteran activists I met in 
MoveOn experienced this ideological fragmentation as young activists in the 1960s, and did not 
                                                
3 The term “pragmatic progressivism” is not an entirely new creation on my part, although to my knowledge I am 
the first to apply it to MoveOn. It has also been used to describe President Obama’s combination of progressive 
ideals and willingness to negotiate compromises that will ultimately be signed into law (Crauderueff 2009). 
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want to see the same thing happen to the progressive movement. One such veteran activist 
epitomized pragmatic progressivism when he described his participation in MoveOn as an 
attempt “to find a way of being practical without ceasing to be radical.” As I discovered through 
my participant observation, this balance of progressive principles and pragmatic political 
strategizing appealed to two groups: movement activists who were tired of being ideologically 
pure but politically ineffective, and Democrats who had become increasingly disenchanted with 
trying to bring about change through the party apparatus. 
 Progressives believe that “society works well only when it has a sense of community, an 
understanding that we are all interdependent on one another,… and that we look out for those 
who can’t take care of themselves” (Lux 2009:3-4). They view the government as a nurturing 
parent who should provide equal care and opportunities for all of its children (Lakoff 2004). In 
practice, this translates into support for universal health care, investment in education, 
environmental protection, withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, protection of civil 
liberties, and increased oversight of banks and corporations (Congressional Progressive Caucus 
2005; Lakoff 2004). More specifically, MoveOn’s agenda focused on ending the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, advocating for universal health care, supporting clean and renewable energies, and 
developing an economic recovery plan that helped the unemployed and held bankers accountable 
for unethical practices (MoveOn.org 2008a, 2009a). To achieve these goals, MoveOn supported 
policies that aligned with progressive principles and had a realistic chance of passing. As one 
field organizer told me, MoveOn’s approach was to “not let the perfect be the enemy of the 
good.” This phrase captures the essence of pragmatic progressivism: taking principled positions, 
but also being willing to make certain concessions to get bills passed that at least moved the 
country in the right direction.  
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 The current incarnation of the progressive movement has been tempered by lessons learned 
through the dissolution of ideologically rigid social movements, and has likewise been shaped by 
the reality of a strong conservative countermovement that has restricted the progressive 
movement’s ability to translate principled political positions into national policies. In short, the 
progressive movement has adapted to the realities of its historical circumstances, and has 
attempted to make positive changes—or, at times, at least prevent further negative changes—
given the “political opportunities” provided it (McAdam 1999).  
ORGANIZATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: “THE MOVE ON WAY” 
 MoveOn outlined its approach to political organizing in a document entitled “The MoveOn 
Way” which, in combination with observations from my ethnographic experience, forms the 
basis for all statements made about MoveOn’s organizational philosophy in this section 
(MoveOn.org 2009b). In this unsigned document, MoveOn described itself as “an experiment in 
radical decentralization.” MoveOn’s founders intentionally designed it as a virtual organization 
with no physical headquarters, unlike most political organizations that have headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. Staff members were even required to work in separate places if they lived in 
the same city. This model avoided “power centers,” where a few leaders dictated the 
organization’s path, in order to establish a more democratic, non-hierarchical leadership structure 
in which any staff member could propose an issue campaign. Furthermore, by “embedding” staff 
in communities like journalists embedded with troops at war, MoveOn believed that its staff kept 
in touch with the concerns of ordinary citizens. 
 This concern for remaining connected to everyday life reflected MoveOn’s view of its 
members as intelligent and resourceful individuals who were capable of making good decisions, 
given adequate information and opportunities to act. MoveOn saw itself as simply “providing an 
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important service to citizens who are trying to figure out how to be politically effective.” This 
service orientation to political activism balanced a member-driven agenda with staff-level 
strategic decision making. Members voted each year on MoveOn’s agenda, and were frequently 
contacted for feedback about issues or recent events. Staff members planned MoveOn’s overall 
strategy, and decided which tactics would be used to advocate for each issue. For major 
campaigns, like a get-out-the-vote program or its anti-war efforts, MoveOn’s board of directors 
and staff would “meet” (usually via phone and/or computer) to develop its long-term strategic 
vision. Staff members also made strategic decisions on the fly when sudden events, like the death 
of a political leader or a natural disaster, changed the nation’s priorities. MoveOn’s balanced 
approach to political organizing was based on the belief that “good leadership must develop a 
sense of mission and strategy, but be grounded in a real, on-going, two-way relationship with 
constituents.” 
 Lastly, MoveOn maintained a “nimble” organizational model that allowed it to work 
efficiently with minimal overhead costs. Its staff grew from five members in 2003 to 
approximately thirty by the end of the decade, which was still relatively small for a group that 
represented over five million people and frequently raised millions of dollars. It also relied upon 
volunteers to maintain its website and to run many aspects of the council system. When 
necessary, MoveOn contracted with other organizations on a campaign-by-campaign basis to do 
jobs it could not do using only hired staff. To create television advertisements, for example, it 
used a progressive-leaning media corporation called Fenton Communications, and to run the 
MoveOn council field operation it used field organizers from Grassroots Campaigns, 
Incorporated.  By keeping itself nimble in this way, MoveOn was able to respond quickly to the 
changing political scene while ensuring that most of its members’ contributions went toward 
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issues and candidates that they supported.   
THE MOVEON STORY 
 In some ways, MoveOn’s founders set out with these political and organizational 
philosophies in mind when they began the organization. However, at that time they could not 
have anticipated that MoveOn would become one of the most influential and innovative 
organizations in a renewed progressive movement. To show how this transformation occurred 
and give some historical context for my research, I will outline the major events that have 
defined MoveOn. 
“CENSURE AND MOVE ON” 
 Wes Boyd and Joan Blades, the Berkeley, California, couple who started MoveOn, were 
not particularly political: Blades was an artist and lawyer, while Boyd was a computer whiz who 
founded a software company with Blades called Berkeley Systems. They sold this company, best 
known for its “flying toasters” screensaver and the “You Don’t Know Jack” computer quiz 
game, for $13.8 million in 1997, and were looking for a new venture by the fall of 1998 (Burress 
2003; Hurowitz 2007; Jacobson 2003). 
 Over lunch at a Berkeley Chinese restaurant, Boyd and Blades talked about their frustration 
with Congress’s seeming obsession with the lurid details of President Clinton’s affair with 
Monica Lewinsky. Boyd and Blades wanted Congress to get back to work on issues that actually 
affected Americans’ daily lives, and decided ordinary people needed a way to tell Congress to 
get back to work (Jordanov and Stevenson 2009). They developed a simple one-sentence e-mail 
telling Congress to “censure Bill Clinton and move on to more pressing issues facing the nation,” 
and forwarded it to a few friends on September 22, 1998 (Jordanov and Stevenson 2009; 
MoveOn.org 2008a). Over the next week, Boyd and Blades launched a website and registered 
 37 
MoveOn with the Federal Election Commission, deciding at the last minute to change the name 
from “Censure and Move On” (Federal Election Commission 1998). Their petition received 
100,000 “signatures” (names added to the bottom of the message) by the end of this first week, 
and eventually hit 350,000 by December of 1998 (Hurowitz 2007; Lyman 1998). Wisely, the 
couple kept track of the names and e-mail addresses of the petition signers. 
 Although there were at least thirty websites dedicated to opposing Clinton’s impeachment 
in late 1998, MoveOn quickly distinguished itself by using its e-mail list to mobilize people for 
online and offline activism (Lyman 1998). Less than one month after creating their first online 
petition, Boyd and Blades asked members to call congressional representatives and urge them to 
vote against impeachment. Members made 17,000 calls to Congress, and asked for more ways to 
get involved (Lyman 1998). In response, Boyd and Blades mobilized over 2,000 members in 226 
congressional districts to deliver a total of 20,000 pages of petition signatures to their 
representatives (Brown 1998; Evangelista 1998). After the House of Representatives voted to 
impeach President Clinton, Boyd and Blades launched an online fundraising campaign in which 
18,500 members pledged $12.6 million and 850,000 volunteer hours to support candidates who 
ran against members of Congress who voted for impeachment (Healy 1999; Hurowitz 2007; 
Zetter 2004). After only three months in existence, MoveOn had already hit upon the 
combination of online and offline activism that would become its trademark. 
DISCOVERING ITS MISSION 
 By the end of 1998, MoveOn had 500,000 members, but it did not have an overarching 
mission. The next two years were a period of trial and error for MoveOn. Some petition 
campaigns were moderately successful, such as a gun control petition that accumulated 70,000 
signatures in the wake of the shooting at Columbine High School, but none of them matched the 
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performance of the original “censure and move on” petition (Hafner 1999). Perhaps most 
surprising was MoveOn’s silence during the controversial Florida vote recount and Supreme 
Court decision that followed the 2000 presidential election. Reflecting on this inaction, Boyd 
said, “We totally blew it. There was tremendous energy within our base, but we didn’t engage 
because I thought for sure that the system would work, that the wheels would turn and a fair 
result would be found. And I was wrong” (Goldberg 2003). Boyd and Blades had hit upon an 
effective model for internet-based political organizing, but their naiveté about how best to wield 
this powerful new tool was costing them members. In fact, by mid-2001 MoveOn’s membership 
had shrunk by half, and Boyd and Blades were seriously considering shutting down the 
organization (Hurowitz 2007; MoveOn.org 2008a).  
 Circumstances changed dramatically on September 11, 2001. In response to the terrorist 
attacks, Blades sent out a petition asking political leaders to “support justice, not escalating 
violence, which would only play into the terrorists’ hands” (York 2005:26). Like their earlier 
petition, this petition hit upon an exposed nerve in the American collective consciousness, and 
quickly received hundreds of thousands of signatures. Unbeknownst to Blades, a twenty-year-old 
recent college graduate in Boston named Eli Pariser had created a very similar online petition, 
asking international leaders to “use moderation and restraint in responding to the recent terrorist 
attacks” (Jordanov and Stevenson 2009). His petition accumulated an astounding 515,000 
signatures from 192 countries in only two weeks (Bernhard 2004; Jordanov and Stevenson 
2009). Peter Schurman, MoveOn’s executive director at the time, took notice of this success, and 
asked Pariser if he would like to join forces (and e-mail lists) with MoveOn (Harris 2001; 
Jordanov and Stevenson 2009). This merger gave MoveOn a much-needed shot in the arm, as it 
brought new members, new ideas, and a youthful enthusiasm to the organization. 
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 Over the next couple of years, MoveOn’s membership and influence grew as it became one 
of the most vocal opponents of President Bush’s plan to invade Iraq. At the time, MoveOn was 
one of the few political organizations openly opposing Bush’s doctrine of preemptive war, so it 
became a magnet for anti-war activists and progressives more generally. As people joined to 
express their opposition to the Bush administration, MoveOn’s membership skyrocketed to 1.7 
million by mid-2003, and reached 2.8 million by the end of 2004 (Jordanov and Stevenson 
2009).  
 MoveOn organized several bold and innovative actions that received a lot of press 
attention. As part of the Win Without War coalition, it helped plan the largest single-day protest 
in history, in which millions of people participated in 6,000 events in 130 countries to oppose the 
invasion of Iraq (Boyd 2003; MoveOn.org 2008a). In addition, over one million people called 
and e-mailed Congress as part of MoveOn’s “virtual march on Washington” in opposition to the 
Iraq war (MoveOn.org 2008a). Perhaps most innovative was MoveOn’s “virtual primary” in 
March 2003, in which nearly 318,000 people cast online “votes” for Democratic presidential 
candidates (Hickey 2004). Howard Dean’s victory in this online primary raised his public 
profile, and money and volunteers began to flood into his campaign (MoveOn.org 2008a). By the 
end of 2003, the combined successes of these events led one reporter to argue, “MoveOn has 
become the most important political advocacy group in Democratic circles—and arguably the 
most important in American politics” (Goldberg 2003). 
TIPPING POINT 
 MoveOn reached what co-founder Wes Boyd referred to as “a tipping point” in 2004 when 
it organized a well-funded and multi-pronged strategy to prevent George W. Bush from getting 
re-elected (Jordanov and Stevenson 2009). As part of this plan, it created the MoveOn Voter 
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Fund, a “527” organization that could raise and spend unlimited sums of money to work for or 
against (but not with) political candidates. The Voter Fund received $10 million in small 
donations and several large donations totaling $5 million from George Soros, a Hungarian-born 
human rights activist, and Peter Lewis, the founder of Progressive Insurance (Hamm 2008; 
Zetter 2004). With this money, MoveOn began running anti-Bush ads, prompting the Republican 
establishment and Fox News Channel to malign MoveOn as an extremist group funded by a 
foreigner who hated America and wanted to bring down the president (Jordanov and Stevenson 
2009).  
 As part of a contest called “Bush in 30 Seconds,” MoveOn asked members to create thirty-
second advertisements about Bush. Out of 1,500 submissions, two videos compared Bush to 
Adolf Hitler, adding fuel to the claims that MoveOn was an extremist organization (Fouhy 2004; 
Hamm 2008). MoveOn’s winning ad, entitled “Child’s Pay,” depicted children working to pay 
off the nation’s one trillion dollar deficit (YouTube 2008). This ad received a great deal of 
coverage after CBS refused to air it during the 2004 Super Bowl (Karr 2004). This controversial 
decision resulted in countless free airings on the news, leading one political expert to suggest that 
the ad “achieved the most air time with the least dollars expended of any ad in the history of the 
republic” (MoveOn.org 2008a). The controversy also brought greater attention to MoveOn and 
swelled its ranks by 40,000 new members (Hamm 2008). 
 Throughout the summer and fall of 2004, MoveOn organized several ambitious offline 
actions. These included nationwide bake sales that raised $750,000 for John Kerry, thousands of 
house parties where members pledged to see Michael Moore’s documentary, Fahrenheit 9/11, 
and even a national concert tour called “Vote for Change” that traveled to battleground states to 
energize young voters (Brownstein 2004; Jordanov and Stevenson 2009; MoveOn.org 2008a). 
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The biggest element of MoveOn’s 2004 election strategy was its get-out-the-vote program, 
“Leave No Voter Behind.” This program was designed to turn out swing voters and infrequent 
Democratic voters (people who rarely voted but supported Democrats when they did) in 
seventeen battleground states.  
 With $5 million in member donations, MoveOn hired five hundred field organizers from 
Grassroots Campaigns, Incorporated, a for-profit company that exclusively trained progressive 
political organizers. These organizers were placed in battleground states by late summer, only 
eight weeks after the program was proposed (Hurowitz 2007). The field organizers taught door-
to-door voter outreach tactics to local MoveOn members, and trained them on MoveOn’s online 
voter database, dubbed the “Web Action Center.” Using this system, members downloaded 
contact information for targeted voters in their neighborhoods, scripts for communicating with 
voters, and informational flyers about John Kerry and George W. Bush. After contacting voters, 
members uploaded their results back into the system. In total, over 70,000 members (including 
myself) knocked on over six million doors and turned out over 500,000 Kerry voters in 
battleground states (MoveOn.org 2008a). Although Kerry lost the election, “Leave No Voter 
Behind” increased turnout among Kerry supporters in battleground states by nine percent over 
predicted turnout rates (Middleton and Green 2008). 
 By the end of the 2004 election season, MoveOn was undeniably one of the most powerful 
progressive organizations in the country. In total, MoveOn raised $50 million in online 
contributions averaging less than $75, spent $40 million on political ads, and donated millions of 
dollars to congressional candidates and John Kerry (Jordanov and Stevenson 2009; Reilly 2004). 
As a recognized leader on the left, it had also become a primary target for derision and outright 
attacks by conservative political leaders and news commentators. Despite its high profile and 
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large membership, MoveOn’s future was uncertain in light of Bush’s re-election. 
RECLAIMING CONGRESS 
 Almost immediately after the 2004 election, MoveOn members told organizational leaders 
that they wanted to focus on taking control of Congress in 2006 (MoveOn.org 2008a). However, 
this was not the only issue of concern to MoveOn between 2004 and 2006. MoveOn allied with 
other progressive groups to successfully oppose Bush’s attempt to privatize Social Security, 
organized candlelight vigils to protest the Iraq war and memorialize those who were killed, and 
continued to mobilize members for online and offline actions of all sorts, including humanitarian 
efforts (MoveOn.org 2008a). When a tsunami killed hundreds of thousands of people in 
southeast Asia in December of 2004, members donated $2.4 million to help survivors (Hurowitz 
2007). Likewise, when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, MoveOn set up a 
website called HurricaneHousing.org where MoveOn members offered temporary housing to 
displaced residents. Within two weeks of the disaster, over 30,000 evacuees had been placed in 
housing through the program (Jordanov and Stevenson 2009). 
 Though these efforts were admirable, MoveOn’s ultimate concern was to end Republican 
control of Congress. It strategically targeted “second-tier races,” battles for seats that mainstream 
Democratic leaders believed were unwinnable. This forced Republicans to spend resources on 
races that they thought were safe, and prevented MoveOn from simply repeating the efforts of 
Democratic Party volunteers in a few key races. In May, MoveOn raised $250,000 overnight and 
channeled thousands of volunteers into the campaign of Ned Lamont, an anti-war Democrat who 
was challenging Senator Joe Lieberman in the Connecticut primary (Holland 2006; Hurowitz 
2007). Though he lost to Lieberman (who ran as an Independent) in the general election, 
Lamont’s primary victory proved MoveOn was capable of influencing elections (Jordanov and 
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Stevenson 2009). This symbolic victory excited MoveOn’s membership and served as “proof of 
concept” for its get-out-the-vote program, “Call for Change.” 
 “Call for Change” was a “liquid phone banking” system that allowed members in non-
competitive districts to call targeted voters in competitive districts (MoveOn.org 2006). MoveOn 
opened temporary phone banking offices, encouraged members to attend “calling parties,” and 
set up an innovative online system that provided the names and phone numbers of targeted voters 
to members who wanted to make calls from home. This system utilized the full force of 
MoveOn’s national membership by allowing members who otherwise would not have been able 
to volunteer for competitive races to pour their energy into districts where it was most needed. In 
total, MoveOn members made seven million phone calls into sixty-three competitive 
congressional districts. On Election Day, the activity was so intense that members were making 
at least forty calls per second (MoveOn.org 2008a). Although the effects of the “Call for 
Change” program were never systematically analyzed, it seems certain that the program 
contributed to the Democrats’ resounding victory.  
CONTROVERSY AND VICTORY 
 Without missing a beat, MoveOn launched into the presidential campaign. It planned a 
series of “virtual town hall meetings,” where members met at house parties and watched 
Democratic presidential candidates field questions submitted by MoveOn members. The first 
virtual town hall focused on Iraq, while the second addressed candidate’s plans for a green 
energy economy (MoveOn.org 2008a). A third town hall focusing on health care was planned for 
the fall, but was canceled after MoveOn’s public image suffered from controversy surrounding 
an ad it placed in The New York Times on September 10, 2007.  
 The ad, headlined “General Petraeus or General Betray Us?,” accused General David 
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Petraeus, then commander of troops in Iraq, of “cooking the books for the White House” by 
skewing statistics to make it appear that the situation in Iraq was improving (MoveOn.org 2007). 
Republican presidential candidates and members of Congress immediately demanded that 
Democrats denounce the ad and return funds they received from MoveOn (Bash, Preston, and 
Mooney 2007; TheWashingtonPost.com 2007). By the end of the month, both the House and 
Senate had voted to formally condemn the ad (Sanner 2007; Taylor 2007). Many MoveOn 
members donated millions of dollars in an unsolicited show of support (Jordanov and Stevenson 
2009), while others unsubscribed from the e-mail list in protest. Recognizing that the controversy 
had divided its members and soiled its reputation, MoveOn chose to lay low for a while. 
 By early 2008, MoveOn was back in the game. In February, 70% of members voted to 
endorse Barack Obama as the Democratic presidential candidate (MoveOn.org 2008a). It ran 
another member-created ad contest, called “Obama in 30 Seconds,” and targeted John McCain 
with ads and events that framed him as a continuation of George W. Bush (MoveOn.org 2008a, 
b). MoveOn planned to combine the best aspects of “Leave No Voter Behind” and “Call for 
Change” in its 2008 get-out-the-vote program, but realized this effort would be redundant after 
seeing how Obama’s plan mimicked MoveOn’s online and offline organizing model (a point I 
discuss in more detail in Chapter Eight). It quickly switched gears and became a “recruitment 
engine” for Obama’s campaign. MoveOn asked members to volunteer for Obama and call other 
members to encourage them to do the same. In total, MoveOn recruited nearly one million 
volunteers who worked a total of 20.8 million hours for Obama. Members also donated over $88 
million to Obama’s campaign, and registered 500,000 young voters in battleground states 
(MoveOn.org 2008b). 
THE OBAMA ERA 
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 Obama’s victory was sweet for MoveOn, but it also posed a challenge: could an 
organization that was built through opposition to President Bush continue to grow under a 
president whose agenda largely coincided with its own (Davis 2009)? As the Obama era dawned, 
MoveOn repositioned itself as a watchdog that would keep Obama and the Democrats in 
Congress accountable for the changes they promised. In the first two years of Obama’s 
presidency, MoveOn lobbied hard for healthcare reform, and celebrated when Obama signed the 
reform bill in March of 2010 (3/26/10 e-mail)4. On the other hand, it criticized Obama’s 
decisions to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and to open up more of America’s 
coastline to offshore oil drilling (12/1/09 and 4/2/10 e-mails). MoveOn also responded to the oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in the summer of 2010 by organizing vigils and asking members to 
call Congress demanding that the cost of the cleanup be covered by BP (6/5/10 and 6/1/10 e-
mails).  
 MoveOn’s 2010 get-out-the-vote program incorporated its “liquid phone banking” 
technology from 2006 with its focus on being a “recruitment engine” for existing Democratic 
grassroots volunteering efforts (9/7/10 e-mail). It recruited thousands of members to canvass for 
Democrats in competitive races, and singled out four “Progressive Heroes”—Senator Barbara 
Boxer, Senator Russ Feingold, Representative Alan Grayson, and Representative Tom 
Perriello—for extra donations and volunteers (9/15/10 e-mail). However, unlike the previous two 
elections, MoveOn did not have the tide of public opinion in its favor. Conservatives and 
moderates were increasingly critical of Democrats’ attempts at health care reform, and approval 
ratings for Obama and Congress were slipping among even liberal Democrats (Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press 2010). Moreover, the Tea Party movement had rallied 
                                                
4 All referenced MoveOn e-mail messages are listed chronologically in the References section, after the 
alphabetically listed references. 
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conservative voters and successfully defeated several Republicans in the primaries. In the end, 
the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives, and three of MoveOn’s four 
“Progressive Heroes” (save Barbara Boxer) were defeated (11/3/10 e-mail).  
 Though MoveOn remained one of the leading progressive organizations and claimed five 
million members across all congressional districts (MoveOn.org 2011), this resounding defeat 
punched holes in the illusion that MoveOn and other netroots organizations were ushering in an 
era of progressive political dominance. In the wake of the 2010 election, MoveOn’s status was 
uncertain: had it passed its peak of effectiveness and begun a slow slide toward irrelevance, or 
was it merely experiencing a minor speed bump in its continued progression toward ever-more 
innovative political uses for internet-based technologies?  
“OPERATION DEMOCRACY”: MOVEON’S COUNCIL SYSTEM 
 Underlying much of MoveOn’s election work and other offline activism from 2005 onward 
was the MoveOn council system, which until the summer of 2008 was referred to as “Operation 
Democracy5.” This council system was central to my research, as it was the primary avenue for 
meeting other MoveOn members face-to-face, and it allowed me to advance to higher-level 
volunteer positions that opened up opportunities to interview members of MoveOn’s staff. 
Because of its importance both to MoveOn’s offline activism and my research, I will briefly 
describe the council system’s emergence, organizational structure, and functionality. 
  Operation Democracy was rolled out in March 2005 to channel the energy of “Leave No 
Voter Behind” into an enduring local-level organizing structure. It was originally envisioned as a 
progressive countermobilization in response to Karl Rove’s proclamation that the Republicans 
were initiating a “permanent campaign” in which the fundraising, volunteer activism, and issue 
                                                
5 The name was changed to simply “MoveOn councils” in May 2008 because MoveOn’s field directors realized that 
members were confused by the “Operation Democracy” moniker, and this made recruitment to the councils more 
difficult because people did not associate “Operation Democracy” with MoveOn (5/1/08 e-mail). 
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framing that normally took place during campaign season would be undertaken indefinitely 
(3/3/05 e-mail). As of 2008, MoveOn had approximately 200 councils across the country. An 
exact number of participants was unavailable, but one field organizer I interviewed estimated 
that no more than one percent of MoveOn members participated in councils. This translates to a 
maximum of 50,000 council members, though based on my experience reviewing councils as a 
regional coordinator, I suspect the actual number was closer to 25,000 listed members. 
Moreover, many people who were on the council rosters did not actually participate in actions. 
Taking this fact into account, I estimate the number of active council members was 
approximately 10,000 across the whole country, which means far less than one percent of 
MoveOn’s reported five million members were responsible for organizing the vast majority of its 
offline actions. My experiences as a council member and regional coordinator, as well as 
interviews with staff and volunteers involved in the councils, form the basis for much of my 
knowledge of MoveOn’s council system. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY 
 Although MoveOn’s overall organizational structure was inspired by the non-hierarchical 
network structure of the internet, it did exert considerable strategic control over the goals and 
tactics of online and offline activism. This top-down strategic control was readily apparent in the 
hierarchical organizational structure of MoveOn’s council system. Only three MoveOn staffers 
ran the field operation: a field director, deputy field director, and behind-the-scenes tech guru 
who kept all of the online council tools working. They decided how to best utilize the councils to 
advance MoveOn’s agenda each month, and developed all of the necessary tools to make this a 
reality.  
 Directly below them was a team of paid field organizers who relayed the strategic vision 
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and action plans to regional coordinators. From November 2005 to March 2009, approximately 
twenty field organizers worked on one- or two-year contracts from GCI. As of March 2009, 
MoveOn added twelve full-time field organizers to its staff to provide more long-term stability to 
its field operations. Field organizers were responsible for overseeing teams of five to seven 
“regional coordinators” (discussed below). Each week the organizers ran team conference calls 
as well as one-on-one “indy” calls with each regional coordinator. On these calls, they informed 
regional coordinators about MoveOn’s upcoming action plans, set weekly goals for recruitment 
and event organizing, and discussed the outcomes of events to assess what worked and what 
could be improved. Field organizers routinely worked sixty hours during a normal week and up 
to one hundred hours per week at the height of election season, even though they were only paid 
$25,000-$30,000 per year. The demands of the job and the low pay meant that only young, 
energetic, idealistic people without families took on the task. 
 As mentioned above, regional coordinators populated the next stratum in the council 
system. There were roughly seventy regional coordinators spread across the country during the 
time I held the position in 2008. Regional coordinators functioned like middle managers in the 
MoveOn council system: they were not involved in national-level strategic decision making, but 
were responsible for translating strategy into implementable actions at the local level. They were 
unpaid MoveOn members who helped build new councils, helped existing councils execute 
offline events, and recruited active members for leadership roles in the councils. Regional 
coordinators also held conference calls after each event to gather feedback from hosts and 
attendees, including suggestions for improvement that were relayed to MoveOn’s staff via the 
field organizers (MoveOn.org 2009c). Each regional coordinator oversaw roughly three to five 
councils that were often spread across multiple states (hence the “regional” part of regional 
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coordinating). To help recruit new council leaders, build new councils, and provide council 
leaders with contact information for members in their areas, regional coordinators had access to 
several online databases that included rich details about each member’s previous types of 
participation. If I wanted to find someone who might be a good candidate to start a new council, 
for example, I could search for members by ZIP code and see the number of petition signatures, 
phone calls, and events that were attributable to each member. This system allowed regional 
coordinators to conduct targeted recruiting for council leaders, core members, and event hosts. 
 “Coordinating councils” populated the ground level of the council system. At the helm of 
each was the council coordinator, a local volunteer who spent twelve to fifteen hours per month 
(and often more, especially during election seasons) overseeing the running of the council. The 
council coordinator recruited and trained members of the council leadership team, found 
organizers for local events, and prepped and debriefed organizers before and after each event 
(MoveOn.org 2009d). Media and recruitment coordinators rounded out the council leadership 
team. The media coordinator contacted local reporters, sent out press advisories before each 
event, and functioned as spokesperson if reporters wanted a statement about the event 
(MoveOn.org 2009e). The recruitment coordinator contacted local MoveOn members to recruit 
them for events, and attempted to recruit new council members by asking event attendees to join 
the council (MoveOn.org 2009f). Beneath the leadership team was the council core, a group of 
committed members who supplemented the work of council leaders by occasionally hosting 
events, providing materials like candles or signs for events, and contacting the media or local 
MoveOn members (MoveOn.org 2009g). 
COUNCILS OFFLINE AND ONLINE 
 Each council had an offline and online presence. Ideally, councils were supposed to hold 
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monthly meetings where leaders and core members discussed that month’s action plan and 
delegated responsibilities for hosting, recruiting, contacting the media, and whatever else was 
necessary to make an event happen. In practice, meetings did not take place monthly, if at all. 
Council leaders and core members were often working at least part-time and/or going to school, 
and therefore were unable or unwilling to carve out an evening for these meetings. Instead, 
council leaders and occasionally one or two core members or event hosts held conference calls to 
plan events.  
 Even though a major part of the council strategy was to recruit new members by asking 
them to host events, in my experience well over half of all events were hosted by council leaders 
or core members. The rest were “pop-up” events hosted by people who were not members of the 
council. Council and regional coordinators encouraged these hosts to join or form a council, but 
most were one-time hosts. During my tenure as regional coordinator, I attempted to recruit 
several pop-up hosts for council leadership positions. However, once I explained the 
responsibilities and time commitment of these roles, these pop-up hosts either directly refused 
the roles or simply stopped responding to my e-mails and calls. This lack of stable council 
leadership and consistent event hosts meant that the week leading up to an event was usually a 
mad scramble to find hosts, get events posted online so nearby members could find them and 
RSVP, and call through lists of often well over one hundred local members to ensure people 
would show up at the event. This hectic pace frequently led to burnout and turnover among 
council leaders and core members. 
 The online component of the council system was much more organized. The main 
Operation Democracy website, for example, allowed members to search for councils near their 
ZIP codes, and provided extensive information about the function and organizational structure of 
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councils. For council coordinators and other leaders, the website provided step-by-step training 
guides for each leadership role, along with guides for leadership tasks like delegating 
responsibility and holding people accountable. Each council also had its own home page where 
members could check out upcoming events and contact other council members, either 
individually or as a group. The council page also provided links to materials pertaining to the 
current month’s event, and an archive of materials from previous events. These materials 
included an explanation of MoveOn’s positions on relevant issues, guidelines for making events 
successful, talking points and a media advisory template for framing the event’s message, and 
signs and other materials for members to bring to the event. This wealth of materials made it 
easy for even the most inexperienced activists to hold successful events. 
MOVEON MEMBERS 
 Because so much of my research focuses on members’ experiences, it is important to 
briefly describe MoveOn members demographically and to provide a typology of participation. 
Despite keeping detailed data on members’ levels of activity and issues of interest, MoveOn had 
no statistical data on members’ demographic characteristics. I therefore relied upon ethnographic 
observation and several other data sources to create a composite sketch of MoveOn’s 
membership base. 
MEMBER DEMOGRAPHICS 
 During my four years of participant observation, most of the members I met were white, 
middle-class or above, and college educated. Many had Bachelor’s degrees, and quite a few had 
post-graduate degrees. There were roughly equal numbers of men and women, and a sizable 
minority of gay men and lesbians. Some middle-aged people were very active, but the most 
active people were generally split into younger (20-35) and older (60+) crowds. As discussed in 
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Chapter Five, members were split between “newcomers” who had little to no activist history and 
“veterans” who had extensive histories of activism. Most lived in modest homes and worked 
middle-class jobs, including several elementary school teachers, real estate agents, and freelance 
business consultants. The majority identified as Democrats for voting purposes, but considered 
themselves progressives first and foremost. More than any other feature, members shared outrage 
at the Bush administration’s foreign and domestic policies, most notably the invasion of Iraq. 
Other sociological studies involving MoveOn members have shown similar trends in the age, 
racial composition, gender ratio, and political identification of members (Heaney and Rojas 
2007; Rohlinger and Brown 2009). 
 To supplement my ethnographic observations, I sampled 1,400 names from a list of 11,335 
people who had contributed $200 to $5,000 to MoveOn during the 2007-2008 election cycle 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2009). This list was biased toward wealthier MoveOn members, 
but because MoveOn did not have official demographic data on members, it was the closest I 
could come to a membership list. The list included each contributor’s name, city of residence, 
occupation, and contribution amount. At least one contributor lived in every state except the 
Dakotas, but they were concentrated in California, New York, Massachusetts, Washington, and 
Texas. This top five reflected a general trend of more contributors coming from states Obama 
carried in 2008 with the exception of Texas, which most likely made the list simply by virtue of 
being the second most populous state in the country (United States Census Bureau 2009). 
Retirees, business people (self-employed and executives), educators (professors, teachers, and 
students), artists (including writers), and health and human service providers (physicians, 
psychologists, and nurses) dominated the list. This data generally reflected my ethnographic 
observations, although as would be expected, it underrepresented younger and less wealthy 
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members. 
 To crosscheck my ethnographic observations and qualitative data analysis, I examined two 
additional studies. A study of Howard Dean’s presidential campaign showed that Dean activists 
were whiter, wealthier, and more highly educated than both the general public and members of 
the Democratic Party. They identified as progressives more than Democrats, and were motivated 
by the Iraq war, universal health care, environmental protection, and other issues that reflected 
MoveOn’s agenda (MoveOn.org 2009a; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 
2005). Likewise, a poll of over 10,000 readers and contributors to the Daily Kos showed that 
they were more likely than the general U.S. population to be male, wealthy, white, and middle-
aged (median age of 45-49 years) (DrSteveB 2008). Overall, these studies reaffirmed by other 
findings, and showed that MoveOn’s membership reflected demographic trends within the 
progressive movement. 
 MoveOn members may be best described as “Political Influentials” (Graf and Darr 2004). 
Like MoveOn members, Political Influentials tend to be wealthy, highly educated, 
disproportionately white, and liberal (Darr and Graf 2007). They are well-informed and well-
connected citizens who are able to shape others’ perspectives on political issues (Graf and Darr 
2004; Keller and Berry 2003). A subset of Political Influentials, called “online political citizens,” 
rely primarily upon the internet to inform themselves about political issues, and attempt to 
persuade others through discussion boards and blogs. Online political citizens comprise only 
seven percent of the U.S. population, but exert disproportionate influence over online political 
opinion formation (Graf and Darr 2004). 
 In summary, MoveOn members were a well-informed and motivated group of Political 
Influentials who saw MoveOn as a way to channel their frustration with the Bush administration 
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into action. Although in some ways they represented a cross-section of the American population, 
in aggregate MoveOn members were wealthier, whiter, and more highly educated than the 
average American. In contrast to the image propagated by conservative commentators, MoveOn 
members were not extremists. In fact, they sought to improve the lives of Americans by working 
within the existing system. MoveOn was simply one avenue through with these informed and 
active citizens tried to effect change. They used the tools made available by MoveOn to connect 
with like-minded people and lobby the federal government. These people were not a threat to the 
conservative movement because of an extremist ideology. Rather, they constituted a threat 
because they were hubs of political influence both online and offline, and were embedded in 
networks of relatively powerful Americans. 
TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION 
 Technically, anyone who ever wound up on MoveOn’s e-mail list, whether by volition or 
accident, was considered a member. This meant that the “member” label itself did little to 
describe participants’ levels of action. To clarify, I present a typology of participation. Individual 
members often shifted between these levels or operated simultaneously in multiple categories, 
but the typology is nonetheless useful for describing the range of experiences that were available 
to MoveOn members.  
 At the lowest level of activity were e-mail recipients, people who were on the e-mail list 
but did not participate in online or offline activism. For these people, MoveOn may have 
functioned more like a news source than a portal for activism. I was unable to interview any 
members at this level because I could not contact them at events, and none responded to 
interview solicitations I repeatedly posted online and around my university campus. Ironically, 
these people simultaneously made up the majority of MoveOn’s reported five million members, 
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and were probably the least likely to identify as members. 
 One step above recipients were online activists, people whose primary or exclusive 
methods of participation were petitions, donations, and other forms of online activity. Online 
activists varied greatly in their levels of response to MoveOn’s action requests: some signed 
nearly every e-petition or frequently sent money, while others were more selective. I interviewed 
fourteen online activists, and discovered that they did not participate in offline events for one of 
two reasons: 1) they had family or work obligations that prevented them from attending public 
events; or 2) they were anxious about publicly associating themselves with MoveOn. The latter 
was especially true for people who lived in areas where progressive political views were 
unpopular.  
 Local activists were members who participated in offline events but did not take on 
leadership roles. Some attended one or two events, while others became “regulars” in the local 
MoveOn scene and were entrusted with minor tasks, like handing out candles at vigils. I 
participated at this level for roughly two years while doing my research. During that time, I met 
hundreds of other local activists, and interviewed twelve of them. I found that some people 
participated as local activists for years, but this level of activity was more often transitory. 
Several people who engaged in one or two offline actions did not enjoy the experience or 
realized they did not have the time to commit to the effort, and thus became online activists. 
Other local activists who were enthusiastic and reliable were recruited to leadership positions 
and became local organizers.  
 Local organizers often got their start when a council coordinator asked them to host an 
event. If they organized a successful event, they were asked to join their local council’s 
leadership team. In this role, they worked with a small group of other local organizers (usually 
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between two and five others) who made decisions about where to hold events, who would host 
these events, and other decisions regarding the delegation of organizing tasks. I worked as a local 
organizer for approximately one year. This role gave me insight into how MoveOn coordinated 
offline events, and helped me arrange interviews with six local organizers. 
 The highest volunteer position open to MoveOn members was the regional coordinator 
role. Regional coordinators were usually recruited from the ranks of local organizers by 
MoveOn’s paid field organizers, although local organizers could recommended local activists for 
the position. As described in the overview of MoveOn’s council system, regional coordinators 
built new councils, and helped existing councils organize events and recruit new members. I 
served as a regional coordinator from April to December of 2008. From this vantage point, I got 
an inside look at MoveOn’s national field operation, and made contact with thirty-five regional 
coordinators, eighteen of whom I interviewed.  
 Above the regional coordinators were members of MoveOn’s paid staff. Field organizers 
trained regional coordinators and provided them with a bigger picture perspective on how their 
individual organizing efforts related to MoveOn’s overall strategic vision. They reported to the 
national leadership team, a small staff of men and women who were mostly in their twenties and 
thirties. This team planned MoveOn’s overall strategy, decided which tactics to use for each 
issue campaign, and wrote the e-mails sent out to MoveOn’s five million members. Most had 
worked for other political organizations before MoveOn, and several started up new activist 
organizations after leaving MoveOn. Through my work as a regional coordinator, I made contact 
with twelve field organizers and six members of MoveOn’s national leadership team. I was able 
to interview four field organizers and three current or former staff members. 
CONCLUSION 
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 MoveOn must be understood as only one participant in a continuing struggle between 
progressive and conservative forces in the United States. It emerged at a time when the internet 
was just beginning to become the ubiquitous communication tool it is today, and its founders had 
the knowledge and opportunity to pioneer new ways to use this tool to mobilize citizens for 
political activism. While remaining rooted in the pragmatic and progressive vision of its 
predecessors, MoveOn continued to develop innovative ways to get people involved in the 
democratic process. Its service orientation to members and opt-in model of activism allowed 
members to choose their level of participation and remain connected to the organization even 
when they were not participating at all. In the next chapter, I outline my methods of data 
collection and analysis, and then dedicate Chapters Four through Eight to descriptions of the 
interpretive processes occurring both within and outside of MoveOn. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss why I used an ethnographic approach to study MoveOn. In 
addition, I explain how I entered the setting, negotiated my roles within the organization, and 
eventually disengaged from it. Along with recounting my experiences and a participant observer, 
I describe how I collected data through other ethnographic approaches and how I analyzed this 
data. At the end of the chapter, I address some difficulties I experienced while researching 
MoveOn. 
THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PROCESS 
 The essential premise of ethnography is that the best way to understand a social group is to 
become part of it, participating, observing, and asking questions along the way. As Blumer 
(1969) and others (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Johnson 1975; Prus 1991) noted, an ethnographic 
approach allows the researcher access to the symbolic meaning making processes by which 
participants in a setting understand themselves and their environment. The goal of this method is 
to achieve “analytical realism” (Altheide and Johnson 1994), an account of the setting and its 
participants that approximates as closely as possible the “reality” of the setting as it is 
constructed by those who participate within it. To accomplish this level of realism, 
ethnographers strive for what Geertz (1983) called “thick description,” a deep and detailed 
record of their interactions, emotions, and observations while in the setting. Successful 
ethnographers achieve an “empathic understanding” (Johnson 1975) of what it is like to be a 
normal member of the group they are studying. This understanding is achieved by immersing 
yourself into the setting completely, sharing a sore back or a broken heart with people who once 
you may have thought of as “participants” but now you know as friends and colleagues. This 
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deep understanding increases the validity and credibility of researchers’ claims because it assures 
that their conclusions are grounded in the lived reality of the group, not abstract notions of what 
might be happening therein (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Hammersley 2002). 
 My research interests in MoveOn were best addressed by achieving an “intimate 
familiarity” (Blumer 1969) with the organization and its members through participation in online 
and offline activism. After volunteering for “Leave No Voter Behind,” MoveOn’s get-out-the-
vote effort for John Kerry in 2004, I was intrigued by the way the organization seamlessly 
intertwined traditional grassroots activism with innovative online voter outreach tools. In this 
program, volunteers could print out lists of targeted voters in their neighborhoods, spend the day 
talking face-to-face with these neighbors, and return home to uploaded the results of these 
conversations to a centralized database. I was intrigued by this marriage of tradition and 
technology, and wondered if it was effective in getting more people involved in political action 
and, ultimately, in influencing elections. 
GETTING IN 
 By the time I entered graduate school in the fall of 2003, the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq had politicized American culture and polarized public opinion 
(Dodson 2010; Layman et al. 2006). I wanted to be involved in the emerging anti-war 
movement, but realized that completion of my doctoral degree needed to be my priority. To 
accommodate both desires, I decided to choose a dissertation topic that allowed me to participate 
in activism while conducting research. During this period—I do not recall exactly when (a 
common experience among MoveOn members, as I discovered)—I signed up to receive 
MoveOn’s e-mail messages, which at the time were focused almost exclusively on the Iraq war 
and the upcoming presidential election. I remained simply an e-mail recipient and occasional 
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online activist until August 2004, when a local MoveOn organizer called me out of the blue and 
asked if I would be interested in getting involved in “Leave No Voter Behind.” I gladly accepted 
this opportunity to help John Kerry defeat George W. Bush, but did not think about MoveOn as a 
research topic at the time. 
 I became a “precinct leader” for MoveOn, which meant (at least in theory) I was in charge 
of organizing other MoveOn members in my neighborhood to go door-to-door and encourage 
people to vote for John Kerry. In reality, I had moved into the neighborhood just one month 
earlier and knew no one, so I took it upon myself to canvass the neighborhood alone. For 
months, I walked around and knocked on strangers’ doors or called people when it was too dark 
or cold to be canvassing. On Election Day 2004, I worked all day in frigid weather to make sure 
that all of the people I had contacted through calls and canvassing actually voted. Somewhere in 
the midst of my election work, I began wondering why people like myself were dedicating long 
hours to an organization that existed almost exclusively in the cloudy realm of cyberspace. Why 
was I so diligently canvassing and reporting my results to this faceless entity, MoveOn? Why 
were so many other people sending twenty, fifty, even hundreds of dollars to a group whose 
leaders they had never even seen, let alone met? What drove this commitment to MoveOn? I 
decided to try to find out. 
 Nominal entry into MoveOn was actually quite simple. Technically, I became a “member” 
as soon as I signed up to receive MoveOn’s e-mails. This membership did not grant me access to 
anything except MoveOn’s e-mail messages that, while interesting in their own right, did not 
constitute an ethnographic setting. Unlike many online groups studied in virtual ethnographies, 
MoveOn did not have an online social space, such as a discussion board or interactive online 
“world,” in which members could participate and communicate (Carter 2005; Garcia et al. 2009; 
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Hampton and Wellman 1999; Hine 2000, 2005; Hughey 2008; Ruhleder 2000). In order to begin 
participant observation, I had to become involved on the local level. My participation in “Leave 
No Voter Behind” should have given me an avenue to become integrated into MoveOn’s local 
“scene,” but it did not for two reasons. As I already mentioned, my lack of integration into my 
neighborhood meant that I did all of my canvassing alone and therefore did not form 
relationships with other local MoveOn members. Secondly, MoveOn’s intense local presence 
vanished after the election because it was dedicated solely to electing Kerry for president. 
MoveOn released the few organizers I had met during get-out-the-vote training. I tried to contact 
them, but their MoveOn e-mail addresses were no longer functional. I knew there had to be 
hundreds, if not thousands, of MoveOn members in the city, but I was at a loss as to how to 
contact them.  
 Finally, in March 2005 MoveOn invited members to attend house parties where they would 
meet to discuss the creation of “Operation Democracy,” a permanent campaign to push forward 
progressive issues and candidates. I jumped at the opportunity to meet a group of local MoveOn 
members, and attended a house party in my neighborhood. About twenty-five people crammed 
into the living room of a modest middle-class house, drinking wine from plastic cups and 
snacking on cheese and crackers. For about two hours we chatted, traded stories of post-election 
depression, and brainstormed ways that MoveOn could advance a progressive agenda during 
Bush’s second term. During a brainstorming session, I met a man who was recruiting MoveOn 
members for a locally-based version of MoveOn he had started with other members he met while 
working on the 2004 election. He invited me to a meeting of the organizing committee for this 
group, where I met two people who later became key informants. I attended several more 
meetings of this small group as well as other public events MoveOn organized in the spring of 
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2005.  
 After a few months of attending these events, I learned that they were being organized by a 
local MoveOn council, which included many of the most active MoveOn members in the area. I 
knew that I needed to integrate myself into this group in order to more fully understand how 
MoveOn worked, so I did what I could to ingratiate myself to council members. As Lofland et al. 
(2006) suggested, I began by taking on small responsibilities, like calling people to recruit them 
for events, bringing candles or signs to events, and helping event organizers carry tables and 
other materials to and from their cars. This helped me present myself as an honest, helpful 
member, and allowed me to initiate informal conversations that built rapport with local council 
leaders (Shaffir 1991). 
 Over the course of my four years of participant observation, my participation slowly 
increased from occasionally signing e-petitions to eventually being among the most active and 
highly responsible volunteers in the organization. From the time I signed up for MoveOn’s e-
mail until August 2004, I experienced what it felt like to be just another person on the e-mail list 
(indeed, as this was prior to my research, I was just another member). With my participation 
during the 2004 election season, I began my journey into MoveOn’s offline activism. From 2005 
through the first part of 2008, I was a core member of my local MoveOn council. In this role, I 
helped plan public events, such as anti-war vigils, sidewalk protests, and visits to congressional 
offices. I spoke at some events, made recruitment calls, brought supplies (candles, signs), and 
contacted the local media to get the word out about our events. During this period I also 
participated in MoveOn’s “Call for Change” campaign, in which members got together at houses 
or temporary phone banking offices to call into competitive congressional districts around the 
country and urge people to vote for the Democrats in the 2006 mid-term elections.  
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 Then, in April of 2008, a local MoveOn field organizer asked me if I would like to be a 
regional coordinator. This was still a volunteer position, but it involved much more responsibility 
than my council work, and provided opportunities to meet members of MoveOn’s paid staff. As 
a regional coordinator, I coordinated with MoveOn’s paid organizers to implement MoveOn’s 
goals and plans at the local level in the state in which I lived at the time. In practice, this meant 
twice-weekly conference calls with my field organizer and other regional coordinators, hours of 
calls trying to recruit people to host or attend events, and more calls to encourage active MoveOn 
members to form coordinating councils in places where none currently existed. I held this 
position until the end of November 2008, when I stepped down to focus on writing my 
dissertation. My participation has now come full circle, as I am once again an ordinary e-mail 
recipient. 
FINDING MY RESEARCH ROLE 
 Although my roles as a member of MoveOn shifted repeatedly over my four years of 
participation, my research role remained fairly consistent. From the beginning, I was open about 
my research interests with the local MoveOn members I met. In fact, I found that emphasizing 
my student status actually helped me build rapport with other members, unlike Shaffir (1991) 
and Thorne (1979) who discovered that their academic affiliations made members of their 
settings suspicious of their motives. In my case, introducing myself as a graduate student had 
several benefits. First, it allowed me to segue into a mention of my research on MoveOn, thus 
ensuring that I remained overt about my researcher status. Secondly, it helped other members 
relate to me, because most had completed at least four years of college, and quite a few had post-
graduate degrees. This made my research interest relatable to them, and made them generally 
more willing to participate in interviews. Lastly, by emphasizing my student status I positioned 
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myself as someone who desired to “learn the ropes” (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991) of grassroots 
activism. More experienced activists gladly took me under their wings and taught me how to 
obtain permits for our protests, how to contact local media, and other tricks of the trade. 
 In general, I took a “shallow cover” (Fine 1980) position in my research, meaning I 
announced my research intent whenever possible but did not disclose specifics about my 
research questions. To a great degree, this lack of specificity was due as much to the emergent 
nature of research interests in an ethnographic study as to my desire to keep my research goals 
secret. Later, after I had developed clearer research questions, I tended to speak about them only 
in broad terms when asked what I was researching. For example, rather than telling interview 
participants that I was hoping to compare their perceptions of MoveOn’s organizational identity 
with those presented in the news, I simply explained that I was seeing what members thought 
about the way MoveOn was portrayed in the news. These more general explanations of my 
research interests were practical, in that members did not speak “sociologese” and therefore 
would likely be confused by a detailed explanation, but they were also designed to prevent 
members from altering what they said or did out of concern that I was watching them.  
 Early on, I took an “active-member-researcher” role (Adler and Adler 1987) in MoveOn. I 
participated in all of the activities that ordinary members did, but I maintained an analytical 
skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the organization’s efforts. Although I shared the 
progressive worldview espoused by MoveOn, I was not convinced that e-petitions and 
candlelight vigils would have any influence at all upon the actions of the Bush administration or 
even public opinion. However, as my level of activity and responsibility increased over the 
years, I shifted closer to the “complete-member-researcher” (Adler and Adler 1987) end of the 
spectrum. Though I always maintained an awareness that I was ultimately participating in 
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MoveOn as a researcher, I internalized the role obligations of my position as a regional 
coordinator. In Snow, Benford, and Anderson’s (1986) terms, I became an “ardent activist,” 
enjoying the rights of access inherent to my membership role while experiencing the burden of 
its responsibility and consequent joy or guilt depending on the outcomes of my actions as a 
regional coordinator (see also Gans 1982; Thorne 1979). 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Along with participant observation, I conducted semi-structured interviews and collected 
many documents produced by or pertaining to MoveOn in an attempt to “triangulate” (Denzin 
1989) my data. After briefly addressing each data source, I discuss the analytical approaches I 
used to turn the mountain of empirical data into conceptually useful material. 
Participant Observation 
 My decision to engage in participant observation of MoveOn was somewhat 
“opportunistic” (Reimer 1977) in nature, in that I was already participating in the group and 
received requests for action of one sort or another simply by virtue of being on the e-mail list. 
These requests split my participation into online and offline components, which often overlapped 
in practice. MoveOn was a “multimodal social world” (Garcia et al. 2009) where the nature of 
participation and communication blurred the boundary between “virtual” and “real” worlds. 
Online participation consisted mostly of what I call distributed collective action, individualized 
participation in actions that are aggregated with the actions of others to form a cohesive 
collective effort, despite the fact that participants’ actions are separated by time and space. 
Examples of distributed collective action include signing e-petitions, providing financial support 
for MoveOn’s efforts, and even making calls to congressional offices as the result of an e-mail 
request. MoveOn also used its e-mail list to coordinate many offline events, like candlelight 
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vigils, congressional office visits, and house parties. These events, which are examples of 
collocated collective action, facilitated face-to-face communication and development of 
localized social networks among members. 
 As described in the previous section, I participated in and helped organize many offline 
MoveOn events during my four years of participant observation. This participation was critical 
for my research, not only for what I learned about MoveOn directly as a result of my 
involvement but also for the contacts I made with local members who I later interviewed.  
Furthermore, my active participation in my local MoveOn council led to contacts with organizers 
who recommended me for the regional coordinator position, and granted me credibility as a 
committed MoveOn member. This legitimating function of participation came in handy when I 
approached staff members about doing interviews for my research. One staffer, in fact, told me 
that he did not ordinarily grant interviews with people researching MoveOn because he received 
so many requests, but he had made an exception in my case because I had done so much for 
MoveOn over the years. 
 I generally did not take notes while participating in MoveOn events, especially when I was 
responsible for running the events. At some events, such as council meetings or trainings, it was 
perfectly appropriate (and, indeed, expected) to take notes. At others, particularly the candlelight 
vigils memorializing the dead soldiers and citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan, I felt it would be 
disrespectful to take notes. In such cases, I waited until I returned to my car or home to jot down 
notes or record my thoughts on a digital recorder. These “jottings” (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 
1995) were the seeds from which my field notes sprouted. I usually typed up full field notes 
within a day or two of the events in order to retain as much detail as possible. At first my field 
notes were a rambling mess of detailed descriptions, thoughts, and reminders to look up 
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academic writings on topics that I thought might become important for my research. Over time, 
as I began to focus on what Blumer (1969) called “sensitizing concepts” that emerged from my 
notes and interviews, my field notes became more structured and I began “memoing” (Emerson, 
Fretz, and Shaw 1995) about patterns I was beginning to see in the data (see also Jorgensen 
1989; Lofland and Lofland 1984). 
 Ironically, although I found MoveOn’s offline actions to be a much richer source of data, 
the vast majority of members never participate in any of the organization’s offline events. 
According to accounts from multiple MoveOn staffers, roughly eighty to ninety percent of 
members participate exclusively online. Because such participation makes up the bulk of 
members’ action, it was important for me to engage in online activism in addition to my offline 
participation. I had signed e-petitions even before I began researching MoveOn, but beginning in 
2005 I ramped up my online activism. Over the course of my research, I signed dozens of e-
petitions, called my congressional representatives, sent letters to my local newspaper on several 
occasions, and donated what little I could on my graduate student budget. This participation, in 
conjunction with my offline work, gave me a good sense of the many avenues by which 
members could get involved in MoveOn depending on their inclinations and opportunities. In my 
four years of participant observation, I experienced all levels and types of activity available in 
MoveOn, and achieved the “intimate familiarity” (Blumer 1969) necessary for successful 
ethnographic research. 
Interviews 
In total, I conducted eighty-one interviews (including five e-mailed questionnaires) with 
people at various levels of activity in MoveOn and outside of the organization. Most of these 
interviews were semi-structured, meaning I had an interview guide on hand to maintain a basic 
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trajectory in the interview, but also allowed participants to wander down unforeseen avenues of 
thought (Holstein and Gubrium 1995; Kvale 1996). I approached the interviews as “guided 
conversations” (Rubin and Rubin 1995) in which I maintained an informal tone while keeping 
track of the conversation and redirecting it if necessary. Later, after I had clarified my research 
questions, I opted for a more structured approach that stuck more solidly to the interview guide, 
although I still left some room for exploration. As Weiss (1994) recommended, I transcribed the 
first dozen interviews in order to catch rookie interviewing mistakes like talking over responses, 
missing opportunities for follow-up questions, or simply talking too much. This process also 
helped me refine my interview guide by omitting redundant questions and adding questions that 
arose from participants’ comments (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Lofland et al. 2006). The data 
gathered through these interviews provided a deeper understanding of MoveOn than I would 
have achieved through participant observation and document analysis alone (Warren 2002).  
I conducted fifty-three interviews with members of MoveOn; twenty-seven of these were 
face-to-face, twenty-five were conducted over the phone, and one participant preferred to submit 
answers through e-mail. These interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and two hours, and 
averaged thirty-three single-spaced pages when transcribed. Due to privacy concerns, MoveOn 
would not release members’ contact information to me, so my access was initially limited to 
members I met through participant observation and “snowball sampling” (Biernacki and Waldorf 
1981) from these initial contacts. This sampling technique, however, overrepresented active 
MoveOn members (the ten to twenty percent that attended at least one event). In an attempt to 
sample a wider variety of MoveOn members, both in terms of participation level and geographic 
location, I began soliciting interviews via the internet. I posted interview requests on the political 
bulletin boards of Craig’s List in fifty-five cities during the summer and fall of 2007, and 
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conducted thirteen interviews with members contacted this way. I also joined MoveOn’s 
Facebook and MySpace groups in hopes of contacting younger members and online activists. 
These efforts proved futile because, as I found when several people responded to me, many 
members of the groups on these social networking sites knew little about the organization, and 
had casually joined on a friend’s recommendation. In addition, when several people asked me 
not to “spam” them with my requests, I realized that I had inadvertently committed a social 
networking faux pas by cold contacting people through MySpace and Facebook without being 
their “friends.” In short, aside from the interviews I completed with Craig’s List respondents, my 
internet solicitation strategy was a complete bust. 
I did, however, manage to interview four field organizers hired by MoveOn through 
Grassroots Campaigns, Incorporated, as well as three members of MoveOn’s paid staff. My role 
as a regional coordinator allowed me to meet at least a dozen paid organizers and a handful of 
staff members. The role also legitimated me as a bona fide MoveOn activist, not merely a nosy 
researcher, and enabled me to request interviews face-to-face instead of anonymously via e-mail, 
thus increasing my chances of receiving an affirmative (or, indeed, any) response. These 
interviews helped me understand MoveOn’s organizational structure, decision-making processes, 
and overall strategy.  
My last two sets of interviews were guided by research questions about MoveOn’s 
effectiveness in influencing national politics and establishing a model of online activism. First, I 
chose “theoretical samples” (Glaser and Strauss 1967) of Democratic and Republican 
congressional representatives in order to ask their staffs how they actually handled the e-petitions 
and phone calls received from MoveOn members. About one year after the 2008 election, I 
contacted ninety-two congressional offices in Washington, D.C., and completed twelve informal 
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telephone interviews with staff members working for both Republicans and Democrats. I also 
constructed a three-page questionnaire that was based on my interview guide, and received four 
completed questionnaires from congressional aides who were unable to do telephone interviews. 
To assess MoveOn’s influence as a model for online activism, I contacted thirteen progressive 
and seven conservative online activist organizations. None of the conservative groups responded, 
but I conducted five telephone interviews with representatives from progressive organizations. 
These conversations shed light on the importance of MoveOn’s model of online activism. 
Documents 
 I collected two types of documents related to MoveOn. Primary documents were created 
by MoveOn, and included e-mails, websites, flyers, scripts, reports, press releases, and other 
such documents. I collected all of the e-mail messages I received through MoveOn’s e-mail 
system between January 2005 and December 2009, totaling nearly 1,000 e-mails. I also 
accumulated a wide assortment of flyers, scripts, and other documents during my participant 
observation in multiple roles within MoveOn. These documents showed how MoveOn used 
rhetoric to shape its public image, frame its issues, and influence views of the organization. 
Secondary documents, on the other hand, were created by people or organizations other 
than MoveOn, but nonetheless pertained directly to MoveOn. These documents included 
newspaper and magazine articles, television news transcripts, blog entries, and other such items. 
Through Lexis Nexis and other web searches, I gathered 522 MoveOn-related articles, 
transcripts, and blog posts published in 2007 by The New York Times, The Washington Post, The 
New York Post, The Washington Times, Fox News Channel’s The O’Reilly Factor, and 
progressive blogs Daily Kos and Huffington Post. I selected these sources to cover a broad range 
of opinions about MoveOn, from conservatively slanted criticisms to progressively slanted 
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accolades and more mainstream, ostensibly objective news reports. Analysis of these documents 
forms the basis of Chapter Six. Along with examining how MoveOn’s organizational identity 
was framed, I wanted to assess whether it was influencing coverage of its issues. To this end, I 
analyzed 725 news articles printed between 2006 and 2009 in newspapers representing fifteen 
media markets. Utilizing three internet search engines (Yahoo!, Bing, and Google) and Lexis 
Nexis, I also tracked down 421 letters to the editor that had been printed as a result of MoveOn’s 
request that members send letters containing specific issues frames to their local newspapers. 
Data Analysis 
 Although the processes of data analysis differed slightly for each type of data, the basic 
procedure was the same for field notes, interviews, and other documents. In keeping with the 
constant comparative method (Glaser 1965; Glaser and Strauss 1967), I read and re-read each 
piece of data, noting what I thought were important passages and emerging patterns. This led to 
my initial codes, which I revised, combined, and/or discarded, as I began to focus on a few 
“sensitizing concepts” (Blumer 1969; Jorgenson 1989; Lofland and Lofland 1984). Particularly 
when analyzing primary and secondary documents, I used Altheide’s (1987, 1996) method of 
qualitative content analysis to guide my development of codes. This method requires that an 
initial coding protocol is developed on the basis of patterns in the data, and is left open to 
revision as coding categories are expanded or consolidated. Through this analysis, I developed a 
theoretical understanding of how MoveOn worked, how members experienced the organization, 
and whether it was ultimately successful in its attempts to shape policy, elections, and public 
opinion. 
 GETTING OUT 
 Because I wanted to observe MoveOn through two presidential cycles, I decided to 
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maintain my participant observation through November of 2008. When I agreed to be a regional 
coordinator in April 2008, I informed my field organizer that I would be pulling out of the 
position after the election to transition into full-time dissertation writing. As a regional 
coordinator, the final months leading up to the election were an intense period of organizing, 
recruiting, canvassing, and doing anything possible to get Obama elected. For the last month of 
the campaign, I volunteered roughly twenty hours per week on top of teaching, revising papers 
for journal submissions, and trying to keep my romantic relationship from becoming strained by 
my lack of availability. The intensity of demands placed upon me took a mental toll, and I 
considered quitting my election work several times prior to the election. Because of my 
commitment to my field organizer and my research, I maintained my role as regional coordinator 
until the end of November 2008.  
 My transition out of MoveOn was actually quite smooth. Because my field organizer and I 
had agreed that I would leave after the election, she had already lined up several potential 
replacements for me by the beginning of November. In addition, many progressives were 
energized by Obama’s victory and, in the midst of this euphoria, wanted to get more involved in 
political organizing work. This resulted in a flood of MoveOn members that showed interest in 
becoming regional coordinators and council coordinators, thus reducing both the need for me to 
remain the guilt felt for leaving. My transition out of the setting was also less noticeable because 
several other regional coordinators decided to leave their positions after the election, for a variety 
of reasons. Thus, because of the fluctuating nature of participation in political activism, I was 
able to disengage from MoveOn without my departure being too conspicuous (Kaplan 1991). 
 After leaving my active role in MoveOn, I maintained contact with my field organizer and 
several other organizers in the region because we had become friends. However, once I was no 
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longer obligated to participate in the weekly conference calls that structured my contacts with 
other regional coordinators, I quickly lost touch with these people. I moved out of state in early 
2009 to focus solely on writing my dissertation, so the face-to-face relationships I developed 
with local MoveOn activists also dried up. Although I still have some passive contact with a few 
of these people through sites like Facebook and MySpace, for the most part my relationships 
with MoveOn members and organizers did not last much beyond the weeks immediately 
following the presidential election. Most of these relationships were based on mutual activism 
and shared experiences with the requirements of our roles in MoveOn’s election work, so once 
the election was over and I left my role there was little upon which to build lasting relationships. 
In addition, these relationships relied upon constant communication through e-mail lists and 
conference calls, both of which I no longer could access once I stepped out of the regional 
coordinator role. This, combined with the fact that regional coordinators were, by definition, 
spread throughout the United States, meant that I had no “structured contact” with other MoveOn 
organizers (Stebbins 1991). 
 Reflecting on my experiences in MoveOn over the four years I was involved, I have mixed 
feelings about the organization and how I was affected by it. Going into this research, I was 
intrigued and impressed by MoveOn’s combination of online and offline activism. As I 
progressed from a casual participant to an organizer, the mystery of how MoveOn pulled off 
their offline actions slowly gave way to a sense of monotony that emerged from the predictable 
and somewhat scattershot ways that I discovered these events were actually organized. What 
from the outside seemed like a flawless system for organizing local events on a national scale 
could sometimes feel to an organizer like a mad scramble to hurriedly throw together events that 
you hoped people would attend. I felt like a fraud when I was required to essentially sell the idea 
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of another vigil, protest, or meeting to the council members in my region, especially when I did 
not see the value of these actions. This feeling of inauthenticity certainly contributed to my 
occasional desire to simply quit being active in MoveOn. On the other hand, my experiences as a 
volunteer organizer for MoveOn allowed me to grow from an observer of political events to a 
trained (if not always perfect) political organizer. The training I received and the skills I acquired 
during my tenures as a core council member and regional coordinator were tremendously 
important for building my confidence and for helping me envision myself as an activist (as I 
discuss in Chapter Five). 
 Through all of these ups and downs, I got a good sense of what it was like to be an active 
member of MoveOn, not just a researcher pretending to be an active member. Over my four 
years of participation, I experienced the same emotional highs and lows felt by other members, 
and toiled in the trenches alongside other regional coordinators and paid organizers. Although I 
recognize that my experience was fundamentally shaped by my role as a researcher, I believe 
that I achieved an “empathic understanding” (Johnson 1975) of what it was like to be a MoveOn 
member.  
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 
 One of the biggest methodological difficulties I faced was that, as an online organization, 
MoveOn did not have a national headquarters or a stable physical setting. When I began my 
research, I assumed that I would be able to visit MoveOn’s office to get an inside perspective on 
how the organization ran and to make contacts with staff members, like Kunda (1992) did in his 
ethnography of a high-tech corporation. However, as I quickly learned, MoveOn is a “virtual” 
organization in which staff members work from their homes all across the country. Although this 
was theoretically interesting, it was a practical disadvantage in terms of being able to integrate 
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myself into the real-world social scene that made up the setting. Moreover, MoveOn had no 
public listing of its current staff or a contact list including staff e-mail addresses. This was a 
practical necessity to prevent its small staff from being overwhelmed with e-mails, but it meant 
that I had no direct line to staff to request interviews. MoveOn did have a general “Contact Us” 
link on its website, but despite trying several times to make inquiries through this avenue, I never 
received any response except for an automatic message that read, “Thanks for contacting 
MoveOn. We welcome your comments and suggestions. We get a lot of feedback, so please 
don’t expect a personal reply. But all mail is read” (3/4/05 e-mail). A similar message appeared 
if you tried to directly reply to MoveOn’s e-mail messages. This insularity made it very difficult 
for me to contact congressional leaders. 
To overcome these difficulties, I slowly worked my way up the chain of responsibility in 
MoveOn until I was at a position (regional coordinator) that was the highest position I could 
attain as a volunteer. This position gave me the opportunity to finally contact and interview some 
of MoveOn’s paid staff. One major break came in September 2008 when I was invited, along 
with all regional coordinators, to a three-day intensive training in Chicago, Illinois, to prepare for 
the upcoming election work. There I was able to network with thirty-five other regional 
coordinators and four MoveOn paid staffers, plus about a dozen field organizers from Grassroots 
Campaigns, Incorporated. Only after meeting these people face-to-face and participating in 
shared real-world experiences was I able to gain access to the leaders of this ostensibly non-
hierarchical virtual organization. 
The other major difficulty I faced was the “role conflict” (Snow 1980; Stryker 1980) I 
experienced as an activist-researcher. In the early stages of my research when my levels of 
participation and responsibility in MoveOn were relatively low, I clearly viewed myself as a 
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researcher first and a MoveOn member second. This distinction became more difficult as I 
transitioned into ever-higher levels of activism, culminating in the regional coordinator position 
in 2008. Because of the intensity of commitment required by this role, my MoveOn member 
identity became more salient (Stryker 1980), to the point where this identity competed for 
primacy with my researcher identity. This conflict was further compounded by the fact that other 
MoveOn members and organizers were sometimes unsure of my motives for participation. In one 
telling instance, I was making phone calls for MoveOn’s 2006 “Call for Change” get-out-the-
vote effort at a temporary phonebanking office when one volunteer who I had told about my 
research interest asked me with suspicion in her voice, “So are you here as a researcher or as a 
member?” Her question surprised me and forced me to reflect upon my motives for participating. 
In the end, I said, “Both.” However, for weeks afterward her question resonated in my mind, and 
made me realize that some MoveOn members wondered if I was a “true” activist or just an 
opportunistic researcher. 
This inner conflict between my member and researcher role caused a mixture of 
emotions. When things went well, I shared in the joy and sense of accomplishment felt by the 
members with whom I had worked. At other times, I felt frustrated by the high levels of time and 
energy demanded by my council and regional coordinator roles. Like Thorne (1979) in her 
research on the Vietnam draft resistance movement, I felt competing pressures to allocate time to 
my research duties and to my membership role requirements. I tried to reduce this sense of 
conflict by reminding myself that participation was a research task, and more active engagement 
in the setting would ultimately yield rich data and interview contacts.  
Perhaps the best indicator of my emotional investment in MoveOn was the guilt I felt 
when I did things that felt inauthentic or manipulative. I experienced pangs of guilt when I 
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participated in actions as a researcher while other members believed I was there because of my 
commitment to the movement. On several occasions, I really did not want to participate in or 
help organize an event, but I knew that it was important for my research to witness the planning 
and implementation of the action. Much like Thorne (1979), I often felt like a phony as I tried to 
maintain a façade of enthusiasm to mask my lack of personal conviction. These guilty feelings 
also arose when I consciously decided to volunteer for tasks in order to build rapport with 
members or staffers, thereby creating feelings of reciprocity that I later drew upon when 
soliciting interviews (Adler and Adler 1991; Wax 1952).  
Finally, I felt guilty upon my departure from MoveOn. On the one hand, my guilt resulted 
from feeling that I had abandoned my post and left my field organizer, with whom I had 
developed a close relationship, to scramble to fill my position. Even though this feeling was 
moderated somewhat by the fact that other regional coordinators also quit after the 2008 election, 
my personal commitment to my field organizer and regional coordinator team made my 
departure painful. On the other hand, I felt guilty for being happy to slip out of my regional 
coordinator role. By the end of the 2008 election season, I was utterly burned out by the constant 
demands to build MoveOn councils, organize local actions, and recruit new volunteers for 
councils. Like Stebbins (1991) reported in his account of leaving the field, the enthusiasm with 
which I started my research gave way to fatigue and a sense of monotony as my field 
experiences became repetitive and my data produced “diminishing returns” (Taylor 1991). After 
four years in the field, my energy was drained, my sense of excitement was gone, my file 
cabinets were overflowing with data, and I was ready to move on from MoveOn. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CONSTRUCTION AND EXPERIENCE  
OF COMMUNITY IN MOVEON 
 
This chapter examines MoveOn’s attempts to construct a sense of community for 
members, and addresses the question of whether members actually experienced feelings of 
community. Online communities have become very popular among Americans (Horrigan and 
Rainie 2001), but questions remain about whether participants can develop bonds of trust and 
reciprocity that make online communities feel as “real” as traditional offline communities 
(Fernback 2007; Putnam 2000; Wellman et al. 2001). My analysis shows how MoveOn used 
rhetoric in its e-mails to create a sense of community, and reveals how these attempts related to 
members’ actual sense of community. 
COMMUNITY AS A RHETORICAL CONSTRUCT 
 Through interviews and participant observation, I discovered that only ten to twenty 
percent of MoveOn members ever participated in offline activism. Moreover, most of those who 
participated did not become integrated into MoveOn’s local councils, where the strongest 
interpersonal connections were made. This lack of consistent involvement hampered community-
building offline. At the same time, MoveOn’s e-mail system was structured such that members 
could not directly communicate with one another, except in limited cases through a council’s e-
mail list. Although MoveOn’s primary rationale for not allowing access to members’ e-mail 
addresses was to prevent abuse of the system (e.g., spamming or personal attacks), the absence 
of person-to-person communication prevented members from developing relationships, either 
locally or nationally. To compensate for these factors, MoveOn attempted to create a sense of 
community through the rhetoric in its e-mails to members. 
DEFINING COMMUNITY BOUNDARIES 
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 Because most MoveOn members did not participate in offline activism, they were not 
exposed to the identity- and boundary-forming work that takes place between members during 
meetings, rallies, and other interpersonal situations (Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2006; 
Downton and Wehr 1998; Hunt and Benford 1994; Hunt et al. 1994). As a result, they relied 
upon MoveOn’s leaders to define the boundaries of their activist community. Organizational 
leaders drew these boundaries rhetorically, creating an “us versus them” dynamic that created an 
image of a MoveOn community and facilitated subsequent mobilization.  
Vilification of Opponents 
One of the most common rhetorical strategies used in MoveOn’s e-mails was portrayal of 
opponents as villains. Vilification is common among social movement organizations (Blain 
1994; Burke 1967; Ellingson 1995; Gamson 1992; Hunt et al. 1994; Snow and Benford 1988; 
Vanderford 1989), and also frequently occurs during the construction of social problems (Best 
1987; Cohen 1980; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). Vilification of the enemy, “unifies 
individuals in movements, provides a clear target for movement action, and allows activists to 
define themselves and their positions in opposition to those of their adversaries” (Vanderford 
1989:166).  
MoveOn relied upon two types of vilification rhetoric. In personal vilification, a specific 
individual was cast as evil or greedy. One example appeared in an e-mail message pertaining to 
the nomination of Alberto Gonzales for U.S. Attorney General. MoveOn alleged that, “Gonzales 
is the man who disgraced us with torture…. His unquestioning allegiance to George Bush runs 
deep enough to cloud his judgment in deadly ways” (1/6/05 e-mail). In another message, 
MoveOn accused Republican Senator George Allen of being racist after he referred to an Indian-
American member of his opponent’s campaign staff as “macaca,” which translates as “monkey” 
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(Feldman 2006). MoveOn asserted, “Sen. Allen… has a long history of demeaning minorities,” 
and listed examples of Allen’s racial bigotry, such as displaying a noose in his office and 
opposing the creation of Martin Luther King Day (8/17/06 e-mail). By describing adversaries as 
threatening and immoral, MoveOn created an aura of danger in an attempt to increase members’ 
commitment and feelings of in-group solidarity (see Blain 1994). Thus, personal vilification 
ultimately helped MoveOn build a sense of community by rhetorically placing members in 
opposition to a cast of powerful and malevolent actors. 
In categorical vilification, the target was an abstract social group that was “typified” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967) as a single-minded bloc of villains. For example, when MoveOn 
asked members to oppose President Bush’s Social Security privatization plan, they targeted 
Republicans and investors, saying: 
The Republicans are counting on scare tactics, half truths, and outright lies…. But 
behind all the deception, the reality is clear: the Republicans want to hand over 
our Social Security to their buddies on Wall Street (3/2/05 e-mail). 
Similarly, in a message sent a few days before the 2006 mid-term elections, MoveOn painted a 
portrait of a nation divided between the haves and have-nots: 
In the Republicans’ America, only a chosen few have a voice. They’re the Enrons 
and the Exxons, the Wall Street brokers and the K street lobbyists. For these lucky 
few, a friendly ear in Washington is just a fat check and a phone call away. 
And then there’s the rest of America—the folks who get shut out. Hard-working 
Americans who can’t afford their own health insurance, who can’t feed their 
children and who are struggling to keep a roof over their heads—and basically 
anyone who dares to dissent against the Republican plan (11/4/06 e-mail). 
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When combined with personal vilification, categorical vilification allowed MoveOn to claim the 
moral high ground and helped members clarify their own ideological positions by giving them an 
enemy against which to react.  
Delineation of In-Group Identity 
Vilification of opponents was complemented by in-group identity formation. MoveOn 
constructed in-group identity through several rhetorical practices. First, it engaged in ideological 
labeling. This process involved frequent references to “progressive” political ideology without 
clear definition of the term’s meaning. This label was used to describe members, the 
organization, and its goals. Used this way, “progressive” served as a generic label that took the 
place of “liberal,” a term that was successfully reframed by conservatives as an indicator of 
weakness and elitism (Frank 2005; Lakoff 2004; Nunberg 2007). This is not so say that MoveOn 
did not have an underlying political philosophy, or to imply that members did not share any set 
of values. From my interviews with members and paid staff, it was clear that MoveOn’s politics 
were based on a general belief that the government should promote peace, equal rights, and equal 
opportunities for all. However, MoveOn never laid out a specific mission statement or set of 
values for its members, leaving “progressive” up for interpretation. In doing so, it allowed 
members to read their own set of beliefs into the label. Thus, the ambiguity of the “progressive” 
label helped create a perception of shared ideology and a sense of community by giving 
members an umbrella term under which to unite. 
A second rhetorical strategy was the use of member talk in MoveOn’s e-mails. Nearly 
every e-mail opened with “Dear MoveOn member,” and messages were full of repeated 
references to “members.” I received one such message the weekend before “Super Tuesday” 
2008, when twenty-four states held primaries and caucuses. The message began with the 
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standard “Dear MoveOn member” introduction, and then portrayed calling MoveOn members in 
states participating in Super Tuesday as an opportunity to connect with fellow “members”: 
More than 1.7 million MoveOn members have the chance to vote Tuesday, and 
we need to do everything we can to make sure they turn out for Obama.... But 
many people lead busy lives and some MoveOn members will forget. A friendly 
reminder from another MoveOn member is the best way to change that.... If 
you’ve ever called MoveOn members on one of our previous campaigns, you 
know how much fun it can be. Your fellow MoveOn members are good folks, and 
many will appreciate your call (2/2/08 e-mail). 
Messages that did not open with the standard “Dear MoveOn member” phrasing also appealed to 
the existence of a strong community of MoveOn “members” across the country. A message I 
received on October 15, 2006, began “Dear Marc,” and immediately launched into a paragraph 
laden with membership rhetoric: 
Today, you will join thousands of other MoveOn members in homes and 
auditoriums across the country to call for change and watch the powerful new 
film Iraq for Sale. Yesterday, MoveOn members called an impressive 100,000 
progressive voters from the Iraq the Vote parties! 
 Member talk was designed to elicit a sense of shared experience in light of the fact that 
most members never attended offline events, and therefore participated in isolation from one 
another. Most members participated together only in a metaphorical sense, and would have had 
difficulty envisioning themselves as part of a community without MoveOn’s rhetorical 
construction of this image of community. 
ENCOURAGING A SENSE OF EFFICACY 
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MoveOn also needed to convince members that their efforts were worthwhile. This task 
was accomplished by assuring members that dramatic political change would result from their 
individual and collective actions. Through its messages, MoveOn suggested to its isolated 
members that they were, in fact, part of a powerful community of activists, and provided 
members with a “vocabulary of motives” for engaging in activism (Benford 1993; Mills 1940). 
Individual Efficacy Appeals 
Individual efficacy appeals were designed to increase members’ confidence in their 
personal ability to help MoveOn accomplish its goals. In the weeks leading up to the mid-term 
election in 2006, MoveOn wanted to motivate members to call progressive voters in competitive 
districts in order to get them to the polls. To convince members that their individual calls could 
change the election results, they asked Al Gore to make a personal appeal: 
What you do this weekend could mean the difference between victory and 
defeat…. I know it’s easy to feel like your calls will be drops in a political ocean. 
I’m here to tell you that they’re not. I know a thing or two about close races where 
a few hundred “drops” make all the difference. And the margins in many of these 
races are even closer. You could personally turn out the voter who tips the 
balance (11/2/06 e-mail). 
Most individual efficacy appeals did not come from authoritative sources like Al Gore, but used 
similar rhetoric to emphasize the importance of a single person’s contribution. Another appeal 
for calling, this time in an attempt to stop President Bush from sending more troops to Iraq, said, 
“we CAN win this vote—but it’s going to take lots of us working together and it could come 
down to a few key senators. Your calls could push the vote over the edge” (1/30/07 e-mail). 
 MoveOn also appealed to individuals’ senses of efficacy when trying to find event hosts or 
 84 
raise money. In 2007, MoveOn sent me a request to host a vigil meant to pressure Congress to 
override Bush’s veto of SCHIP, a children’s health care law. After asking me to host the vigil, 
MoveOn emphasized my ability to singlehandedly make a difference, saying, “Lots of people 
from your neighborhood are ready to stand up for children’s health care. We’ll invite them. All 
they need is someone to help pull the vigil together” (10/12/07 e-mail). In another case, MoveOn 
tied individual efforts to those of other members by setting up a donation matching system. It 
cleverly appealed to members’ individual efficacy by pointing out the consequences of inaction, 
before showing members how their efforts could be multiplied: 
Imagine waking up one January morning and reading this headline: ‘Obama’s 
health care plan dies in Congress.’ I don’t want to feel like I could have done 
more. Do you?... If you donate today, another MoveOn member will match your 
donation.... Your donation of $40 will become $80. Double your impact by 
making a matched donation today (11/30/09 e-mail). 
 Such appeals combated the “free rider” problem commonly experienced by movements, 
wherein individuals choose not to participate because they do not recognize how their 
involvement will help the movement (Olson 1965). They also allowed members to feel a sense of 
personal efficacy in absence of the emotional connections and more tangible sense of collective 
action that typically characterize offline participation in social movements (Jasper 1997; Snow, 
Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). Because of the isolated nature of online activism, MoveOn 
needed to rhetorically create a sense that these isolated efforts were important to the overall 
success of the movement. 
Collective Efficacy Appeals 
Along with appealing to members’ senses of individual efficacy, MoveOn also frequently 
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emphasized how members’ efforts were linked together into a larger whole. For example, in 
September 2006, MoveOn asked people to host “Call for Change” parties, where members called 
Democratic voters in competitive congressional races. In one message, they claimed, “Control of 
the House is in reach, but making it happen is going to take a big push. Republicans have got 
millions of dollars in corporate money. What we have is people power. So it’s going to take 
every last one of us—working together—to win” (9/7/06a e-mail). This claim was backed up by 
a comment from a member who hosted a calling party in the past: 
The general atmosphere was incredible—very collegial!... The fact that so many 
people are motivated to come out to make these calls is incredible…. You can feel 
the momentum building, the tide is turning, and there is a sense that we CAN and 
WILL win this election in November!!! 
Similarly, in a message sent one day after rallies were held in support of the SCHIP 
legislation, MoveOn reported, “last night, the streets came alive with chants, cheers, honks, and 
our urgent cry for health care.... With just a day’s notice, 10,000 of us rallied at nearly 250 rapid 
response events nationwide!” (10/5/07 e-mail). To reinforce the sense that this effort was 
accomplished together, MoveOn included several reports from the rallies, including one where a 
member said, “It’s wonderful to work with other MoveOn members and pass out leaflets.... It’s 
democracy at work” (10/5/07 e-mail). It also included photographs from events around the 
country in order to cement the idea that each member was part of a larger collective effort. 
MoveOn also contextualized action within the broader progressive movement, so 
members could visualize their actions as contributing not only to MoveOn’s immediate goals but 
also to the advancement of progressive values. As it did when defining the boundaries of its 
identity, MoveOn portrayed certain legislative battles as a contest between the forces of good 
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(progressives) and evil (conservatives). For example, MoveOn sent the following message 
regarding the inclusion of a public health insurance option in the Senate health care bill:  
Yesterday, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced that he’s including a 
compromise version of the public option in the Senate’s health care bill. This is a 
huge victory over conservatives who spent all summer trying to kill the public 
option.... Thanks to the tireless efforts of MoveOn members and the broader 
progressive movement, the public option now has a ton of momentum (10/27/09 
e-mail). 
By citing participation statistics, including comments or photos, and describing members’ 
efforts as part of the progressive movement, MoveOn constructed an image of a community of 
like-minded people working together. Although most members never participated in offline 
activism, and those who did were geographically separated from other groups of active members, 
these messages were meant to establish a sense among individual members that they were part of 
MoveOn’s community as well as the larger progressive community. 
Victory Claims 
Along with efficacy appeals, MoveOn made explicit pronouncements about victories that 
had been achieved or were purportedly achievable through the collective effort of MoveOn 
members. These claims often occurred alongside efficacy appeals, as the following message 
shows: 
As the campaign season enters the final stretch, experts on all sides are taking 
stock. The short version? We’re winning…. [W]e’re relying on the energy and 
commitment of thousands of MoveOn members who are ready for change. It’s 
people-powered politics, and if folks like you are ready to step up to the plate, it’s 
 87 
how we’re going to win (9/7/06b e-mail). 
Victory appeals also reassured members that their efforts were worthwhile by pointing to 
tangible results. One day after progressive Senate candidate Ned Lamont defeated Joe Lieberman 
in Connecticut’s Democratic primary in 2006, MoveOn asserted, “we’re on a roll…. Lamont’s 
win is the leading edge of a wave we can ride to victory in November. This is what winning feels 
like. Get used to it” (8/9/06 e-mail). MoveOn was particularly ebullient following Obama’s 
victory in the presidential election in 2008: 
Last night, together, we made history. In the sun and the rain... you knocked on 
doors, made phone calls, and registered people who’d never voted in their lives. 
And you helped elect President Obama.... [Y]esterday you proved nothing is 
impossible. If we stand up together and if we fight together and if we believe 
together, we can change the course of history (11/5/08 e-mail).  
Victory claims like these were valuable because they conjured up images of a powerful 
MoveOn community that helped members maintain their commitment despite being isolated 
from other members and MoveOn’s staff. When combined with efficacy appeals, they functioned 
as “motivational frames” (Snow and Benford 1988) that convinced members that the aggregation 
of their individual efforts could indeed lead to victory. 
By creating an “us versus them” dynamic, establishing an in-group identity, and 
encouraging members to view themselves as part of an effective collective effort, MoveOn 
hoped to create a sense of community among members who participated online. Without actually 
asking members about their feelings of community, though, MoveOn had no way of knowing 
whether their rhetorical construction of community was successful. The next section addresses 
this concern. 
 88 
COMMUNITY AS PERCEIVED BY MEMBERS  
 To determine whether MoveOn’s attempts to construct community through e-mail 
translated to actual feelings of community among members, I asked thirty-three MoveOn 
members if they felt connected to other members and to the organization as a whole. These 
interviews revealed that many members did feel like they were part of a community. Those who 
participated in offline action were more likely to feel a sense of community, but many members 
also described a sense of connection that emerged through online participation. 
 
IDENTIFYING WITH THE COMMUNITY “OUT THERE” 
 As I was conducting interviews with MoveOn members, I noticed how they would often 
talk about MoveOn or other MoveOn members as being “out there” somewhere. It struck me as 
an interesting metaphor for the experience of using the internet itself: we react to what we see on 
the screen as something that is real but is located elsewhere, in some kind of information cloud. 
The visualization of MoveOn as a community that existed “out there” brought to mind 
Anderson’s (1983) concept of “imagined community.” Anderson argued that, in the absence of 
personal connections, people can still identify as members of a community by forming mental 
images of what community members are like and then identifying with this imagined 
community. Because many MoveOn members had little or no contact with other members, they 
based their images of the national “MoveOn community” upon their own identities and what 
they could glean from online participation. When possible, these impressions were supplemented 
with knowledge gained through actual face-to-face contact with other members. 
 A member named Jeff who had participated in both online and offline actions was one of 
the first members I interviewed who used the “out there” terminology to describe his connection 
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to MoveOn’s community: 
I don’t know most of the national members,... but I know they’re out there. Now 
that I know something about the organization, I know it’s probably some guy like 
me in Oklahoma or Pennsylvania or California, or whatever it is. And they 
probably think like me.... And when I get something from MoveOn, I know that 
there’s all these people at that moment doing this, you know? And so that does 
provide you with a connection. 
Jeff’s comment was supported by Kelly, an online activist who added that her feeling of 
community was increased by MoveOn’s e-mail communications: 
I feel like there’s this group of millions of people, a cybergroup.... And I like it 
when MoveOn writes in their e-mails about the results of—it’ll be a day or two 
after a petition was signed, and they’ll tell us how many people responded to it 
and what the outcome of it was. That does help you know that there’s other 
people out there that have the same belief system you do, at least in certain areas, 
especially with everything that’s going on with the government these days. 
Her statement also revealed that some MoveOn members viewed the organization almost like a 
support group for their political beliefs at a time when, at least while Bush was in office, they felt 
isolated and afraid of publicly expressing their opinions. As a council coordinator named Norah 
put it, “with things being so polarized, it’s nice to know there’s someone you can call who’s not 
going to hang up on you.” 
 A common ideological base was very important to members’ sense that they were part of a 
larger community. “You know you’re part of a movement,” explained a local organizer named 
George. “There’s a real sense of shared purpose and a shared sense of ideology.” When I asked 
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him what that ideology was based upon, George replied: 
I think if you sit down and talk to these people, they’re pragmatic progressives 
who just want to see the country support its people as opposed to support 
corporations. There’s a real element of pragmatism, what we can do, that I think is 
really healthy about MoveOn. 
Another local organizer named Kurtis agreed that he felt a sense of connection to other MoveOn 
members, but clarified, “the connection isn’t so much based on MoveOn membership. That’s 
what got it started, but it’s based on shared values and shared commitment to actually doing 
things together.” In other words, MoveOn membership performed a signaling function, providing 
a shorthand way of assessing a person’s ideological position on national issues. In fact, this 
assumption of shared values and camaraderie was even integrated into the training of MoveOn’s 
field organizers by Grassroots Campaigns, Incorporated. One organizer named Jeremy recounted 
how he was told to approach calls to MoveOn members as a friend, not a political organizer 
whom they had never met: 
 I was told that when you’re calling these folks this is like a long-lost friend.... I 
was told that’s the way MoveOn members see MoveOn. It’s this almost familial 
relationship, insofar as we’re like-minded individuals. You know, it’s a common 
vision for the world.... And I found that when I called through MoveOn members, 
it really was that familial relationship. You know, “Hey, I know you, you know 
me. You work for MoveOn, we’re obviously on the same page. Tell me what I 
can do for ya?” 
 In contrast to this deep feeling of familiarity, a couple of people said that the connection to 
other members felt pretty superficial. Interestingly, both used the example of MoveOn bumper 
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stickers to illustrate their points. A man named James who primarily participated in online 
activism but had helped plan a couple local events, said of his sense of community, “Sometimes 
people honk their horns at you and stuff like that because they agree with what your bumper 
sticker says. But that’s about the extent of it.” Likewise, a local activist named Beth said she felt 
“a little connection” when other members noticed a MoveOn bumper sticker on her car or a 
patch on her jacket and came up to introduce themselves. On the other hand, when she lived in 
Kansas, Beth said several people reacted negatively to her after seeing her bumper sticker 
because it signified that she was “a liberal” in their minds. Whether people responded with honks 
and waves or middle fingers, the bumper stickers and other MoveOn paraphernalia served, like 
MoveOn membership itself, as symbols of a progressive political ideology. Although not all 
members felt equally strong connections to MoveOn on the basis of this ideological 
commonality, it helped many members feel like part of a community even when they were not in 
contact with other members in their area. 
EXPERIENCING COMMUNITY THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 The majority of members who did express some feeling of community were involved in 
MoveOn’s offline actions. This was not too surprising, as face-to-face contact has traditionally 
been the basis for communities, and is still important even though our increasing reliance upon 
communication technologies has distanced us from one another (Putnam 2000). In MoveOn’s 
case, these technologies were precisely the tools that enabled members to form communal ties at 
the local level. 
 Members who were involved in their local councils were particularly likely to report a 
sense of community. Norah, the council coordinator quoted earlier, said this feeling emerged: 
from doing things together, planning things together, standing together at night in 
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February holding candles. I tend to have a sense of connection with people I’ve 
done something with, a sense of community and solidarity. If you plan an event 
with someone or you’ve struggled through something, you do feel closer to them. 
George, the local organizer who said MoveOn was based on a pragmatic progressive ideology, 
described MoveOn members in general as “compatriots,” and added, “And if they’re Operation 
Democracy, they’re brothers!” He said this feeling of camaraderie emerged from “shared 
experience,” including both offline action and the experience of watching MoveOn be “kicked 
around” by conservative political commentators and Republican politicians. For these active 
members, community sentiment grew out of connections made while jointly accomplishing tasks 
and sharing the burden of occasional public critique of an organization with which they were 
identified. 
 Not everyone who reported feeling connected to other members was active in a MoveOn 
council. Some members who had only recently become involved in MoveOn’s offline actions 
also reported a sense of community. Their stories revealed how they tried to reconcile this new 
understanding of MoveOn as a “real-life” organization with their previous image of it as a 
faceless national entity. A woman in her twenties named Lisa became involved with MoveOn 
after her brother was sent to Iraq. She said she felt disconnected from MoveOn until she attended 
an anti-war protest in 2007: 
I don’t really know who the national people are. They’re just names on an e-mail. 
But now that I’ve gone to a protest where it was many, many different people and 
had that visual, I do have more of a sense of being part of a larger group. It’s 
funny. I’m a very experiential person, and that shifted me. I was very moved. 
Sometimes the transition into feeling like part of a community was aided by social interactions 
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with MoveOn members that went beyond the immediate tasks required of a given event. Alexis’s 
perception shifted when she began to socialize with organizers who were running the temporary 
phone bank in her community during the “Call for Change” effort in 2006: 
I got to be friends with the organizers, who were all young like me. We would go 
out and they would tell stories about what it was like to be part of MoveOn. So I 
got this perspective on them at the local level and MoveOn as this giant entity. I 
still think I see MoveOn that way, as such an impersonal entity, but I felt a sense 
of community with the people I worked with. 
 Several other people made a similar distinction between MoveOn as an organization and 
MoveOn as represented by its members. They understood that MoveOn provided the opportunity 
to meet new people who shared their values and were committed to action, but they did not 
necessarily feel connected to MoveOn itself. James, who said he felt a superficial connection to 
other members when they recognized his bumper stickers, described MoveOn as “more a venue 
than it is an organization with blood and life.” He added, “It gives us a sense of identity only 
insofar as other people are there to talk with about issues.” As Lisa said, many members viewed 
MoveOn’s national staff as “just names on an e-mail” until they stepped out from behind their 
computers and attended a local event. For these members, MoveOn’s attempts to create a sense 
of community through the rhetoric in its e-mails was not successful in its own right, but the e-
mails served as prompts to engage in offline actions that did lead to the sense of community 
MoveOn was attempting to foster. 
REJECTING THE NOTION OF COMMUNITY 
 All was not rosy with MoveOn’s attempts to create a sense of community. In fact, a 
significant portion of the people I interviewed rejected the notion that they were members of a 
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MoveOn community. Some said their lack of participation in local action caused this absence of 
communal ties, but others pointed the finger at MoveOn itself. 
 Members who said that lack of local action prevented them from feeling like part of a 
community fell into two categories. The first group consisted of people who had never or rarely 
participated in such action. I met one such person at a house party in 2007, which happened to be 
the first MoveOn event he had attended. When I interviewed him two weeks later, Daniel said he 
did not feel connected to MoveOn members simply because he did not spend enough time with 
them. He compared his involvement in MoveOn with an organization in which he was more 
actively involved, the Unitarian Universalist church: 
I would say much more that if I met someone and, you know, didn’t know 
anything about them and they were Unitarian Universalists, then I would feel 
much more of a connection than with a MoveOn person. And I think it’s probably 
just because I spend a lot more time with that organization and with the people. 
Another example was an elderly couple that had recently moved to a new city and did not know 
anyone in the area. Prior to their move, they had participated solely in MoveOn’s online 
activism, but they decided to use local council events as opportunities to socialize and meet like-
minded people. Wilma and her husband, Harold, attended a media training event I helped 
organize, where they met about a dozen other local members. They mingled and seemed to be 
well integrated into the group, but later they noted that none of the contacts they made at the 
meeting led to any further socializing. In our interviews, Harold said that he did not “feel like 
we’re embedded in a functioning group,” and his wife expanded on that idea, stating: 
When you had this workshop, I felt, “Okay, I have a connection,” but it’s an 
unusual connection. I think the internet creates the possibility of what I would call 
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“cells” for whatever activity there is, or for educational purposes. Our society 
needs more communal contacts because people are so isolated. 
Their comments showed that, while they did not feel integrated into a community at the time of 
our interview, they did desire to be more connected to other MoveOn members. Indeed, a 
number of members acknowledged that they wanted to feel like part of the community, but had 
not yet taken steps to make this happen. In such cases, they did not reject the existence of a 
MoveOn community, but rather the characterization that they were part of it. 
 Along with these folks, there were some members who said they once felt connected to 
MoveOn but no longer identified as part of the community. In most cases, this decline 
corresponded to a decrease in their level of activity. Barry, for example, had been very active in 
his MoveOn precinct group during the 2004 “Leave No Voter Behind” voter outreach campaign. 
By 2006, however, he was not active in MoveOn at all, although he was still on the e-mail list. 
When I asked him if he felt like part of the MoveOn community, he said he was “aware that 
there’s people who identify with MoveOn” and claimed that he “was part of that group before 
the presidential election, but I no longer think of myself as being part of that group.” His 
decrease in activity resulted from his disappointment that MoveOn had not taken a stronger anti-
war stance, and this disconnect from MoveOn’s strategy as well as the lack of personal contact 
resulting from his non-participation led to the change in his self-categorization as a member of 
MoveOn’s community.  
 Perceived changes in MoveOn’s strategy also caused Beth to lose her sense of connection 
to MoveOn. In her case, the loss of connection resulted from MoveOn’s approach to building 
community, not from a change in its political agenda. Beth led her local coordinating council for 
over a year, but eventually curtailed her participation because she felt like MoveOn was not 
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focusing enough on long-term community building among council members: 
When I was involved in the coordinating council I felt pretty connected to a base 
in this community. I thought it was a very valid part of their agenda, or it could 
have been, but they really didn’t seem to care enough about that.... When they 
gave that up, or seemed not to care so much anymore, it was really hard. It 
became more about getting the message out and less about, “Hey, take this month 
off and do some community-building!” The model they were using was a 
business, and it felt like we were just doing a job. I started to feel like an 
employee. 
Clearly, she felt an increasing sense of distance from MoveOn’s strategy, as symbolized by her 
repeated use of “they” when referencing MoveOn’s leadership. She was also quite disappointed 
that MoveOn did not seem to value community as much as she did. Unlike some members who 
did not feel like part of MoveOn’s community but still believed such a community existed and 
was nurtured by MoveOn, Beth began to question MoveOn’s interest in building community 
altogether. 
 She was not alone. A number of members who had been active in MoveOn’s offline 
actions became quite frustrated with their inability to make lasting contacts with other local 
members. MoveOn’s e-mail system was set up so that most messages were written by paid staff 
and sent down to members. Members who were not involved in councils had no way to 
communicate with one another through MoveOn’s system, and even those who were council 
members only had limited access to e-mail other members. Council leaders, for example, could 
send a message to everyone who had given their e-mail addresses to the council at some point, 
but they could not send messages to members in their local areas who were not on the council e-
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mail list. Although the system was set up this way to protect the privacy of members and prevent 
anyone from abusing the e-mail system, it also hindered active members’ ability to recruit new 
council members or simply engage in e-mail exchanges that could have created a stronger sense 
of community among local members. 
 James, the man who described MoveOn as “a venue” for communication with like-minded 
people, was very frustrated with MoveOn’s e-mail policy, and perceived it as an issue of control: 
MoveOn jealously guards the e-mail address list. You can’t get an e-mail address 
from MoveOn no matter how much you threaten.... I understand why they do that, 
but it makes our job that much more difficult because you have to develop your 
own e-mail lists. But MoveOn doesn’t want that; they want all the communication 
to be done through them.... Trying to encourage inter-member communication is 
probably not in the interest of the organization. 
Similarly, when I asked a member named Alberta if her lack of connection to other local 
MoveOn members was due to time constraints or an absence of desire for such connections, she 
somewhat heatedly replied: 
Well, how would I get a hold of them?... They don’t have membership lists, and 
they don’t give out names of members, so how would you know? They have no 
idea how to build a sense of community.  
A few members took it upon themselves to forge contacts with each other despite what they 
perceived to be MoveOn’s prohibition of such connections. In one case, a woman named Brenda 
spoke with another MoveOn member as part of a member-to-member interview program 
MoveOn ran in order to learn more about its members. She and her partner hit it off and 
exchanged e-mail addresses, even though they both had the impression that “we weren’t 
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supposed to stay in touch.” The fact that Brenda and other members like her felt that such 
communication was frowned upon revealed rather pointedly that even though the rhetoric in 
MoveOn’s e-mails was designed to create a sense of community, the very system through which 
these e-mails were sent undermined such claims. 
 Lastly, some members believed that MoveOn was inherently unable to build a “real” 
community because it was an internet-based organization. In some ways, this critique cut most 
deeply, because it rejected the possibility that community sentiment could be created through e-
mail and websites. When I asked a member named Adam, who had only participated in online 
action, if MoveOn’s e-mails made him feel connected to other MoveOn members, he replied, 
“No, it just feels like I’m taking a quick little survey.... I’ve always seen myself as someone on 
the outside of it looking in.” Another online activist, Justin, said that if he ran into another 
MoveOn member at a party, he “wouldn’t necessarily feel connected because we’re both 
MoveOn members. It’s just, like, we’re on the same listserv, we get the same e-mails, maybe we 
could have a discussion on a certain point.” The top-down nature of MoveOn’s e-mails and 
absence of biographical information or photos of staff members on the website meant that many 
members viewed the organization as an impersonal, abstract entity. One online activist described 
her attempts to picture other MoveOn members and staff as “an exercise in fantasy,” while 
another used The Wizard of Oz as a metaphor for MoveOn’s impersonality, saying, “it does make 
you wonder, who are the leadership? Who’s behind the screen? Who’s the Oz, the Wizard?” 
CONCLUSION  
 The top-down structure of MoveOn’s e-mail system allowed it to shape members’ 
impressions of “the MoveOn community” through clever use of language that painted a picture 
of millions of people working together to make the country a better place. The problem with 
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such a system, though, was that it stymied members’ attempts to establish long-term connections, 
and made many members feel like MoveOn was not truly interested in helping them create 
genuine, local-level social bonds. At the heart of this dilemma was the issue of control. When 
community was something that could be created by MoveOn’s staff through rhetoric in e-mail 
messages, it was still very much under the control of organizational leadership. If MoveOn 
enabled members to communicate person-to-person through its e-mail system or invested more 
deeply in local community building events, this control was lost.  
 The concern with control was not about community formation as such, but about the loss 
of message control that might occur if members began forming local groups that acted 
independently of MoveOn’s agenda. In short, MoveOn viewed community (or at least the 
perception of community) as a means to achieve its political goals. At the same time, it 
recognized that the very structure of the internet worked against this model of centralized 
control, by allowing like-minded people to communicate freely and make connections without 
any need for oversight. MoveOn addressed this issue by using the internet to construct an image 
of community even as it closed off avenues for real community-building to take place. It also 
gave members opportunities to meet offline, but made sure that they stayed on message by 
giving them specific tasks or talking points that reflected the organization’s overall agenda. 
 Despite the fact that many members experienced little if any sense of genuine communal 
connections to one another, participation affected most active members’ sense of self. In the next 
chapter, I explain how processes of activist identity development and reinforcement occurred 
among MoveOn members. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DEVELOPMENT AND ENACTMENT OF ACTIVIST IDENTITIES 
AMONG MOVEON MEMBERS 
  
 In this chapter, I explore how participation in MoveOn.org, an online progressive political 
organization, affected the identities of MoveOn members. This analysis is rooted in symbolic 
interactionist analyses of the self (Blumer 1969; Cooley 1902; Goffman 1959, 1963; James 
[1890] 1983; Mead [1934] 1962; Stryker 1980) as well as studies of the relationship of social 
movement participation to self-identity (Armato and Marsiglio 2002; Bernstein 1997; Broad 
2002; Einwohner 2002; Gamson 1995; Hunt and Benford 1994; Kiecolt 2000; Snow and 
McAdam 2000; Stryker, White, and Owens 2000; Taylor and Whittier 1992). In particular, I 
draw upon Gecas’s concept of “value identity,” which he defines as self-definitions that 
“characterize the moral or political or philosophical stand that persons take and in terms of which 
define themselves” (2000:98).  
 Some MoveOn members I interviewed had never been involved in political activism, while 
others had long histories of working for social and political causes. These two groups, which I 
refer to respectively as “newcomers” and “veterans,” followed paths to and through MoveOn that 
were similar but distinct. Drawing on fifty-two interviews, I follow these paths and show how 
participation in MoveOn helped newcomers develop activist identities and supported veterans’ 
pre-existing activist identities. These insights add to the literature on the formation and function 
of activist identities in social movements (Bobel 2007; Downton and Wehr 1998; Kelly and 
Breinlinger 1995; McAdam 1989; Simon et al. 1998). 
PRECIPITATING FACTORS: EXPERIENCE AND WORLDVIEW  
 Newcomers and veterans differed in their experiences prior to MoveOn. Newcomers had 
little, if any, history of social or political activism, while some veterans had been activists for 
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most of their lives. What made the groups similar was a shared belief that people had a 
responsibility to get active in political issues if they wanted to see change occur. 
NEWCOMERS 
 For a few newcomers, their work with MoveOn was their first taste of activism. This was 
the case for Darcy, a regional coordinator in her fifties who began her activist career in the fall of 
2007 with MoveOn’s voter outreach campaign during the Kentucky governor’s race: 
They called me and asked if I was interested. At that point I was just ready to do 
something. I was pretty much fed up with the Bush administration, so I said, 
“Yes, I’ll come down there and help you.” I met with a bunch of MoveOn 
members and we did some canvassing, and then they made me the precinct 
captain. Then I got a call in January [2008] asking me if I wanted to be a regional 
coordinator. I had never been politically involved ever, so I really jumped in over 
my head. 
Unlike Darcy, most newcomers had at least volunteered with churches or community groups, but 
they did not define this work as activism. A local activist in her late twenties named Lisa, for 
example, had participated in several community-oriented actions but did not think of these as 
“activism” until my question reframed the activities in this light: 
Personally I don’t really call it activism, but I guess it is. I was really involved in 
a youth group in my high school and junior high years through my church. That 
got me volunteering a lot and going into lower income neighborhoods. We did 
neighborhood clean ups, reaching out to community members, stuff like that. So I 
would say that sort of triggered my awareness of being involved in activism. 
Newcomers also frequently recalled witnessing their parents discuss and/or participate in social 
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and political causes when they were children. Annie, a regional coordinator in her late twenties, 
said her parents contributed to her social awareness: 
[In my family] politics were discussed but never engaged in. I mean, my parents 
went to the protests during the Sixties and Seventies and the whole nine yards, but 
they were never really gung-ho. My mother was involved with a non-profit that 
gives free summer vacations to poor kids. We would also go to folk concerts that 
Pete Seeger organized. So I wasn’t taken to protests when I was ten, but I was 
being educated in the art of social consciousness. The idea of helping people 
make their lives better has definitely been part of my culture. 
 Although their levels of political consciousness and engagement varied, newcomers shared 
a general participatory worldview. They believed that people should actively try to improve the 
world and their conditions within it, rather than simply hoping that others would do the necessary 
work. This worldview made them prime candidates for social movement recruitment. 
VETERANS   
 Unlike newcomers, veterans had more extensive histories of activism. In fact, one local 
organizer named Susan had participated in civil rights marches and sit-ins, marched on 
Washington with the Students for a Democratic Society in 1965 to protest the Vietnam War, 
worked with women’s peace groups and the National Organization for Women, counseled sexual 
assault victims, been arrested for protesting at a nuclear test site, and helped organize protests for 
both the Gulf War and the current Iraq War. Her life story epitomized many veterans’ lifelong 
dedication to activism. It also illustrated another common thread among this group: emphasis on 
political participation outside of the party structure. Veterans generally distrusted the Democratic 
Party, but they also recognized that their opportunities to make effective change in national 
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politics were tied to the reality of two-party rule in the United States, as the following comments 
by a local activist named Truman indicate: 
I have been involved in radical politics and social change for my whole adult life, 
pretty much. And it’s always been an issue about how to push society to change 
and still be practical in some way. Now, I have strongly disliked the Democratic 
Party, ‘cause it seems to never take a position that promotes progressive change 
and it absorbs the energies of many people who’d like to make some changes in 
society. At the same time, efforts to work outside of it are often not very practical. 
 Not all veterans fit this profile of the Sixties radical turned twenty-first century pragmatist.  
Some, like sixty-six year-old local activist Alberta, had participated in institutionalized politics. 
She had worked on a senatorial campaign and was very involved with Howard Dean’s 2004 
campaign before becoming active in MoveOn during the 2006 congressional election. For her, 
MoveOn was only one of several means to work for Democratic candidates, but her loyalty 
ultimately rested with the Democratic Party: 
I belong to four Democratic parties in the state. I used to be chair of the 
Democratic Party in the UK, and I was on the board of Democrats Abroad for 
four or six years. I believe in the political party process. I’m a Democrat, and I 
don’t want something that’s too amorphous. I want to get out the vote, and I want 
to do it through the Democratic Party, if possible. MoveOn is not the center of my 
universe. 
 Many veterans who came of age in the Nineties had also built up significant histories of 
activism. A regional coordinator named Kevin, for example, had already been active in an anti-
tobacco campaign for eight years prior to his work with MoveOn, despite the fact that he was 
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only twenty-two years old at the time of our interview. Another regional coordinator who was 
also in his twenties had spent many years volunteering every day at a battered women’s shelter 
and a home for people living with AIDS. The story of Darren, a local activist in his thirties, is 
representative of how many younger veterans shifted from humanitarian work into political 
activism: 
In high school and college, I was involved in my church quite a bit, and through 
that... I worked with mentally handicapped adults [and] children who were 
victims of HIV/AIDS. I worked a lot with low-income youth, and with 
adjudicated youth through Outward Bound. And then I joined the Peace Corps 
and went to South America.... [In 2000] I sent e-mails to everybody I knew, 
saying, “Don’t vote for this man [George W. Bush]. He’s gonna be trouble.” And 
then when the attacks of 9/11 happened, I heard the voices of the hawks in 
Washington and it scared me. I started wearing a black ribbon... as my own little 
form of protest.... And then around 2002 or 2003, when we were ramping up for 
the Iraq War, I visited Washington, D.C., with some Peace Corps friends and 
staged a protest outside the White House. I held up a sign that said, “Dear Mr. 
Bush: Who would Jesus bomb?” 
 Veterans’ activism exposed them to leftist perspectives (Marxism, environmentalism, 
pacifism, and so on) that fundamentally framed how they viewed the world, and also integrated 
them into activist networks that reinforced their political engagement. At the same time, they 
knew from their prior experiences working outside the political system that idealistic protest, 
while personally fulfilling, often did little to change national policies, especially when an 
antagonistic administration was in power. Veterans were dedicated to political change, but 
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wanted to go about it in a way that would maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
activism. Such circumstances made MoveOn’s approach to political activism appealing. 
CATALYZING EVENTS 
 Prior to joining MoveOn, some members had not participated in activism because 
constraining factors, such as full-time jobs and families, made them “biographically unavailable” 
(McAdam 1986) for protest. Others were inactive simply because they did not feel that the 
political situation in the United States during the Clinton years was dire enough to get involved. 
Several events in the first decade of the twenty-first century provided the “moral shock” 
necessary to increase the perceived urgency of political activism. Jasper (1997:106) explains that 
a moral shock occurs, “when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of 
outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action.” This event causes people 
to recognize the disjuncture between their values and reality, and compels them to try to change 
current conditions to bring them into line with their values (Jasper 1997, 1998).   
NEWCOMERS  
 Newcomers’ outrage was fueled by virtually all aspects of the Bush Administration’s 
policies and practices: the controversial way Bush became president in 2000, the 
administration’s post-9/11 hard-line militaristic response and incursion into civil liberties with 
the Patriot Act, perceived failures in domestic policies, and, of course, the Iraq war. Members 
like Harold, a local activist in his eighties, were completely disgusted with George W. Bush: 
The country has reached a point where change is essential. I consider George W. 
Bush to be the worst president in American history.... I have great difficulty 
knowing anything that Bush has done that you might say has a long-term benefit. 
The last seven years has been one bad thing after another, it seems to me. So 
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that’s the background for the interest in MoveOn. 
Likewise, a regional coordinator named Bruce explained how he and his wife decided to get 
active in MoveOn out of frustration with the Republican Party: 
We were so disenchanted with the Republican Party and their stance on a whole 
bunch of issues that we were pissed off and decided to get active on the other 
side.... It made quite an impression on some of the other MoveOn people, because 
we got active very quickly. It’s kind of like admitting you’re an ex-Nazi. 
 The strongest underlying motivator for getting politically active was the Iraq War. Some 
people got involved in the anti-war movement because their relatives were being deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan, but the majority did so for less personal reasons. Moral outrage over the 
costs of the war (both in dollars and lives) overwhelmed newcomers like Linda, an online activist 
and mother of three: 
Keepin’ our military over there and spending billions of dollars a month on a war 
that we went into based on false information, and we haven’t really even begun to 
come out of it. We’re spending, what is it, $2 billion a month for this war? What 
about education? What about our country? And the health insurance issue?... The 
money that goes out every month and the lives that are lost drives me nuts. 
Moral shock about the Iraq War and the Bush Administration’s foreign and domestic policies 
grew into a “perfect storm” of outrage that made newcomers feel it was imperative that they do 
something to stop the Bush Administration’s negative practices. 
VETERANS 
 Similar to the newcomers, veterans were shocked and appalled by the events of 2000-2008. 
Though many veterans had never reduced their participation in movements, some had decreased 
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their activity in the Eighties and Nineties to raise families and build careers. The war and other 
actions by the Bush Administration reactivated these people. A local activist named Jeff, for 
example, had taken time to focus on raising his two children after a divorce. However, he was 
inspired to get politically active once again after the 2000 election: 
I thought the 2000 election was stolen, and I knew enough about the Constitution 
to, I couldn’t figure out the [Supreme] Court’s judgment. You know, 5-to-4, that 
really pissed me off, and I knew that that was wrong. And that started it, you 
know. 
 Other veterans became more active because changes in their lives allowed them to engage 
in political activism. Lawrence, for example, was a self-proclaimed “workaholic” who had only 
signed MoveOn’s online petitions prior to changing jobs and reducing his hours. With his newly 
found free time, he began volunteering for local MoveOn actions and quickly became a regional 
coordinator, the highest volunteer position in MoveOn. Several veterans also increased their 
activity after retiring. One regional coordinator named Louise had been active in the student anti-
war and civil rights movements during the Sixties, and had worked for George McGovern’s 
presidential campaign in 1972. However, while focusing on her career and raising two sons in 
the Eighties and Nineties she was not involved in activism. MoveOn’s 2006 get-out-the-vote 
effort became the catalyst for her reengagement with politics: 
I heard about MoveOn in July of 2006. I got a call from a volunteer to come down 
and work one day at the office in [name of city omitted]. I went and did that and 
I’ve never stopped. [laughs] Before that, I was getting increasingly frustrated 
listening to the news and pacing the house saying, “I can’t stand this! I can’t stand 
this!” So the call came and said, “You want to come down and see what we’re 
 108 
doing?,” and I said, “Absolutely!” I was really motivated to do something. 
 Even veterans who had never reduced their participation in activism were energized by the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They saw their activism with MoveOn as part of a larger struggle 
against the United States’ violent foreign policy. Greg was a self-employed writer and online 
activist who had been active in leftist politics since 1968, when he participated in the infamous 
protests at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. He strongly opposed George W. 
Bush’s choice to invade Iraq: 
I think anyone that can really see outside of Fox News and the propaganda [will 
see] that this little coward is hiding behind an army and using them for his own 
sadistic pleasures. He’s into killing and that’s all there is to it. If people don’t see 
it, I don’t know what to say to people like that. They [Bush’s supporters] went for 
simplicity and they got it, and it’s given rise to a redneck intellectualism that is 
just ridiculous. 
Likewise, Darren, the local activist whose participation in MoveOn was preceded by work with 
the Peace Corps and his church, explained that the goal of his activism was “bigger than just 
getting out of the Iraq or Afghanistan war; it’s the end of the military-industrial complex that 
creates perpetual war.”  
 In summary, the Bush Administration’s actions supplied the “moral shock” (Jasper 1997, 
1998) that energized newcomers and veterans, who then began seeking opportunities to get 
politically active. 
JOINING MOVEON 
 Most members, including newcomers and veterans, did not recall exactly when or how 
they first heard about MoveOn. Because of the low threshold for membership (simply signing an 
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e-petition made one a member), many peoples’ entry into MoveOn was rather casual or even 
inadvertent. Those who did remember said they came across MoveOn through a number of 
avenues. Newcomers’ and veterans’ paths to MoveOn were similar in several ways, but there 
were also important differences. 
NEWCOMERS   
 A few newcomers discovered MoveOn online, as was the case for Linda, the mother of 
three who was outraged at the costs of the war: 
I was just searching for something, some way for me to get involved in the 
political process. I just searched on the internet and found their website, and read 
about them and what they do. And I thought it was a perfect fit for me. 
Others first heard about MoveOn through participation in other progressive political 
organizations. Lisa, for example, was a college student and online activist in her twenties who 
discovered MoveOn through Howard Dean’s presidential campaign. When she learned that 
MoveOn had endorsed Dean in its 2003 online primary, she researched MoveOn and joined its e-
mail list.  
 Most newcomers joined MoveOn after hearing about it from friends and family. Because 
the person providing the information was a trusted source who knew them well, members 
assumed that MoveOn was a legitimate organization that represented their views. Della, an 
online activist in her fifties, joined as a result of friends’ forwarded e-mails: 
I have friends who have an activist inclination, and they forwarded e-mails to me. 
I decided to get on their e-mail list based on the content of the e-mail that was 
forwarded to me. They say, “You wanna get on our mailing list, sign up.” So I 
said, “Okay, I want to get on your e-mail list,” and signed up. 
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Similarly, Andrea, a forty-one year-old local activist, heard about MoveOn through 
conversations with influential others during the 2004 election season: 
My brother was talking to me about those bake sales that were going on. They had 
all these funny names. And then a neighbor started talking to me about it in terms 
of voter legitimacy, like a paper trail and all that. She had gotten involved. So 
that’s how I started hearing about MoveOn, and then I went to the website and 
signed up. 
 Whether or not newcomers remembered how they got involved in MoveOn, they felt that 
MoveOn was a convenient way to get involved in the political process. This sentiment was 
expressed by Justin, an online activist in his thirties: 
It feels like in a lot of ways our system is set up to shut out people from 
participating in democracy. Whereas, this organization’s going out there and 
sending a petition to your desk, and all you have to do is click on it, maybe write a 
personal message if you want. It’s taken the grunt work out of it. 
Beyond matters of convenience, though, members believed that MoveOn’s size magnified their 
voices and gave them the power to influence national political decisions. Della, the online 
activist mentioned above who joined MoveOn as a result of a friend’s e-mail, said: 
I think MoveOn has a powerful voice and they’re doing important work, and they 
stand up for what I believe in. I feel they increase the significance of my voice 
because they get together millions or thousands of people to do the work they’re 
doing. So I’m not just an isolated voice; I have the power of numbers. 
This combination of size, convenience, and outspoken progressive political opinions was the key 
to MoveOn’s ability to draw in newcomers and keep them involved. 
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VETERANS  
 Many veterans found out about MoveOn through similar channels as newcomers, including 
conversations with friends and family, forwarded e-mails, and a “buzz” about MoveOn within 
other activist organizations. Because these stories are so similar, I have opted to omit redundant 
comments in order to better address how veterans’ joining experiences differed. Veterans 
reported more often than newcomers that media coverage helped them discover MoveOn. 
Although it seems like media coverage could have greater influence in spreading MoveOn’s 
name to those not already embedded in activist networks, it also stands to reason that people who 
were already involved in political action paid more attention to political news and were more 
attuned to what was being said about progressive organizations. A good example of this was the 
experience of Jeff, the local activist with two children mentioned earlier. He recounted hearing 
about MoveOn while visiting his brother, a right-wing Republican who was listening to talk 
radio at the time: 
Somebody was commenting on MoveOn. You know, kind of the classic [adopts a 
mock southern accent], “All those Michael Moore, MoveOn freaks!” or whatever 
the standard thing was. That was when I first heard about MoveOn. That was 
probably around 2000. I didn’t know what they did and didn’t know who they 
were, but I didn’t believe who I was listening to. 
 Veterans were somewhat more likely than newcomers to be early adopters of MoveOn, 
although the majority joined MoveOn between 2004 and 2008, when it gained national attention 
for its outspoken anti-war position and election work. Several people I interviewed received 
MoveOn’s very first message about the Senate censure of Bill Clinton in 1998. Others joined 
during the 2000 election season. Even though MoveOn did not run a get-out-the-vote program or 
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raise significant funds in 2000, some veterans, such as a seventy-two year-old online activist 
named Brenda, saw it as an outlet for activism because they respected the position it took during 
the Clinton censure debate: 
I was living in Mexico during the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. Although I wasn’t 
active in it then, I said, “Gosh, we should do something,” and somebody told me 
about this website. And then it wasn’t until the 2000 election, when I realized he 
[George W. Bush] was gonna run, that I actually gave them my name and started 
to do something. 
John, a local activist in his mid-sixties who had participated in anti-nuclear and alternative 
religious movements, joined in 2004 because he was impressed by MoveOn’s vocal opposition 
to the Iraq war: 
I felt really powerless about stopping the war when I was not a member of 
MoveOn. It was the idea that here’s a group of three-million-plus people that are 
all interested in accomplishing the same goal. That’s the same attraction as 
religion, basically: “We’re gonna save the world,” or at least try to. So that’s why 
I joined. 
 In keeping with their antagonism toward party politics, veterans expressed more often than 
newcomers that MoveOn’s position outside of the party system was an important factor in their 
decisions to participate. Susan, whose activist history stretched back to the Fifties, explained why 
her husband and she chose to participate in MoveOn’s 2004 election work: 
We wanted to be active in the election, but we didn’t want to be active in the 
Democratic Party. We got involved in MoveOn because they seemed to us to be 
left of the Democrats. It was simple: anything to the left of the Democrats was 
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okay with me. I wanted to put my energy into getting out the vote against Bush 
any way I could possibly do it that wasn’t in the Democratic Party. 
Likewise, local organizer Kurtis said he “liked the progressive but not partisan angle” of 
MoveOn’s political work.  
 Veterans were also more attracted by what they perceived to be MoveOn’s grassroots 
approach to political action. Given their histories of participation in activist groups, veterans like 
Willow, a local activist with a background in anti-war and feminist activism, craved the 
opportunity to get active with like-minded people on a local level for national issues: 
It was people who were ready to deal with the important issues that affect real 
people in the United States and not waste time with bullshit. Not who we can get 
elected, or this scandal, or that thing. It’s issues like healthcare, the transparent 
vote, and the war. That’s what attracted me: people organizing on a local level, 
grassroots people taking care of things that we don’t really have the power to 
influence through our current political system in this country. 
Though veterans’ motivations for joining MoveOn were similar to those of newcomers in many 
ways, their activist backgrounds made them more attuned to media coverage of social movement 
groups and drew them to MoveOn because of its stance as a non-partisan, grassroots political 
organization. 
GETTING ACTIVE IN MOVEON 
 Given their histories of political involvement, I expected veterans to be more active in 
MoveOn than newcomers. In reality, both groups were active in online and offline activism to 
about the same degree, though for slightly different reasons. 
NEWCOMERS 
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 Some newcomers faced family and job responsibilities that constrained their activism. One 
mother of three named Linda who also worked part-time as a loan officer was limited to online 
activism by her family and work responsibilities: 
I participate in most of the petitions and donate occasionally when I can. I haven’t 
been able to join actual community events, but I hope to at some point. It’s just 
my time. I’ve got soccer three days a week. I need to get my kids to practice and 
games. My schedule gets kind of crazy... Sometimes I read [MoveOn’s e-mail 
messages] at three-o-clock at night.  
Although she did not have children, a local activist named Andrea related that the nature of her 
job prevented her from getting more active in MoveOn: 
Basically all I really act on is signing the petitions. I can’t call [congressional 
offices] during my work hours because I work for the government. It’s not 
allowed…. Well, I made calls for MoveOn for the [2006] senatorial elections. I 
went to one MoveOn meeting after that, but it was just people saying they were 
gonna read different newspapers or write letters to the editors. And I just sort of 
disengaged. That was it. I mean, I barely have time to read my mail, you know? 
 Newcomers who got more deeply involved in MoveOn typically fell into two categories: 1) 
younger people who were in college, unemployed, or working part-time; and 2) middle-aged or 
elderly people who had an “empty nest” and were retired, unemployed, or working part-time. 
These people often rose quickly to leadership positions because they had the extra time to 
dedicate to MoveOn’s local organizing efforts, which frequently required regional coordinators 
to volunteer ten hours or more per week. A typical pattern of escalating involvement was that of 
Doug, who got involved in his late twenties while he was working at a job that allowed him 
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some free time: 
I was kind of a lurker on their e-mail list until the 2006 election. I responded to an 
e-mail about phone banking and got invited into the office here. I figured I’d do a 
couple hours and be done with it, but I wound up coming in just about every night 
between September first and Election Day.... From there I was asked to be council 
coordinator. I did that for two years.... Then they were ramping up for the [2008] 
presidential election, and I was asked to be regional coordinator. After a little bit 
of going back and forth, I decided to do that because I thought it was really 
important to be able to have a role in growing and adding councils. 
Another newcomer named Darcy became a regional coordinator only two months after attending 
her first MoveOn event. MoveOn’s request for participation came at an opportune time in her 
life, after her children had left the house and she was only working part-time. As she put it, “I 
would have said ‘yes’ to any group that was getting involved and doing something. It was just 
sort of serendipity. I was ready and they were there, and they asked me and I said ‘yes.’”  
Interestingly, both Doug and Darcy had stepped down from regional coordinating at the time of 
our interviews because they had started new jobs that demanded much more of their time.  
 Less commonly, some newcomers with full-time jobs or families also took on high levels 
of responsibility. For these people the combination of a participatory worldview and a sense of 
urgency convinced them that they needed to get involved despite their work or family 
obligations. One such individual was a forty-four year-old man named Peter who had a full-time 
job, a wife, and a twelve-year-old son. He jumped at the opportunity to be a regional coordinator 
because he felt it was a productive way to use the anger he felt toward the Bush Administration: 
I worked with [my field organizer] doing an event. It was a petition delivery 
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against war with Iran. And then he asked me right away to be a regional 
coordinator. I was ready. I had been angry for some period, an onset of rage, 
barking at people around me. I was ready to hear somebody asking me to focus 
that energy. It was perfect timing. I tell people it’s like therapy for me, having a 
way to channel this anger. Not so much anymore, but while Bush was president. 
Annie, the newcomer whose former activist parents took her to Pete Seeger concerts as a child, 
also experienced this sense of urgency. Although she was busy, Annie found the regional 
coordinator role uniquely suited to daily routines, and made an effort to fit activism into her busy 
schedule: 
As a regional coordinator, I wasn’t really going to events. I was organizing the 
heck out of them. At the same time I was doing about six other things: being an 
elementary school teacher, and I’m also an actor. So I was doing those things all 
at the same time. Often MoveOn events are in the middle of the day, and I can’t 
exactly tell twenty-one children that I’ll be back in a few hours. But I can get 
other people to do them. 
For these busy people, MoveOn’s internet- and telephone-based organizing system allowed them 
the flexibility to engage in activism in the spaces between their work and family obligations.  
VETERANS  
 While many veterans were involved in offline activism and organizing, an equal number 
participated primarily or exclusively in MoveOn’s online forms of activism. I assumed that 
veterans would be more involved than newcomers because they were committed to activist 
lifestyles and identities. However, as I dug deeper I started to understand why some veterans 
were not highly active in MoveOn’s offline activities. 
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 Through their histories of participating in social movements, veterans had built up skill sets 
and social networks that were well suited to MoveOn’s offline actions. Some searched for 
organizational opportunities to put their activist skills to use, and often sought or were asked to 
take on leadership positions. A typical pattern was the experience of John, the local organizer 
who began participating in MoveOn in 2004 after retiring and moving back to his home state: 
Not long after moving back I started getting more active in MoveOn and was 
eventually invited to a demonstration. I thought, “Yeah, that would be great,” so I 
went to that. Then somewhere along the line I was invited to a council meeting, so 
I went to it. I liked the people there and felt that this was something I could do, so 
I started volunteering for stuff. I was made council coordinator in very short order 
because I have the time and I’m responsible enough that I can do stuff that it’s 
hard to find people to do. 
Another veteran named Kurtis had been active in his community for over twenty years, and had 
become very close with many local activists. He brought these network connections to MoveOn 
when he became a precinct leader during its 2004 voter outreach campaign: 
As the ’04 election came along, I was dead-set against Bush getting re-elected and 
wanted to do something to help with that. I heard about the No Voter Left Behind 
program that they were instituting and there being a need for precinct leaders, and 
I thought, “Okay, that’s something I can do.” And because I have a network of 
people I know in town here I was able to kind of enlist some of their help too. 
 Other veterans restricted their participation to MoveOn’s online forms of activism. These 
veterans faced family and job responsibilities as well as other challenges that hindered offline 
participation. One example was Greg, the interviewee who protested at the 1968 Democratic 
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National Convention in Chicago. Despite the fact that he was unmarried and had no kids, a 
disability that left him in a wheelchair made it difficult for him to participate in offline activism: 
On occasion, through e-mail they’ve let me know about local members getting 
together, but I haven’t made it. I just didn’t want to make the hassle to go over 
there. I’d probably go with a cane, but still, it’s twice the effort of a normal 
person. If I had the legs I’d go, but, you know, standing is a great part of a lot of 
these things [public events]. So I do a lot of the internet. 
Similarly, one regional coordinator I knew was unable to attend MoveOn events because he was 
quadriplegic and needed to be attached to his breathing tube at all times. Nevertheless, he was 
able to organize MoveOn events from his home using the internet and phones. Although these 
two examples are more dramatic than the typical experiences of veterans, they illustrate that 
online participation did not necessarily entail less commitment or a weaker form of activism. 
 Many veterans were also involved with other activist organizations, which limited the time 
they could dedicate to MoveOn. One veteran named Deborah restricted her MoveOn activism to 
online petitions because she was already going door-to-door for the Sierra Club and making calls 
to voters for the Democratic Party. As the 2008 election season got into full swing, this 
competition for veterans’ time and energy became particularly apparent as many MoveOn 
members joined Barack Obama’s campaign. In my role as a regional coordinator during the 
election season, I noticed that it became increasingly difficult to recruit people for MoveOn 
calling parties or other events because they were already doing similar things through the Obama 
campaign. This was the case with Nancy, a local activist who decided to volunteer for Obama 
rather than MoveOn: 
My focus now is more on getting Obama elected. I’m more passionate about 
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Obama. In fact, if I’m remembering correctly, MoveOn sent a thing [an e-mail 
message] and wanted some phone banking, and I didn’t do it because I thought, 
“I’m doing it through Obama’s [online system].” So I think right now I’m feeling 
less connected to MoveOn and more connected to Obama, and once this [election] 
is done it will probably shift back and then MoveOn will be my vehicle for issues. 
 On the other hand, several veterans did dedicate themselves to MoveOn as a primary outlet 
for their activism despite other activities. Kurtis, for example, was a council coordinator for 
several years while concurrently holding down a full-time job and chairing his local union. 
Another council coordinator named Beth balanced her MoveOn responsibilities with full-time 
attendance at a university and three part-time jobs. As mentioned earlier, Kurtis was deeply 
integrated into his local activist community and had a decades-long history of activism. Beth did 
not have either of these traits, but she came from a politically active family and had a brother 
who had been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Their lifelong dedication to activism, 
integration into local activist networks, a history of political awareness in members’ families, 
and/or a personal connection to issues were enough to counteract the pull of their other 
responsibilities. These factors mitigated the competing demands of work, school, and family. 
 Even though I was surprised to see that veterans were no more involved in MoveOn than 
newcomers, when I considered issues of “biographical availability” (McAdam 1986) and 
competing commitments to other activist organizations, it made sense why some of these 
dedicated activists were not more highly active in MoveOn. Many veterans saw MoveOn as one 
convenient outlet for their activist participation among many possibilities, and only some 
decided to make MoveOn their primary activist organization. 
DEVELOPING AND REINFORCING ACTIVIST IDENTITIES 
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 Participation in MoveOn had important effects upon the identities of the vast majority of 
MoveOn members I interviewed. Newcomers’ participation led to the development of new 
activist identities. For veterans, the experience was not transformative because they already saw 
themselves as activists, but it allowed them to reinforce these activist identities. 
 NEWCOMERS  
 Newcomers credited MoveOn with giving them the skills and confidence necessary to view 
themselves as activists. When I asked a regional coordinator named Peter if he felt like an 
activist, he replied: 
Yes, I do, and I owe it to MoveOn. Before [joining MoveOn], I didn’t feel like I 
was actually doing anything useful as far as moving the country in the right 
direction. But now I feel like I’ve been effective. I feel like other people have 
responded to me well as a leader and just as a fellow citizen. It’s actually made 
me feel pretty good about myself. 
They also reported that MoveOn had been a critical catalyst in changing them from people who 
felt like action was important to people who acted on their convictions. One person who 
succinctly expressed this idea was Katrina, a forty-nine year-old local activist who had 
participated in MoveOn’s election work in 2004, 2006, and 2008: 
I think [participation in MoveOn is] very important, because it’s not just about the 
election, it’s about my value system. MoveOn is a venue for me to act upon what 
I value. It’s just exactly what I would create if I were to think anything up. When 
I see people who have such passion and live their passion and their values, I can 
really connect with that and it’s important to me. 
Most newcomers said they planned to continue participating in political activism and organizing, 
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and a couple changed careers as a result of their work with MoveOn. One former regional 
coordinator named Kathy said MoveOn “helped me find my true self and tapped into the 
organizer I had in me.” Although she had been uninvolved in activism prior to MoveOn, she 
decided to dedicate herself to political organizing and got a job as the executive director of a 
non-profit organization in her state, a position she said she would have never considered before 
MoveOn. Likewise, a local activist and former regional coordinator named George switched 
from a career in sales and marketing to working as a labor union organizer. 
 Activist identity development did not always correspond to high levels of participation in 
MoveOn. Although most newcomers who developed activist identities were very involved in 
MoveOn’s offline activism and organizing, some less involved members also developed activist 
identities. One such person was Lisa, the college student who joined MoveOn after hearing about 
it through Howard Dean’s presidential campaign. Her involvement in MoveOn was driven by the 
fact that her brother had been deployed to Iraq. When the military wanted to deploy him for a 
second time, she organized a letter-writing campaign and successfully halted his redeployment. 
She got involved in some of MoveOn’s anti-war vigils and protests, but mostly just read 
MoveOn’s e-mails and occasionally signed petitions. Still, Lisa saw MoveOn as an important 
component of her budding activist identity: 
MoveOn’s been a channel of activism and a source of inspiration.... It’s been a 
nice backup to what I am doing in my personal life [her letter-writing campaign], 
just to know that other people are doing it as well, and that people care and stand 
beside you. It gives me the confidence to continue that work and to start 
conversations with people about that [the war] and not be afraid to get into it.  
 Newcomers indicated that their emerging activist identities would last beyond their work 
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with MoveOn. By the time I interviewed them, quite a few members had moved on to other 
organizations or had taken breaks from activism due to new jobs, health problems, or other 
factors. Nonetheless, many said that they still felt like activists even though they were not 
participating in activism at the moment. One former regional coordinator named Gary had 
stepped down after six months because the position was taking too much time away from his job 
search. Nonetheless, he said, “Even though I’m out of MoveOn right now, I still feel like an 
activist. I can still use the skills I learned, and, you know, being surrounded by people doing this 
stuff really made me more politically aware.” Sarah, another former regional coordinator, said 
she “felt like [she] had to break up with MoveOn” after the 2008 election due to what she 
described as “burn out.” Even though she quit her regional coordinating position and 
unsubscribed from MoveOn’s e-mail list, Sarah said she felt like an activist and anticipated 
participating in activism after taking a break to regain her energy. 
VETERANS  
 Through MoveOn, veterans were able to continue careers of value-based actions and 
reinforce their activist identities. That being said, MoveOn was not necessarily as important to 
veterans as it was to newcomers in this regard because veterans’ activist identities were bolstered 
by years of experience and concurrent involvement in other activist organizations. Darren, the 
anti-war activist and former Peace Corps volunteer, explained: 
Even when I was canvassing with MoveOn, my construction of self was not tied 
up with MoveOn per se, but was tied up with being an activist. I was an activist 
first, and a MoveOn member only as a means to support being an activist. It was a 
means of doing what I believed in doing. So MoveOn as an organization served a 
role, but in my perception of self it doesn’t rank very high of things that have 
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helped me find who I am. 
Sandy, a regional coordinator who had an extensive activist history, expressed a similar 
sentiment. She had been involved in civil rights boycotts as a high school student and had 
recently retired from her job as a fundraiser for non-profit organizations that benefitted women’s 
shelters. Moreover, she had taken in several foster children who she had met through her work 
with these shelters. In comparison to this work, her participation in MoveOn seemed relatively 
unimportant in her self-development. As she put it, “MoveOn is the political effort I’m most 
committed to at the moment, but it may not always be important to me. I was an activist before 
MoveOn and will be an activist after MoveOn.” 
 Some veterans did rely upon their participation in MoveOn to strengthen their activist 
identities. One woman named Joy had opposed the military and economic intrusion of the United 
States into Central America during the Eighties and participated in the marijuana legalization 
movement in the Nineties. When she had a child, though, her activism gave way to mothering. 
As she became more involved in MoveOn from 2006 onward, her activist identity reemerged as 
an important part of her overall sense of self. Joy said that she felt like “MoveOn found a lost 
activist” when they asked her to volunteer. One local activist in her twenties named Alexis 
clarified how participation in MoveOn added a political dimension to her activist identity: 
I had a sense of an activist self [before MoveOn], but it was rooted in working for 
things that benefitted kids. It’s not that I don’t still value kids, but I think now I 
see it as more respectable to work toward political aims than to be like, “I 
volunteered for a day care center.”... I’ll tell stories to people about my interest in 
politics, and I’ll sort of come around to it, like, “I made calls for them. I did 
this.”... So it’s definitely incredibly important in terms of my activist and my 
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political selves. 
 In contrast, some veterans grew unhappy with MoveOn because they felt its model of 
organizing did not adequately draw upon their activist skills, and therefore did not give them 
opportunities to reinforce their activist identities. MoveOn prefabricated signs, press releases, 
and talking points for events in order to keep a consistent message across hundreds or even 
thousands of simultaneous events. Although newcomers found these materials helpful, some 
veterans felt stifled and thought MoveOn was micro-managing what was ostensibly grassroots 
activism. These people left MoveOn in favor of organizations that they believed would draw 
upon the full range of their activist skills, as this comment from former local activist Alberta 
illustrates: 
I don’t think that I’ll put much more energy into MoveOn. They don’t understand 
me, and I probably don’t understand them. They’re asking me to just be part of a 
crowd and just do whatever they need. I’m an action-oriented person with 
organization and management skills. I think my skills are better used by 
organizations like the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch. 
 Along with this frustration over MoveOn’s event planning model, some veterans believed 
MoveOn was capitulating to the Democratic Party. As mentioned earlier, many veterans 
distrusted political parties and joined MoveOn because they thought it was a political outsider. 
When MoveOn appeared to be going along with the Democrats on issues that were near and dear 
to their hearts, veterans like Barry, a former local activist, decided to stop participating: 
I don’t like them very much anymore in one very important respect, and that is 
that I think they’re too moderate for my taste.... As far as I’m concerned, the Iraq 
War is by far the overwhelmingly important issue right now. That’s where the 
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entire focus of my political interest is at this point, and that’s not theirs. So I’m 
not on their wavelength anymore. 
Overall, veterans viewed MoveOn as an important avenue for expressing their activist identities. 
In keeping with Lichterman’s (1996) “personalized politics,” they were not loyal to the 
organization, except to the extent that it provided them opportunities to enact their values and 
reinforce their identities. Thus, when they disagreed with MoveOn’s organizing model or its 
positions on issues, they simply joined other groups that would allow them to more fully enact 
their activist identities. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter shows how MoveOn members’ values were translated into activist identities 
through value-oriented actions rooted in the organization. It ties Stryker’s (1968, 1980) emphasis 
on role-based identities to Gecas’s (2000) concept of “value identity” by showing how values 
that transcend particular roles nonetheless lead people into roles where they either develop or 
reinforce value-based identities. In the conclusion, I expand upon this point by describing the 
value activation process by which values lead to role-based action and, consequently, identity 
formation. However, before turning to this I first show in the next chapter how MoveOn’s 
organizational identity is shaped by the organization, ideologically motivated news sources, and 
finally members’ own activist experiences. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE CONTESTED MEANING OF MOVEON: ORGANIZATIONAL 
IDENTITY FRAMING BY MOVEON, MEDIA, AND MEMBERS 
 
 On September 10, 2007, MoveOn placed a full-page advertisement in The New York Times 
entitled, “General Petraeus or General Betray Us?”. This ad accused General David Petraeus, 
then the commander of troops in Iraq, of “cooking the books for the White House” by skewing 
his Senate testimony to support the Bush Administration’s positive assessment of the Iraq war 
(MoveOn.org 2007a). Republican leaders immediately called upon Democrats to publicly 
condemn the ad and distance themselves from MoveOn, and Senator John McCain began 
traveling with a laminated copy of the ad so he could denounce it at every stop on his 
presidential campaign (Bash et al. 2007; TheWashingtonPost.com 2007). Within sixteen days of 
its publication, both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives voted to formally 
condemn MoveOn’s ad (Sanner 2007; Taylor 2007). MoveOn members responded by donating 
over $500,000 to MoveOn on the day of the Senate resolution alone (Bai 2007b).  
 This controversy starkly illustrated how MoveOn represented different things to different 
groups of people depending on their positions on the political spectrum. In this chapter, I trace 
the relationship between MoveOn’s attempts to shape its organizational identity, “framing 
contests” (Ryan 1991) between ideologically driven news sources to define MoveOn’s identity, 
and interpretations of these competing identity frames by MoveOn members. The contest to 
frame MoveOn’s organizational identity—that is, what were defined as the distinguishing 
features of the organization (Albert and Whetten 1985)—took place in a “multiorganizational 
field” (Curtis and Zurcher 1973) that included organizations that were allied, opposed, and 
relatively neutral to MoveOn’s progressive political agenda (for more on organizational identity, 
see: Brown et al. 2006; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000; Hatch and 
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Schultz 1997, 2002; Meyer 2004; Scott and Lane 2000; Whetten and Mackey 2002). A multi-
organizational field includes all of the relationships between a focal social movement 
organization and other allied or opposed social movement organizations within an arena of 
political contestation. In the abortion debate, for example, a pro-choice organization would 
cooperate with other pro-choice groups in an “alliance system,” and compete with anti-abortion 
organizations in a “conflict system” (Klandermans 1992; Kriesi 1989; Luker 1984). These allied 
and antagonistic organizations influence movement organizations’ decisions about how to frame 
their issues and, as I show, their organizational identities (Cornfield and Fletcher 1998; 
McCammon et al. 2004). 
 I expand the concept of multiorganizational field to include news sources. Especially with 
the rise of political blogs and cable news networks like Fox News Channel, news sources are 
increasingly taking explicitly ideological positions in relation to political issues (Bernhardt, 
Krasa, and Polborn 2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell 2010). In other 
words, these sources are functioning much like social movement organizations by providing 
interpretations of events that support their ideological positions. At the same time, leading news 
sources that are commonly considered “mainstream” play important legitimizing roles when they 
cover a social movement organization, even if this coverage is not entirely positive (Gitlin 1980; 
Ryan 1991). These sources, which I refer to as “discourse leaders,” help set the tone for how 
other “mainstream” news organizations (those still adhering to journalistic norms of objectivity 
and balance) should cover a topic. They also fundamentally shape public opinion about these 
topics (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Jordan 1993; Page, Shapiro, and 
Dempsey 1987).  
 In this chapter, I contribute to scholarly understanding the contentious processes of identity 
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framing that occur in a multiorganizational field by linking identity framing by MoveOn, 
multiple news sources, and MoveOn members into a coherent (if not comprehensive) portrait of 
the organizational identity framing process. I address each interpretive arena in turn. 
MOVEON’S ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY PROJECTIONS 
 MoveOn attempted to shape its public image by making claims about its identity in 
documents that were available to both organizational members and outsiders. In keeping with 
symbolic interactionist analyses that propose identity definitions emerge through interpretations 
projected by individuals and reacted to by others, I refer to MoveOn’s claims as “organizational 
identity projections” (Blumer 1969; Cooley 1902; Goffman 1959). I qualitatively content 
analyzed fifty-three documents in which MoveOn explicitly framed its identity, including press 
releases, yearly reports, selected e-mails, and a short video about MoveOn’s work in 2007. The 
claims it made were generally similar across all types of documents, although press releases 
included one distinct claim.  
PROGRESSIVE 
 As in its attempts to define identity boundaries for community construction among 
members (see Chapter Four), MoveOn continually asserted that it was a progressive political 
organization. For example, its website included the statement, “With 5 million members across 
America,…we work together to realize the progressive promise of our country” (MoveOn.org 
2011). Likewise, its 2008 post-election report stated, “MoveOn members made it clear from 
early 2007 that electing a progressive president was our top priority” (MoveOn.org 2008b). The 
“progressive” label was used in place of “liberal” and “Democratic” in MoveOn’s identity 
projections; in fact, the latter two terms were notable for their absence as identifiers for MoveOn 
across all identity projections.  
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 MoveOn shied away from calling itself “liberal” because conservatives were able to 
successfully reframe this term as indicative of weakness, immorality, and lack of patriotism 
(Frank 2005; Nunberg 2007). This tarnished ideological label was thus jettisoned in favor of one 
that had not yet been critically undermined by conservative counterframing. Moreover, by 
calling itself “progressive” rather than “Democratic,” MoveOn could position itself as an 
independent outsider organization, even as it supported Democratic candidates (see Chapter 
Eight). MoveOn was indeed legally independent of the Democratic Party, but since 1998 it had 
only supported Democrats in elections and almost exclusively backed Democrats’ legislative 
proposals. It hoped to define itself as independent in the eyes of members, however, because a 
significant proportion of its membership base believed the Democratic Party was too 
accommodating and weak on important issues like the Iraq War. Lastly, by identifying itself as 
“progressive,” MoveOn explicitly aligned itself with other organizations on the left end of the 
political spectrum, including progressive blogs. It thus embedded itself within a larger political 
movement that, as I discussed in Chapter Two, was inspired by American movements of the past 
120 years. 
INFLUENTIAL 
 Secondly, MoveOn asserted that it was influential. Statements of effectiveness appeared in 
many MoveOn documents, but were especially prominent in yearly reports. In its 2005 report, 
MoveOn said it played significant roles in Republican Senator Tom DeLay's resignation as 
House Majority Leader and President Bush’s failure to privatize Social Security. MoveOn also 
stated that its fundraising efforts for progressive congressional candidates “had a big impact,” 
and claimed, “in a number of these races candidates who were on shaky ground are now firmly 
in the lead” (MoveOn.org 2005a). It often supported such statements with statistics, charts, and 
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outside assessments to add legitimacy to these claims. For example, in its 2006 post-election 
report MoveOn cited an academic study of its voter outreach program, stating “A Yale 
University study showed that our phone bank was the most effective volunteer calling program 
ever studied” (MoveOn.org 2006). After the 2008 election, MoveOn proudly reported, “MoveOn 
members pulled out all the stops to elect Barack Obama, donating over $88,000,000 and 
volunteering over 20,841,507 hours” (MoveOn.org 2008b). Such statements and statistics 
concretized MoveOn’s assertions of political influence. As I show later, though, they also gave 
conservative news sources fuel for claims that MoveOn was becoming too powerful. 
CHAMPION FOR ORDINARY AMERICANS 
 Thirdly, MoveOn portrayed itself as a champion for ordinary Americans. On its website, 
MoveOn described itself as “a way for busy but concerned citizens to find their political voice in 
a system dominated by big money and big media” (MoveOn.org 2011). It frequently used the 
phrase “people-powered” to describe its approach to politics, implying that it was motivated by 
average people coming together for grassroots action (MoveOn.org 2006, 2008a, b). MoveOn 
also claimed, “the issues that concern and animate our members are the issues that move 
America” (MoveOn.org 2006). As with its assertions of influence, MoveOn used statistics, such 
as its membership (five million by 2010) and average donation ($43.31 in 2004) figures, to 
support claims that it enjoyed broad-based support (MoveOn.org 2011). By calling attention to 
these statistics and claiming to represent “average people,” MoveOn hoped to counterbalance 
claims made by conservative politicians and commentators that it was a radical fringe 
organization. In fact, in its 2005 annual report, MoveOn made this strategy clear: 
Right-wing operatives from Karl Rove on down have made MoveOn a target of 
their attacks…. The primary way we can fight back is by making our 3.3 million 
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members the face of the organization…. Our members look, act, and talk like real 
Americans because they are real Americans—and that’s the best way we can 
demonstrate that MoveOn’s a mainstream phenomenon (MoveOn.org 2005a). 
ANTI-WAR BUT PRO-SOLDIER 
 Finally, in its press releases MoveOn went one step beyond claims that it represented 
average Americans by asserting it also represented soldiers. It did so by highlighting the 
participation of veterans and military families in anti-war protests. A press release from 
December 2005 describing the delivery of “Out of Iraq” petitions to congressional offices began 
as follows: 
Opposition to President Bush’s failed Iraq policy surged today as MoveOn.org 
Political Action members, including veterans and military families, delivered 
petitions bearing 400,000 signatures to 248 district congressional offices, urging 
support for an exit strategy plan with a timetable to bring U.S. troops home from 
Iraq (MoveOn.org 2005b). 
Another press release stated that “more than 20,000 veterans and family members, as well as 
citizens from both parties” had signed a petition demanding that Congress censure President 
Bush for “lying” about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (MoveOn.org 2004). 
By emphasizing the support of veterans and military families, MoveOn hoped to undercut the 
conservative strategy to portray it as unpatriotic and anti-soldier (Cillizza and Kane 2005). The 
fact that such statements only appeared in press releases suggests that MoveOn believed it 
needed to reassure outside audiences of its anti-war but pro-soldier position, but felt confident 
that members and allies already rejected the right-wing identity framing attempts. 
 When examined in full, MoveOn’s organizational identity projections reveal a pattern of 
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definition in response to real or perceived public opinion about the organization, much as 
described by Cooley (1902) in his theorization of the “looking-glass self.” MoveOn strategically 
framed its identity in anticipation of conservative counterframes. In this regard, MoveOn’s 
projected organizational identity was largely developed through a process of reactive identity 
framing. Such reactions against negative portrayals may well have been necessary to prevent the 
organization from being widely perceived as too radical for most Americans. However, by 
expending most of its energy on defending real or anticipated attacks on its identity, MoveOn 
failed to articulate an unambiguous organizational identity in which its mission and values were 
clearly defined. As I show below, this meant that its allies and members had to rely upon 
negative identity frames when constructing their own interpretations of MoveOn’s organizational 
identity. 
CONTENTIOUS IDENTITY FRAMING IN THE NEWS 
 To examine how conservative, progressive, and “mainstream” news sources framed 
MoveOn differently, I selected seven sources representing these aspects of the ideological 
spectrum. To represent the conservative point of view, I chose Fox News Channel’s The O’Reilly 
Factor, The New York Post, and The Washington Times. These sources took openly conservative 
political positions in their news reports, had high viewership/readership, and frequently covered 
MoveOn (Guthrie 2008; MondoNewspapers.com 2009). I selected two blogs, Daily Kos and 
Huffington Post, to represent the progressive end of the spectrum. Both of these sources were 
leading blogs among netroots progressives and in general (Technorati.com 2007). They therefore 
were influential in shaping public perceptions of MoveOn. Finally, I chose The New York Times 
and The Washington Post to represent the “mainstream” media. Both newspapers were nationally 
recognized news sources that often set the agenda for news coverage across the country; in other 
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words, they were “discourse leaders.” I also selected these newspapers because I wanted to 
investigate whether they had a liberal bias, a common accusation leveled by conservatives 
(Gibson 2007; Hannity and Colmes 2007). 
 Using Altheide’s (1996) qualitative media analysis approach, I content analyzed a 
saturation sample of 522 reports about MoveOn that appeared in these sources during the 2007 
calendar year. As suggested by Altheide, I coded all of these reports, but paid particular attention 
to the flurry of reports that appeared during “crisis” moments. These moments most notably 
included MoveOn’s (successful) campaign in March to prevent Democratic candidates from 
participating in a Fox-hosted presidential debate, and the publication of MoveOn’s “Petraeus or 
Betray Us?” ad in September. These moments included the clearest examples of the contention 
surrounding the definition of MoveOn’s identity. I dedicate more attention to conservative news 
coverage in my analysis because both progressive bloggers and MoveOn members relied upon 
these reports when developing their own interpretations of MoveOn’s organizational identity.  
CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGES TO MOVEON’S IDENTITY CLAIMS 
 MoveOn’s projected organizational identity was repudiated in coverage by Fox News 
Channel’s The O’Reilly Factor (ORF), The Washington Times (WT), and The New York Post 
(NYP). These sources portrayed MoveOn as a far-left fringe organization, but reaffirmed 
MoveOn’s claims of influence when these claims could be used to frighten the conservative 
base. 
Radical and Unpatriotic 
 All three sources frequently labeled MoveOn “far left,” “radical,” or “lunatic fringe.” To 
make MoveOn seem more radical, they also rhetorically connected the organization to well-
known symbols of evil. For example, NYP suggested, “If Osama bin Laden ever gets tired of 
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waging global jihad, perhaps he should interview for a job with MoveOn.org” (The New York 
Post 2007a). Likewise, during MoveOn’s campaign against the Fox News debate in March 2007, 
Bill O'Reilly compared MoveOn’s tactics to those of Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels: 
Within the Democratic Party, there are two elements, moderate Dems and radical 
left Dems. The radical movement is funded by George Soros and Peter Lewis, 
who pour millions of dollars into candidates and websites like MoveOn to do their 
bidding…. These people use propaganda techniques perfected by Dr. Joseph 
Goebbels, the Nazi minister of information. They lie, distort, [and] defame all the 
time (O’Reilly 2007a). 
After MoveOn’s Petraeus ad was published in September 2007, WT argued that the ad was 
“beyond the pale, sinking swiftly to the level of Klansmen and Neo-Nazis” (The Washington 
Times 2007). By rhetorically connecting MoveOn to these individuals and groups, conservative 
news sources attempted to vilify the organization and frighten moderate citizens into believing it 
was too radical to consider joining (McCaffrey and Keys 2000; Vanderford 1989). 
 Conservative sources also tried to frame MoveOn as unpatriotic or even anti-American. A 
common strategy was linking MoveOn to George Soros, a billionaire who became a bogeyman 
for conservative commentators after he donated $30 million to progressive organizations in 2004 
(including $2.5 million to MoveOn) to help them defeat George W. Bush (Bai 2007a). On his 
show in April 2007, Bill O’Reilly referred to Soros as “an extremist... who wants to impose a 
radical left agenda on America.” He then claimed that Soros was using MoveOn to buy off and 
intimidate politicians:  
George Soros has given the radical left organization MoveOn many, many 
millions of dollars. This group actively supports liberal politicians like Howard 
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Dean and John Edwards.... If the liberal politician doesn’t toe the Soros line, he or 
she will be denied funding and brutally attacked (O’Reilly 2007b). 
 Other conservative sources echoed this rhetoric and extended the argument to also 
condemn the Democratic Party. NYP used this guilt-by-association tactic one day after 
MoveOn’s Petraeus ad appeared. It described MoveOn as “hard-left paranoics” and “social 
termites” that had “libeled a genuine American hero” with their “fascistic smear.” It then linked 
MoveOn to the Democratic Party, saying Democrats “meant for groups like MoveOn to be their 
attack dog” (The New York Post 2007b). Two days later, WT reported that “antiwar Democrats 
in Congress are throwing tantrums because the war news is suddenly brighter,” and asserted that 
MoveOn was, in fact, “the tail that wags the Democratic dog” (Pruden 2007). By implication, 
then, MoveOn and its Democratic allies were actually invested in failure in Iraq. This 
characterization portrayed MoveOn and the Democratic Party as unpatriotic radical organizations 
that were out of touch with most Americans. 
MoveOn as Bully 
In contrast to their rejections of MoveOn’s other claims, conservative news sources often 
reaffirmed its claims of influence. They used these claims to frighten viewers and readers into 
believing MoveOn was imposing a “radical, left-wing” agenda upon the Democratic Party and 
the United States more generally. For example, during the Petraeus ad controversy, NYP called 
MoveOn “the $28 million left-wing smash-mouth bully of politics,” in reference to how much it 
spent on its 2006 get-out-the-vote efforts for Democratic congressional candidates (Campanile 
2007). WT and ORF also relied upon this “bully” theme. During the Fox News debate 
controversy in March 2007, WT stated: 
In the battle for control of the Democratic Party, the George Soros-MoveOn.org 
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crowd is used to getting its way…. Nevada Sen. Harry Reid knelt before 
MoveOn.org demands that another scheduled primary debate co-hosted by Fox be 
called off. And yesterday Barack Obama bowed to the mob…. This is about who 
runs the Democratic Party. Ever since they came close to nominating Howard 
Dean for president in 2004, left-wing Web activists have tried to punish any 
Democrat who dares to step out of line (Pierce 2007). 
In September 2007, Bill O’Reilly used strikingly similar rhetoric to drive home the point that 
MoveOn was using strong-arm tactics:  
A group of far left bloggers has succeeded in frightening most of the Democratic 
presidential candidates and moving the party significantly to the left, at least in 
the primary season. The lead intimidators are MoveOn, Media Matters, and the 
vicious Daily Kos. These people savagely attack those with whom they disagree. 
And the politicians don’t want to become smear targets (O’Reilly 2007c). 
As these examples show, conservative news outlets credited MoveOn with significant political 
influence when such claims could be used to energize the conservative base. At the same time, 
they framed MoveOn as a radical fringe organization when such a characterization better suited 
their purposes. These negative portrayals fueled reactive identity framing among both 
progressive bloggers and MoveOn members. 
PROGRESSIVE ATTEMPTS TO REHABILITATE MOVEON’S IDENTITY 
 In keeping with MoveOn’s identity projections, both Huffington Post (HP) and Daily Kos 
(DK) regularly referred to the organization as “progressive” and portrayed it as influential. 
However, the two sources spent most of their time engaged in what I refer to as identity 
rehabilitation. Identity rehabilitation may involve both positive reframing of an organization’s 
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identity and “countermaligning” (Benford and Hunt 2003), although in this particular case 
countermaligning was used exclusively. In countermaligning, a social movement organization 
attacks an opponent’s credibility in an attempt to delegitimize it and thereby undermine the 
claims the opponent made about the movement organization. In the case of MoveOn, though, 
this process was undertaken by progressive blogs, which served as proxies for MoveOn in the 
“framing contest” over its organizational identity (Ryan 1991). 
The two blogs targeted Fox News almost exclusively, perhaps because it was the most 
widely watched cable news network and, therefore, a very powerful conservative voice (Guthrie 
2008). They attacked its claims of being “fair and balanced” by pointing out cases in which Fox 
News commentators maligned MoveOn. During the controversy over MoveOn’s campaign to get 
Democratic presidential nominees to withdraw from the debate hosted by Fox, DK responded to 
a Fox News report in which MoveOn was labeled “radical fringe” by asking, “Would a truly 
unbiased outlet call MoveOn ‘radical fringe?’ Nope, those are right-wing GOP talking points” 
(Kos 2007a). A few days later, in response to claims that MoveOn and DK were guilty of “junior 
grade Stalinism” for pressuring Democrats to drop out of the Fox News debate, DK sarcastically 
remarked, “I guess I missed the part where MoveOn and I kidnapped the entire Fox News 
contributor corps in the middle of the night, lined them up against a wall, and shot them” (Kos 
2007b). Using a tactic similar to Sykes and Matza’s (1957) “condemnation of condemners,” one 
HP blogger emphasized what he saw as the ludicrousness of Bill O’Reilly’s bias against 
Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards, saying, “Leave it to Fox’s Bill O’Reilly to take 
the mainstream current over the cliff—bellowing Tuesday that Edwards has ‘sold his soul to the 
far left... [and] MoveOn’s running him’” (J. Cohen 2007). Another HP blogger called Bill 
O’Reilly a hypocrite when he failed to denounce racist comments on a right-wing blog, 
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FreeRepublic.com, while simultaneously claiming Daily Kos and MoveOn were hateful sites 
(Young 2007).  
 Aside from showing these two sources’ ideological alliances with MoveOn, these 
rehabilitative actions indicated that they viewed conservative identity framing efforts as genuine 
threats to MoveOn’s credibility. Moreover, the fact that the blogs focused on attacking the 
sources of these negative frames instead of articulating positive identity frames shows that 
MoveOn did not provide a clear enough projected identity. Because the organization dedicated 
so much of its identity framing effort to countering conservative counterframes, it left allies like 
DK and HP with little choice but to also spend most of their time attempting to define MoveOn’s 
identity by clarifying what it did not represent. 
COVERAGE BY DISCOURSE LEADERS AS LEGITIMIZING FORCE 
 Although conservative commentators claimed The Washington Post (WP), and The New 
York Times (NYT) were part of the “liberal media” (Gibson 2007; Hannity and Colmes 2007), I 
found that neither explicitly advocated a political ideology. In general, NYT and WP seemed 
more concerned with adhering to the journalistic norm of objectivity. Of course, as Gans 
(2004:182) noted in his study of national news organizations, “objectivity is itself a value.” To 
be clear, I am not asserting that NYT and WP were value-free news sources. Rather, I am 
claiming that their reporting on MoveOn was driven by adherence to the institutional ideology of 
American journalism, which asserts that news coverage should emphasize “balance” by 
including at least two perspectives on any issue (Schudson 2001). In the case of MoveOn, this 
meant that the two sources reported both critical and supportive statements about MoveOn. The 
fact that MoveOn received such balanced coverage by these well respected and widely read 
newspapers reinforced MoveOn’s claims that it was a “mainstream” political organization, not 
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some fringe group. 
 In many cases, the sources’ adherence to balance norms was apparent in the structure of a 
single article. For example, in an article about MoveOn’s controversial Petraeus ad, WP quoted 
Republican presidential nominee John McCain calling the ad a “McCarthyite attack,” then 
balanced this with a quote in which a spokesman for Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton called 
the uproar over the ad “a political sideshow” (The Washington Post 2007). Other times, the two 
papers achieved balance by portraying MoveOn positively in some articles but criticizing the 
organization in others. While covering its anti-war campaign, NYT characterized MoveOn as 
organized and clean-cut, in contrast to the stereotypical image of Sixties-era war protesters: 
The playbook for opposing a war has changed markedly since the street protest 
ethos of the anti-Vietnam movement. Tie-dyed shirts and flowers have been 
replaced by oxfords and Blackberrys…. And instead of a freewheeling circus 
managed from college campuses and coffee houses, the new antiwar movement is 
a multimillion-dollar operation run by media-savvy professionals (Crowley 2007). 
Likewise, WP highlighted the organization’s “mainstream” legitimacy by noting its connections 
to Democratic leaders: 
MoveOn, after its rather guerrilla start, has increasingly become part of the 
Democratic establishment in Washington.... The group’s conference calls often 
include aides to House and Senate Democratic leaders, and executive director Eli 
Pariser and [political director Tom] Mattzie have also had meetings with some of 
the party’s 2008 presidential candidates... (Bacon 2007). 
These positive portrayals were balanced with critical statements, some of which almost echoed 
conservative news reports. For example, an opinion piece in WP argued that Hillary Clinton did 
 140 
not condemn MoveOn’s ad because she “was afraid to alienate an important constituency, the 3.3 
million members of MoveOn.org, who stand symbolically at the frontiers of New Hampshire 
[primaries] and Iowa [caucuses]” (R. Cohen 2007).  
 In general, NYT and WP avoided both celebratory and defamatory rhetoric in their 
attempts to achieve “objective” coverage of MoveOn. Although this “balance” was motivated by 
journalistic norms and was not designed to reinforce MoveOn’s identity projections, it 
nonetheless legitimized MoveOn’s claims that it was a “mainstream” political organization. In 
this regard, coverage by these “discourse leaders” also helped mitigate the effects of negative 
identity frames presented by conservative news sources. 
MEMBERS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF MOVEON’S IDENTITY 
 In interviews with forty-three members of various levels of participation, I asked members 
to describe MoveOn to me and explain how news coverage of MoveOn may have affected their 
perceptions of the organization. Because MoveOn relied upon vague identifiers like 
“progressive” and “average Americans” to articulate its organizational identity, members were 
able to impute meanings that reflected their own particular interpretations of these terms. In a 
process I call biographical filtering, members’ cognitive frames of MoveOn—that is, how they 
interpreted its organizational identity—were shaped by their histories of activism and forms of 
participation in MoveOn. In addition to filtering their interpretations through their own 
experiences, members relied heavily upon negative coverage by conservative news sources, and 
engaged in reactive identity framing much like the progressive blogs. 
BIOGRAPHICAL FILTERING OF ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 
 When I asked members to describe MoveOn, I found that most members articulated 
identity interpretations that generally coincided with MoveOn’s identity projections, but some 
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refuted MoveOn’s identity projections. These differing interpretations followed the “newcomer” 
and “veteran” distinction I described in Chapter Five to some extent, but it would be an 
oversimplification to say that these categories aligned exactly with the differences in identity 
framing. 
Interpreting “Progressive” Identity 
 A newcomer in her fifties named Katrina who had participated in both online and offline 
MoveOn activism described MoveOn as “more liberal than Democrat,” and characterized it as an 
“outside[r]” organization. Likewise, a sixty-six year-old veteran named Nancy, who frequently 
signed MoveOn’s e-petitions and attended offline events, made a point of distinguishing 
MoveOn from party politics: 
It’s not linked with—even though it stands in line more and will endorse 
Democratic candidates—it’s not linked to the Democratic Party. The issues are 
progressive… [and] it’s not part of a political party.  
On the other hand, a former MoveOn organizer and veteran activist in his thirties named Darren 
unsubscribed from MoveOn’s e-mail list because, as he put it, “I didn’t think they were as 
progressive as I once thought…. They started aligning with the Democratic Party too much, and 
didn’t seem to have an independent voice.” Another veteran named Truman stopped 
participating in MoveOn’s offline actions because he felt “they’ve retreated toward the classic 
moderate left position.” This sentiment was more common among veterans, although—as 
Nancy’s comments show—not all veterans shared this view. As I showed in Chapter Five, many 
veterans joined MoveOn because they perceived it as more radical than the Democratic Party. 
Their histories of activism in left-wing movements and distrust of party politics made them 
suspicious of MoveOn’s support of Democratic candidates and policy proposals. As a result, 
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they were more critical of its “progressive” identity claims than people who had less activist 
experience. 
Evaluating MoveOn’s “Grassroots” Credibility 
 Members spoke about MoveOn’s claim to be a “people-powered” in terms of how 
“grassroots” the organization seemed to be. One newcomer named Maggie who solely 
participated in online activism described MoveOn as grassroots because it provided opportunities 
for interpersonal communication about political issues: 
I see it as outside the political establishment, and I do see it as grassroots, yeah. 
‘Cause, you know, people can e-mail. People are forwarding me MoveOn stuff all 
the time ‘cause they don’t know I’m already involved. It’s just such an easy way 
to pass information around. 
Della, another newcomer and online activist, also emphasized the “networking” capability of 
MoveOn in her interpretation of its grassroots credibility: 
With the Democrats, there is a pecking order and a hierarchy, and I don’t get that 
from MoveOn. MoveOn starts at the base, and—it’s a network. It’s a virtual 
network… [that] gets people together in cyberspace to do work that will affect our 
lives in this country. 
 In contrast, members who were more active in MoveOn’s offline actions and/or had 
histories of activism tended to question MoveOn’s “grassroots-ness.” In their eyes, online 
participation was not truly grassroots because it did not get people together face-to-face for 
coordinated action on the local level. A middle-aged veteran named Norah who was a regional 
coordinator at the time of our interview explicitly contrasted grassroots activism with online 
participation, saying:  
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I think of it as grassroots, not just the internet. Because I’m involved in a local 
council and we’re doing all these events, and everywhere I go I meet people who 
say, ‘Oh, you’re in MoveOn, that’s so cool!’  I think it’s very much grassroots and 
a place for progressives... to come together and take action. I used to see it more 
as like an internet group, and I think we’ve really moved away from that, out into 
the streets. 
Similarly, a veteran named Kurtis who led another council compared MoveOn’s internet-based 
activism with his experiences in social movements during the Seventies and Eighties. These prior 
activist experiences shaped his understanding of what could justifiably be called grassroots: 
“Grassroots” for me used to be, before the internet existed, groups of people just 
getting together locally and working together.... People getting out there and 
doing the work. That’s true grassroots, I think. This concept of having three 
million people on a list who get e-mails and respond that way, it’s not really—
certainly by the traditional definition of “grassroots,” there’s nothing grassroots 
about that. 
 Clearly, members’ histories of participation in MoveOn and other activist organizations 
influenced their interpretations of MoveOn’s organizational identity. These prior experiences 
shaped their cognitive frames regarding the interpretation of the meanings of “progressive” and 
“grassroots.” For those who had little if any prior experience during which they had developed 
these cognitive frames, MoveOn’s proclamations of organizational identity went largely 
unchallenged. Furthermore, because of the ambiguity of meaning inherent to broad terms like 
“progressive,” they were able to read into these terms whatever meaning made the most sense in 
the context of their limited experience with activism.  
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REACTIVE IDENTITY FRAMING AND NEGATIVE NEWS COVERAGE   
 Regardless of whether they were newcomers or veterans, members paid a great deal of 
attention to news coverage of MoveOn. In my interviews, I found that members referred to 
negative coverage by conservative news sources far more frequently than coverage by other 
sources. Like the progressive blogs, members reacted against this coverage as a way of 
articulating their interpretations of MoveOn’s organizational identity.  
Some members claimed that they were not influenced by negative coverage of MoveOn. 
However, their responses showed that, though perhaps unaware, they reacted against portrayals 
of MoveOn as a radical fringe organization. Adam, an online activist in his thirties, touched upon 
this when I asked him what he had heard about MoveOn in the media: 
You know, I can’t really say I’ve seen it a lot in the media. But at the same time, 
when I have it’s been more from, more conservative kind of bashing it. Or calling 
it “radical,” and me kinda laughing at the characterization of it as such…. I just 
can’t even take [the negative coverage] serious… especially from Fox. 
This sentiment was also reflected in the response of Justin, a thirty-two year-old online activist: 
Well, the perception coming through that I gather coming from the mainstream 
media is that MoveOn is a very liberal, super left organization funded by George 
Soros…. But I think that my perception of MoveOn through things I read in the 
mainstream is not affected at all. I expect them to demonize it, you know?  As 
they’re gonna try to demonize any left-wing organization as tinfoil-hat-wearing, 
lunatic type stuff. 
 Members expressed suspicion of information reported by the “mainstream” media, and 
often equated “mainstream” with conservative news outlets like Fox News. Though they doubted 
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the objectivity of such coverage, members nonetheless revealed that this news coverage helped 
them view MoveOn as influential. Patricia, an online activist in her fifties, stated: 
I think for people who agree with MoveOn’s values and principles and actions 
like myself, what I’ve seen in The New York Times or in the local paper validates 
what you do and is kind of affirming. You feel like, ‘Oh, someone notices!’…  It 
makes it feel like what I’m doing is worthwhile. 
Beth, a twenty-two year-old local council leader, said press coverage “adds legitimacy to their 
mission… and shows that you’re probably doing something right.” This belief was especially 
fueled by negative coverage, which members took as proof of the organization’s strength. James, 
a sixty-three year-old active council member, expressed this sentiment particularly well: 
I think the acid test of that [MoveOn’s effectiveness] is we have right-wing 
pundits like Rush Limbaugh and Bill O’Reilly come out and just smash MoveOn 
and other groups so intentionally and constantly. You know they’re getting some 
attention in the White House and elsewhere. They are feared because they have 
the ear of the people. 
As these statements illustrate, members relied upon media coverage, and especially 
negative press, as a key indicator that MoveOn was an influential political organization. Through 
reactive identity framing, conservative attempts to undermine MoveOn’s credibility were 
translated into statements that actually supported MoveOn’s claims of influence. Much like the 
doomsday cult followers studied by Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1964), members found 
confirming evidence of MoveOn’s identity projections even in seemingly contradictory news 
accounts of the organization. 
CONCLUSION 
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 In this chapter, I have traced the connections between organizational identity framing 
attempts by MoveOn, ideologically motivated news sources, and members are connected. As in 
symbolic interactionist accounts of identity formation, this complex process involves projection 
of a desired identity and reactions to outsiders’ (in this case, news sources’) interpretations of 
this identity. Given the increasingly partisan nature of news coverage, news sources compete 
along ideological lines to define this organizational identity. Members are exposed to these 
competing identity frames, and filter the claims through their own cognitive frames to come to 
their own understandings of MoveOn’s organizational identity. In the next chapter, I continue to 
focus on interpretive meaning making, but turn my attention to MoveOn’s attempts to stage and 
script successful media events. 
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CHAPTER 7: LIGHTS, CAMERA, ACTIVISM!  
THE STAGING AND SCRIPTING OF MOVEON’S OFFLINE EVENTS 
 
 Nearly every action undertaken by MoveOn was directed toward spreading its messages 
about issues. Most of this effort centered on injecting its issue frames into the public discourse at 
opportune moments early in the “issue attention cycle” (Downs 1972; Henry and Gordon 2001; 
Joppke 1991), before news commentators and political spokespeople had the chance to spin 
messages in their favor. With the dominance of cable news networks and the ascendancy of 
political blogs, MoveOn faced a perpetual “news cyclone” (Klinenberg 2005) that seemed to 
have accelerated from a twenty-four hour news cycle to a “twenty-four minute news cycle” 
(Poniewozik 2008; see also Boczkowski and de Santos 2007; Karlsson and Strömbäck 2010; 
Kovach and Rosenstiel 1999; Leskovec, Backstrom, and Kleinberg 2009; Rosenberg and 
Feldman 2009). As one MoveOn field organizer put it in an interview, “news isn’t news as long 
as it used to be.” To accommodate the speed of the news cycle, MoveOn provided pre-packaged 
sets of materials for each “rapid response” event it asked members to organize. It also offered 
training to regional coordinators and council core members in how to stage these events and 
interact with the media such that the message intended for each event would be successfully 
conveyed to the public and to politicians.   
I analyze this process from a dramaturgical perspective. As Goffman (1959) asserted, 
social interactions can be viewed as performances in which actors attempt to manage others’ 
impressions through the use of language, gestures, props, and other elements that set the stage for 
their performances. Although Goffman focused on microsocial interactions, others have adapted 
the dramaturgical approach to analyze how organizations, including social movement 
organizations, manage the impressions of their members and audiences. Snow (1979) showed 
 148 
how the Nichiren Shoshu movement provided cues to members regarding how to portray 
themselves and act in public to convey the impression that the movement was “mainstream.” 
Kubal (1998) revealed how activists framed political claims differently in “back stage” and 
“front stage” regions of the movement. Benford and Hunt (1992) outlined four dramatic 
techniques used by movements to guide members’ and onlookers’ interpretations of the 
movement’s goals, targets, and power. Three of these dramatic techniques form the basis of my 
analysis of how MoveOn scripted and staged members’ performances in offline events.  
 I also draw attention to how MoveOn implicitly and explicitly directed members’ 
emotional experiences and expressions during these events. MoveOn asked event hosts and 
participants to perform “emotional labor” (Hochschild 1983) for the organization by displaying 
or suppressing certain emotions during events to convey the “appropriate” impression to the 
media and other audiences. These “feeling rules” (Hochschild 1983) were spelled out in e-mails, 
training manuals, and event planning materials. In the words of Zurcher (1982, 1985), MoveOn 
“scripted,” “staged,” and “phased” members’ emotions. The organization told members what 
emotions were appropriate for an event, guided the construction of “stages” that conveyed the 
organization’s message, and set expectations for which emotions should be felt and/or expressed 
before, during, and after events.  
 I illustrate these dramaturgical processes by following the trajectory of rapid response 
events from the highest levels of MoveOn’s strategic decision-making, through the intermediate 
back stage regions where events were rehearsed, and finally to the local level, where they were 
enacted for audiences on the front stage. After explaining the strategic importance of these 
events, I give a behind-the-scenes glimpse into the training involved in staging successful media 
events. Then I turn to an in-depth examination of how MoveOn directed the physical and 
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emotional performances of members through both figurative and literal scripts. To do so, I focus 
on four events: a candlelight vigil, a calling party, a congressional office visit, and an interactive 
public quiz event. These events were representative of MoveOn’s offline “repertoire of 
contention” (Tilly 1979), the set of tactics it most commonly used to dramatize its issue claims. 
DIRECTING THE ACTION: MOVEON’S STRATEGIC FOCUS ON MEDIA 
 Using its e-mail list, MoveOn could simultaneously reach out to millions of people in an 
attempt to mobilize them for rapid response events, local-level actions whose primary purpose 
was to create what one field organizer called “a progressive echo chamber” by getting coverage 
in hundreds of media markets across the country on the same day. A member of MoveOn’s 
national staff explained the strategy this way: 
You can’t in this country push a politician to raise the profile of an issue unless it 
comes up in the media all over the place. And we can’t afford, as a movement, to 
buy ads for every single issue we want to push. So earning media coverage by 
getting people out on the street and showing that there’s a base of support for an 
issue is just a critical tactic…. Otherwise you won’t be taken seriously when you 
go to Congress, you won’t be taken seriously in the op-ed pages of the paper. 
In short, as one of the leading progressive organizations in the country, MoveOn understood the 
importance of attempting to shape public discourse and, consequently, politicians’ positions on 
issues. 
 To accomplish this, MoveOn relied upon a combination of top-down strategizing and 
bottom-up feedback to choose issues and tactics. Every month, MoveOn sent a survey to 
approximately 30,000 members asking them to vote on what issues the organization should work 
on in the next couple of months. This feedback, combined with unsolicited feedback from 
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members sending e-mails to MoveOn, helped organizational leaders narrow their focus of 
possible targets. Member feedback was then synthesized with the leadership’s overall strategic 
vision and sense of what issues were most important at the moment, which was often based on 
the top headlines in leading newspapers. Another of MoveOn’s paid staffers described the 
process: 
So people [members] say, “Let’s do something about gas prices.” Then we think, 
“What’s the most strategic way for members to weigh in on gas prices?” And we 
tend to kind of brainstorm. Like, “Okay, what are a bunch of tactics that we could 
use? We could be handing out flyers at local gas stations, or we could do protests 
at local energy companies,” or whatever. So we look at those and rank them and 
rate them, and come up with one that seems like it’s gonna work best for the 
members and, you know, accomplish the objectives that people want us to 
accomplish. 
A paid field organizer also noted that an important consideration was, “What’s going to be the 
big media hook that’s going to get the attention we need, but also get our point across? Is it a 
candlelight vigil, a petition delivery, a town hall meeting?” Once MoveOn’s staff selected the 
tactics they believed would best serve the message, they relayed this information to field 
organizers, who oversaw the network of approximately two hundred MoveOn councils across the 
country. The field organizers informed regional coordinators of the plan, and the regional 
coordinators contacted their local councils to let them know what events they would soon need to 
organize. Council leaders then contacted local MoveOn members to recruit event hosts and 
participants, and encouraged local news outlets to cover the event.  
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 These councils were developed in part wherever MoveOn members were geographically 
concentrated enough to warrant a local organizing body. However, as interviews and work as a 
regional coordinator confirmed, they were also strategically developed to represent as many 
major and mid-level media markets as possible. This served the larger purpose of creating the 
“progressive echo chamber” effect by increasing the chances that MoveOn would be able to 
coordinate events in the majority of media markets in the United States. Given that MoveOn 
planned to have members across the country organize simultaneous events with the same 
message, it was critical to consider the scalability and replicability of an event. To ensure that 
events “echoed” one another, MoveOn provided pre-packaged signs, talking points, and tips on 
how, when, and where to set up events. As a MoveOn field organizer explained:  
It comes back to a basic media principle of consistency, of having your talking 
points and hammering them home…. [I]f you take three or four of the biggest 
[problems with a piece of legislation] and synthesize them into one event with the 
same message all across the country, first it’s local news, then it’s regional news, 
and then it’s national news. You’re firing on all cylinders there. 
This combination of bottom-up feedback and top-down strategizing allowed MoveOn to function 
much like a representative democracy: members guided its selection of issues, but leaders had 
decisive control over organizational strategy and tactical implementation of events related to 
these issues. 
 Ultimately, all of this strategizing was directed toward the successful transmission of 
MoveOn’s messages. The events planned by MoveOn’s leaders and organized by its members 
were rhetorical performances meant to convey specific impressions of the organization and its 
issues to the public via the news media. Like most other social movement organizations, 
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MoveOn wanted to frame the debate over issues with which it was concerned, and it needed the 
news media to transmit its issue frames (Benford and Hunt 2003; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; 
Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991; Snow et al. 1986). However, without any permanent local offices, paid 
local organizers, or other opportunities to place organizational representatives into controlling 
positions at the local level, MoveOn relied heavily upon pre-packaged activism and top-down 
dramaturgical control to orchestrate successful media events. 
REHEARSING OUR ROLES BACK STAGE: MEDIA TRAINING 
 MoveOn expended a great deal of time and resources on training its most active members 
in how to organize events that would attract media attention and convey its messages. During my 
time as an active member of my local council and then, later, as a regional coordinator, I 
participated in three group trainings in how to run what MoveOn called “media events,” and ran 
two trainings for councils I oversaw. These trainings were opportunities to rehearse our scenes 
and get to know our lines back stage, before we were in front of the media and the public. One 
training was particularly illustrative of MoveOn’s concern with directing members’ 
performances at media events. 
 On a cold but sunny Saturday in February of 2007, I attended a media training that was 
led by one of MoveOn’s paid field organizers. A group of about fifteen council members, 
including me, crowded into a conference room in a temporary field office for four of MoveOn’s 
field organizers. As we entered, Jeremy, the field organizer, welcomed us and handed each of us 
a seventeen-page document, entitled Coordinating Council Media Training Manual, that 
included an overview of why media was important to MoveOn, what principles and logistical 
considerations we should keep in mind when planning events, and samples of media materials 
that we would use to role play a media event. We sat around a large dark wooden conference 
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table in a crescent shape, facing the front of the room where Jeremy stood beside a white board. 
He began by discussing why media was important to MoveOn’s strategy. These goals included 
putting public pressure on decision makers, educating the public about issues in an efficient way, 
legitimizing an issue as a bona fide point of public concern, and psyching up local MoveOn 
members by getting their names in the paper. Ultimately, Jeremy said, the strategy boiled down 
to one simple fact: “The media sets the political debate in America. It’s the major filter through 
which the agenda is set. What is discussed in the media is what our leaders need to respond to.” 
 Jeremy then shifted to a discussion of media principles that council members should keep 
in mind when planning events. “MoveOn provides us with a pre-packaged message,” he said. 
“We just need to make sure we get that message across effectively.” To “sell the story,” as he put 
it, we needed to make it compelling, and this required inclusion of a hero, villain, and victim in 
every story. This set up a dramatic conflict, which Jeremy pointed out is “the bread and butter of 
the media.” He used the hypothetical example of a health care event in which Republicans and 
big pharmaceutical companies would be the villains, Democrats who stood up for universal 
health care would be the heroes, and middle-class Americans would be the victims. Secondly, 
Jeremy cautioned us to stick to the talking points provided by MoveOn and make our points 
succinctly, saying, “It doesn’t do us any good if we respond to a reporter’s question with a three-
paragraph diatribe, because they’re only going to print or film that seven-second sound bite. So 
keep it brief.” His statement is supported by research that shows the average length of sound 
bites has consistently decreased from forty-three seconds in 1968 to less than eight seconds in 
2004 (Bucy and Grabe 2007; Hallin 1992; Lichter 2001). Third, he encouraged us to keep a 
consistent message throughout the event and repeat it over and over. Again using a sales 
analogy, Jeremy noted that “advertisers know that people have to hear something nine times 
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before it sinks in,” and told us, “Even if it starts to get really boring for you, it’s important that 
you keep repeating the same message at the event and to the media so we can get our point 
across.”  
Next, we spent about thirty minutes discussing and roleplaying what the training manual 
referred to as “pivoting.” Pivoting involved responding to reporter’s questions rather than 
answering them outright. Jeremy painted the activist-reporter relationship as an antagonistic 
encounter in which the reporter would try to “steer the conversation” in ways that would prevent 
the activist from effectively conveying his or her message. To combat this, Jeremy taught us to 
use “pivoting phrases,” such as, “The truth is…” and “What’s important is that…” to return to 
MoveOn’s prepared talking points. He enthusiastically walked us through how to use the 
pivoting phrases. “So a reporter says, ‘Why would you support this? It’s obviously a bad policy,” 
he explained. “You start out with, ‘The truth is’ and your talking point; that’s the sound bite.” 
Throughout his explanation, Jeremy repeatedly pointed out that reporters are typically in a 
position of power by virtue of being the questioner, but asserted that pivoting would “turn that on 
its head” and give activists the power. He cautioned, though, that this reversal of the power 
dynamic “does not mean that we should be negative or defensive in our response.” Adding an 
important layer of emotion management to his training, Jeremy concluded, “Everything has to be 
upbeat and rosy, even when they [reporters] are trying to beat us into the ground, because when 
we’re upbeat and rosy, we’re staying on message.” 
The final twenty minutes of this training session were spent on a roleplay for an event. 
This part of the training was particularly enlightening in terms of the dramaturgical elements of 
MoveOn’s events, because it was essentially a dress rehearsal for the types of events we would 
be staging in the near future. Jeremy asked three women to play the parts of event speaker, 
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attendee, and reporter, while he played the role of event organizer. The women playing the 
reporter and attendee briefly stepped out of the room and then returned to simulate arrival at the 
event. Jeremy, in character, told the “speaker” where to stand so that the “reporter” would be 
able to get a good camera angle that incorporated the “audience.” “We’re gonna have people 
with signs, holding them up. It’s gonna kinda be a half-moon feel,” he said, still in character. 
“That way the camera guy can get a picture of the large crowd, but you can still see them and 
speak.” Breaking character, Jeremy then expounded on the philosophy of staging such events. 
His explanation brought into sharp focus the thoroughly dramaturgical nature of MoveOn’s 
events: 
The key here is that these are planned events. There’s no reason they shouldn’t be 
choreographed. But more specifically, when you’re choreographing something, 
the ones you have to worry about are the ones that aren’t part of the ensemble, 
right? So we’ve got ten, twenty, thirty, forty members showing up to any one 
event. Well, the best thing we can do is make sure that we have someone greeting 
them and sharing with them just how they can be most useful…. We can put their 
minds at ease by first sharing with them the agenda…. Second thing we can do is 
give ‘em a task. Give ‘em a sign if they don’t have one. Or give ‘em a good place 
to stand. Say, “You could be perfect if you stood over there, because we need to 
make sure the crowd stays together. It makes for a better picture, better visual.”… 
And it doesn’t hurt to let ‘em know, “You’re only gonna have seven seconds for 
your sound bite; make it a good one.”… We just want them to know when they’re 
talking to the press, we’re there to expound upon this message. 
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With that, Jeremy wrapped up the training and thanked us all for coming. As we grabbed our 
coats and prepared to leave, we commented to one another and to Jeremy about the effectiveness 
of the training. As an active council member, in that moment I was truly pleased to have gained 
the confidence and tools to interact with reporters. Only later did I recognize how deeply 
MoveOn was exerting dramaturgical control over our actions and emotions through this media 
training. 
IT’S SHOWTIME: THE SCRIPTING AND STAGING OF MOVEON’S EVENTS  
 This dramaturgical control extended to the materials MoveOn provided to event hosts and 
participants. As Benford and Hunt (1992) argued, social movement events are ultimately dramas 
performed for a public audience, much like staged theatrical performances. They elaborated upon 
four “dramatic techniques” used by movements to construct events, three of which are pertinent 
to my analysis. 
The first technique is “scripting,” in which a set of directions is developed that “define 
the scene, identify actors, and outline expected behavior” (Benford and Hunt 1992:38). This 
includes identifying antagonists, victims, protagonists, a supporting cast, and audiences. The 
movement also supplies members with “vocabularies of motive” (Mills 1940) that lay out 
rationales and justifications for why the requested action is important. These scripts are built 
upon diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames that dramatize the problem, specify 
appropriate ameliorative actions, and emphasize the urgency of getting involved (Snow and 
Benford 1988, 1992). 
Secondly, movements guide the “staging” of performances, including both the material 
necessities of the event as well as its symbolic qualities. Thus, movements tell members what 
resources to make available to participants, and provide guidance (if not the materials 
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themselves) regarding how best to convey the movement’s message through symbolic elements 
like signs, images, choice of setting, location of audience, and other such considerations. 
 Finally, movements guide participants’ performances to ensure the intended message is 
effectively communicated. They demand “dramaturgical loyalty” from members, calling for 
adherence to the script to present a convincing, sincere performance to the audience. They also 
ask members to exercise “dramaturgical discipline” by behaving in ways that maintain the 
movement’s desired emotional tone throughout the performance.  
SCRIPTING 
 MoveOn provided scripts to members both figuratively and literally. For each event, 
MoveOn guided members’ perceptions, actions, and emotional experiences through e-mails, 
event materials, and conference calls. In addition, participants and hosts were able to download 
actual scripts for speaking to reporters, onlookers, other participants, and, in the case of calling 
parties, voters. 
 In August of 2005, MoveOn asked members to host or attend candlelight vigils in support 
of Cindy Sheehan’s vigil in Crawford, Texas. Sheehan was the mother of a soldier who had been 
killed in Iraq, and she was camping on the roadside directly across from George W. Bush’s ranch 
during the president’s vacation to dramatize her point that Bush lied to the American people 
about the imminent threat posed by Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction. In its first e-
mail about the planned vigils, MoveOn identified the villain, victims, and heroes in the 
performance, and set an emotional tone that called for both outrage and sorrow: 
Cindy Sheehan, mother of Army Specialist Casey Sheehan who was killed in Iraq, 
continues her vigil outside President Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. She was 
joined Thursday by several more moms, each of whom lost a child in Iraq, and 
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other military families. The closest she got to the president was when his 
motorcade of giant black SUVs raced past her on the way to a $2 million 
Republican fundraiser. 
This message also prescribed appropriate behavior and emotional displays at the event, saying, 
“These vigils aren’t rallies or places to give speeches. They are moments to solemnly come 
together and mark the sacrifice of Cindy and other families.”  
After I signed up online to co-host my local vigil, I received an e-mail that included a link 
to a “host packet” of prepared event materials. This host packet included a guide to setting up the 
vigil, a media advisory template, and a set of talking points. These materials laid out the entire 
logistical and emotional script for the dramatic performance. Reflecting the earlier invitational e-
mail, the host guide specified, “part of your role as a coordinator is to help ensure that the vigil 
remains quiet, dignified, respectful, and safe.” It then called upon the host to take unspecified 
ameliorative actions “in the unlikely event of a conflict” in order to “make sure people know that 
this is not a place for speeches or policy discussions.” Clearly, MoveOn desired a limited range 
of actions and emotional expressions that would convey an image of solemn reflection. Literal 
scripts for contacting and speaking to reporters before and during the event reinforced this 
figurative scripting. Under the cut-and-paste headline, “Mothers in [YOUR TOWN] to President 
Bush: Meet with Mother Whose Son was Killed in Iraq,” the media advisory template spelled out 
the reasons for the vigil. Included in this advisory was a pre-packaged quote to be attributed to 
whomever the host wished to name: 
“Many of us have children in Iraq and have the same questions as Cindy,” said 
[XXXX], [CITY] MoveOn member. “We want to know why our sons and 
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daughters are still in Iraq? Why have so many died? When will they come home?” 
concluded [XXX]. 
This scripted emotional expression was further reinforced by the talking points provided by 
MoveOn, which included statements like, “All we are asking is that the president sacrifice one 
hour out of his five-week vacation to meet with a mother who lost her son in Iraq.” These 
materials were the concrete manifestations of the scripting of action and emotional displays that 
was being undertaken through all of MoveOn’s communications with event hosts and 
participants. 
 Actions and emotions were equally scripted for events that were not held in public 
locations or focused on media attention. In November of 2007, for example, I hosted a “calling 
party” as part of MoveOn’s “Call Kentucky for Change” get-out-the-vote program. This event 
had two goals: first, it was a test of the get-out-the-vote tools that MoveOn planned to use for the 
2008 election; secondly, it was an opportunity to help a Democrat get elected as governor in 
Kentucky. As the host of the event, I was asked to join a national conference call three days 
before the party. On the call, two MoveOn staffers walked hosts through final preparations for 
the event. Both staffers spent a significant portion of the call telling party hosts how to manage 
participants’ expectations and emotions. They especially focused on the management of 
participants’ fears and frustrations, and prepared hosts to motivate callers in the face of negative 
interactions with voters: 
There are going to be people who are rude, or irritated, or not particularly nice. 
And if I get one of those things, what I do is as soon as I get off the phone with 
them, I dial the next number. And that’s really something that you want to 
communicate to your guests. You know, “You probably won’t get anyone who’s 
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rude or irritated, but if you do the best thing you can do is get on that next call and 
reach a voter who’s supportive.” 
 This scripting of emotions and actions also appeared on the host materials provided by 
MoveOn. These materials included a script for what to say to guests before they started calling, a 
sheet with background information about the two candidates in the Kentucky governor’s race, a 
script for what to say to voters, tips for calling and reporting call results to MoveOn, and an 
event guide that laid out what I should do as host before, during, and after the event. To “get 
folks excited” about calling voters, the host guide suggested I provide a bell for callers to ring 
each time they finished calling through a list of voters. Likewise, the guide suggested that at the 
end of the party I “ask about folks’ favorite call and encourage them to share fun/interesting calls 
with the group” in order to “make sure everyone feels good about their time” spent at the party. 
Perhaps the most glaring example of scripted emotional expression appeared on the “Tips for 
Calling” sheet MoveOn provided for each participant. In a section regarding how to leave 
messages for voters, the tips sheet directed callers to “speak slowly and clearly, and smile” 
[emphasis added]. Like Hochschild’s (1983) bill collectors, MoveOn’s volunteers were asked to 
perform emotional labor through their vocal expressions in order to shape the impressions and 
(hopefully) behavior of the strangers to whom these messages were directed. 
STAGING 
 MoveOn was also deeply involved in the staging of these events. Because the events 
were supposed to convey specific and consistent messages simultaneously across the country, 
MoveOn exerted significant control over the symbolic elements of each event. Basic 
considerations for staging included selecting a location and time for the performance, gathering 
props, organizing the cast, and inviting the audience (i.e., the media). Along with public spaces 
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like parks or the steps of government buildings, MoveOn frequently planned events that were 
located at local congressional offices. These “stages” were selected because they offered a 
visually symbolic interaction between congressional representatives (or their staff members) and 
MoveOn members that would entice news reporters. In fact, MoveOn frequently told hosts 
where to hold events, and advised, “If you have a choice between places, opt for the one that is 
most easily accessible to media.” Moreover, MoveOn often recommended that events be held in 
the middle of the day during the workweek. This made it difficult for many members to 
participate because they were working, but it made the events more convenient for reporters, 
who would have time to write stories or edit footage before their evening deadlines.  
In December of 2007, I helped plan a petition delivery event that MoveOn organized in 
response to statements President Bush made about the possibility that the United States would 
need to intervene militarily to stop Iran from enriching uranium. For this event, MoveOn 
members delivered petitions signed by representatives’ constituents to their local congressional 
offices, and asked these representatives to co-sponsor legislation opposing Bush’s attempts to 
justify war with Iran. As with other events, MoveOn provided hosts with an assortment of 
guides, scripts, talking points, and media advisories. The host guide clarified that “the primary 
point of this event is to show your Representatives that local constituents are paying attention to 
their stance on Iran,” but it also noted, “your delivery will reach thousands more people if you 
are able to get media coverage.” To assist hosts in this effort, MoveOn prioritized media contacts 
(from the Associated Press down to local radio stations) and told them to call local news outlets 
during reporters’ morning assignment meetings to maximize the potential for coverage. In the 
media advisory template, MoveOn emphasized “excellent visuals,” including “voters, stacks of 
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petitions, [and] signs.” These “visuals” were props for the symbolic performance of democratic 
expression for the benefit of the press and the targeted representatives. 
 Some props, like the signs, were professionally prepared and immediately downloadable 
for quick and easy use. The petition delivery signs included a red octagon with a white hand in 
front and bold black lettering underneath that said “Stop Bush’s Iran War.” MoveOn clarified 
their symbolic value and outlined appropriate use in the host guide: 
These signs will be useful if you do pre- and/or post-delivery sign-waving outside 
the congressional office. You can hold the signs and wave to cars as they go by. 
You can also bring them into the office with you to reinforce your message during 
the meeting with congressional staff. This also helps spice up the photos of your 
meeting! 
Props also included event participants, which the media advisory tellingly included in its list of 
“excellent visuals.” For the Iran petition delivery, MoveOn emphasized the strategic use of 
veterans and military family members. If participants indicated they were veterans or military 
family members when they signed up online for the event, MoveOn gave this information to 
hosts and encouraged them to introduce these people to congressional office staff and reporters. 
These veterans and military families, as well as other participants, served double duty as cast 
members and props in the dramatic performance.  
 Another event that was staged with great attention to the media was the Bush-McCain 
Challenge. This event was based on the old Pepsi-Coke Challenge, in which passersby were 
asked to taste samples of the two sodas to see of they could tell which one was Pepsi. For the 
Bush-McCain Challenge, the point was to ask people if they could tell whether George W. Bush 
or John McCain made a given statement. The Challenge was originally planned for May 22, 
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2008, but was rescheduled for May 28, 2008, in light of an impending announcement by Barack 
Obama that would monopolize the media spotlight during the originally scheduled time. One of 
MoveOn’s staff members related this information to the regional coordinators via an internal e-
mail: 
 Barack Obama announced today that he plans to declare that he’s reached the 
necessary threshold of delegates in the Presidential race on May 20th…. [T]his 
makes it very likely that there’ll be a media frenzy around him and Hillary 
Clinton on May 21st and 22nd…. [W]e won’t be able to effectively get our 
message out if the media is obsessing over the Democratic horse-race. So we’re 
changing the date to the next week to make sure we can be heard (5/9/08 e-mail). 
MoveOn clearly prioritized media accessibility in the timing of the event, saying, “The best time 
to hold this event is at noon, because we’ll be inviting the media to cover our Bush-McCain 
Challenge.” As with the Iran petition delivery, this time was inconvenient for many members, 
but was selected anyway because of its convenience for reporters. 
 The Bush-McCain Challenge was the most elaborately staged MoveOn event of which I 
was a part during my four years of participant observation. Because the state in which I lived in 
2008 was predicted to be a “swing state” in the presidential election, MoveOn spent over $200 
having signs and other materials printed at the local Kinko’s. It supplied laminated “game cards” 
with photos of Bush and McCain, quiz sheets with questions for passersby, flyers with 
information about John McCain’s position on issues, and several bright red two-foot-by-three-
foot signs saying “Take the Bush-McCain Challenge: Can You Tell the Difference?” The host 
guide outlined how all of these props should be used, and specified, “The big posters should be 
taped to the multiple sides of the table to look good for cameras.” Under the heading “What the 
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Table Should Feel Like,” the host guide directed the visual and emotional tone of the event, with 
an eye toward how it would look in the news: 
The goal is to have the table feel like a fun, inviting carnival game—not like a 
political table with literature. This means your table should be energetic. Great 
props include balloons, candy, and high-energy volunteers behind the table. Any 
add-ons you can think of that add “fun” can be great. (Imagine a clown handing 
out flyers). Not good are things that will look fringey or dark on the news (like a 
grim reaper costume holding some sign about Bush). People nearby handing out 
flyers about the table will also add to the excitement. 
The fact that MoveOn made a point of deterring members from doing anything that would 
appear “fringey” (i.e., make MoveOn look like an extremist organization full of crazy people) 
clearly illustrated how these events were carefully staged symbolic performances designed to 
convey particular impressions of the organization as well as inject its issue frame into public 
discourse.  
PERFORMING 
 In its event materials and prep calls, MoveOn also made it clear that it expected 
dramaturgical loyalty and discipline. Dramaturgical loyalty requires that participants “be taken in 
by their performance enough to appear sincere but not so much as to become overinvolved,” 
while dramaturgical loyalty “involves sustaining self-control so as to behave in ways that 
maintain the movement’s affective line” (Benford and Hunt 1992:45-46). In other words, 
participants were expected to display behaviors and emotions that reinforced the event’s message 
and did not jeopardize MoveOn’s public image. As agents of control during the event, hosts were 
tasked with maintaining the emotional tone of events and keeping participants on message. 
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MoveOn set out expectations for members’ emotional performances in the materials I 
received as a co-host of the Iran petition delivery. It urged participants, “Be respectful. Losing 
your temper or getting rowdy will not help our campaign, reflect well on your group, or stop 
Bush from attacking Iran.” In addition, the guide told people to “speak from the heart” while 
telling staffers why they opposed war with Iran, but, somewhat contradictorily, provided three 
bullet-pointed suggestions for what to say, including statements like, “We’re already fighting one 
disastrous war in Iraq, and our military is stretched to the breaking point.”  
As a symbolic gesture of kindness, my co-host Beth, who was the council coordinator for 
my local MoveOn council at that time, baked a cake for the congressional staff members. It was 
not just any cake, though; she had carved the cake in the shape of Iran, frosted it in green, and 
piped the words “Don’t Invade Iran” in black lettering on top. Clearly, she was dedicated to 
keeping the event on message. Beth and I arrived about twenty minutes before the rest of the 
participants were supposed to show up, introduced ourselves to the congressional staff, and told 
them to expect ten to fifteen people. Indeed, a total of eleven people arrived. We chatted for a 
couple of minutes outside the office, introducing ourselves to one another and waiting for 
reporters to show up. No news crews appeared, though, so shortly after 2:00pm on a cold 
December day, we all shuffled into the reception area at the congressional representative’s office 
and stood in a loose semi-circle facing the office manager, who came out to greet the 
participants. Beth set the tone for the meeting by presenting the staff with her Iran-shaped cake, 
and then spoke about our reasons for being there. In a serious tone, she interwove her personal 
story about her brother’s service in Iraq and Afghanistan with prepared talking points about how 
Bush was not authorized by Congress to start a war with Iran. She then asked other participants if 
they would like to share their reasons for coming to the petition delivery. 
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One woman who appeared to be in her early sixties spoke first. She recounted a long 
history of peace activism beginning with opposition to the Vietnam War, and said she was 
disgusted with how eager President Bush seemed to be to start a war with Iran. Her tone was one 
of subdued outrage; she restrained herself from expressing outright anger, thereby maintaining 
the appropriate emotional tone set by Beth and laid out in the event materials. The next speaker, 
however, did not adhere to this emotional script. He was dressed in blue jeans, and wore a black 
leather jacket with an American flag patch sewn onto the left sleeve and a patch on the right 
sleeve designating the military division in which he served during the Vietnam War. As a 
veteran, he seemingly was an ideal spokesperson for our message. Although this life experience 
gave him perspective on the realities of war, his self-presentation and strident emotional tone 
made him appear threatening to the representative’s staff. He initially stayed on message, saying, 
“I know what it’s like to go to war, and it ain’t no fun, let me tell you. I don’t wanna see a bunch 
of kids have to go through what I went through.” His tone turned increasingly angry, though, and 
his message shifted to impeachment:  
Nothing’s gonna change as long as Bush is in office. I don’t know why we’re 
asking [name of representative omitted] to support some resolution against war 
with Iran when really he should be working on impeachment. Why won’t he stand 
up and say, “Enough! Let’s just impeach this bastard!”  
At this point, I could feel the tension in the room as Beth and the other participants exchanged 
glances as if to say, “Great—now they’re gonna think we’re a bunch of nuts!” Taking action to 
restore the emotional tone and redirect the message, Beth jumped in before the congressional 
staffers could respond: 
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Some of us certainly agree with what he just said, but I want to make it clear that 
we’re not here today to ask Representative [name omitted] to push for 
impeachment. We just want to ask him to support this resolution to prevent us 
from getting stuck in another war that we don’t need to fight. 
This statement validated the veteran’s sentiment and reframed it in a less threatening way, thus 
returning the performance to the emotional script and getting us back on message. 
 Hosts performed similar roles at other events. At the Cindy Sheehan vigil, for example, a 
local activist named George who had volunteered to help organize the event stood on a ledge 
surrounding the fountain around which we had arranged the attendees. To set the emotional tone 
for the evening, he reminded people that the vigil was intended to solemnly honor the soldiers 
who had been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. One attendee piped up, “Let’s not forget the 
thousands of civilians that have been killed too!” George acknowledged his point and integrated 
this new meaning into the overall solemnity of the vigil, saying, “Yes, thank you. Let’s light our 
candles tonight for all of the innocent lives lost in these wars, whether soldier or civilian.” With 
that, the council coordinator Kurtis, George, and I began lighting peoples’ candles, and, in 
hushed tones, asked them to light their neighbors’ candles. For the next forty-five minutes, 
nearly all of the roughly 800 attendees stood silently in concentric circles, many with their heads 
bowed.  
A cameraman for the local newspaper moved silently through the crowd snapping photos, 
while the murmur of George responding to a reporters’ questions could be heard in the 
background. There was occasional whispering and shuffling of feet as a few participants left 
early, but overall the participants stuck very closely to the script. At the end of the event, George 
again stepped onto the ledge, and began humming “Amazing Grace.” Without any further verbal 
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prompt, the humming quickly spread throughout the crowd. For the next few minutes hundreds 
of people hummed together, some swaying slowly to the sound of the song. With the last 
hummed chord, George solemnly said, “Thank you. Have a good night.” With that, the 
performance was over. Participants blew out their candles and slowly dispersed into the night. 
MANAGED RESPONSE 
 MoveOn’s scripting of emotions continued even after the events. In follow-up e-mails, 
participants were given cues as to how members should feel about the actions in which they 
recently participated. These cues essentially encapsulated the “feeling rules” (Hochschild 1983) 
MoveOn constructed for events. They included statements from MoveOn staffers and event 
participants, as well as photos from events across the country. I refer to this process as managed 
response because it is a top-down effort to frame the outcome of events as well as the 
appropriate emotional responses to these events. 
 Managed response e-mails followed a fairly consistent format. First, MoveOn provided 
an overview statement that framed the event as effective and portrayed an image of collective 
efficacy. An e-mail I received the day after the Iran petition delivery, for example, framed the 
event in this way: 
Yesterday, all over the country, MoveOn members turned out in force to tell 
Congress to stop President Bush’s march to war with Iran…. From Paducah, KY, 
to San Diego, CA, MoveOn members delivered a clear message that constituents 
want their elected officials to oppose Bush’s rush to war…. These actions really 
matter—personal visits to offices show that Americans really care about this 
issue. And the fact they happened all over the country means Congress will really 
sit up and take notice (12/14/07 e-mail). 
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These framing statements were followed by quotes from participants about their great 
experiences at the events. These comments were used to create a sense of solidarity among event 
participants despite the geographic separation of their individual events, and helped frame how 
participants should feel about the events. After the Cindy Sheehan vigil, MoveOn sent an e-mail 
that included comments from nine members about the best moments in their vigils. One woman 
reported that the best part was “to know that you are not alone, and that there are others in your 
own community who are so supportive of Cindy Sheehan and finding a new way.” Another 
recounted a moment when “two or three Vietnam veterans happened upon our vigil and joined in 
with love, tears, and peace in their hearts. They were very grateful” (8/18/05 e-mail). These 
comments were supported by photos from events across the country that visually modeled the 
appropriate emotional response to the vigil. One photo included a mother and daughter lighting 
candles together, while another showed candles placed beneath a photo of a soldier who had 
presumably been killed in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
 The emotional frame constructed through comments and photos from the events was 
supplemented by reports of news coverage. These reports essentially quantified the success of 
the events, and reinforced the importance of media attention as the primary goal of these events. 
In its report of the Bush-McCain Challenge, MoveOn included two quotes from news articles 
about the events, and noted, “as more and more news articles and stories keep pouring in, it’s 
becoming clear that voters and the news media are starting to realize just how similar Bush and 
McCain really are” (5/29/08a e-mail).  
As a regional coordinator, I also received an internal e-mail from a member of MoveOn’s 
staff about the results of the Bush-McCain Challenge. It sent a more mixed message about the 
success of the events. On the one hand, the staffer noted that one of the main “challenges” of the 
 170 
event was the fact that “we only got media coverage at about 1/3 of our actions.” On the other 
hand, she reiterated that the events were “really powerful,” and reported, “we’re still seeing the 
articles and clippings pour in,” indicating that the events were largely successful. To further 
solidify this frame, she included links to eight newspaper articles and television reports on the 
Bush-McCain Challenge events (5/29/08b e-mail). This message was an interesting example of 
how the occasionally disappointing realities of political organizing were acknowledged back 
stage among organizers, while a narrative about the success of the events was maintained in the 
front stage for participants. The somewhat contradictory tone of this message also showed that 
MoveOn’s staff was still interested in maintaining a positive frame overall for its organizers, so 
they did not get discouraged. Thus, what seemed like back stage for regional coordinators was, in 
fact, just another layer of front stage for MoveOn’s staff. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter shows how MoveOn carefully orchestrated its offline events with an eye 
toward its overall strategy, which was intensely focused on spreading messages through “earned” 
media coverage. From the back stage council trainings to the front stage of the performances 
themselves, MoveOn had a hand in shaping participants’ perceptions, actions, and emotions. All 
of this stage direction helped MoveOn control its message and public image despite the fact that 
it relied upon of thousands of volunteers with various levels of experience and potentially quite 
divergent political views to translate its strategic vision into action.  
In the next chapter, I turn to an analysis of MoveOn’s effectiveness in shaping national 
policies and elections, media messages, and contemporary models of collective action. 
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CHAPTER 8: MEASURING MOVEON’S INFLUENCE 
 
 “Success” is a notoriously difficult outcome to define and determine in social movement 
research. Because of the types of changes movements seek and the number of other groups 
simultaneously working on issues, it is hard to establish causal relationships between movement 
goals and outcomes (Earl 2000). Researchers attempting to measure movement success have 
mostly focused on political outcomes, such as policy changes or signs of electoral influence 
(Amenta and Caren 2004; Andrews 1997; Gamson [1975] 1990; McAdam 1999). Other studies 
have argued that a movement’s ability to shape news coverage of issues can be used as an 
indicator of success (Earl 2004; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 1980; Oliver and Maney 
2000; Ryan 1991). Rather than trying to determine success as such, some scholars have 
examined “spillover” effects (Meyer and Whittier 1994), “spin-off” (McAdam 1995) effects, and 
the effects a movement has upon countermovement organizations (Lo 1982; Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996; Mottl 1980; Zald and Useem 1987). Movement spillover occurs when 
organizations within the same movement mimic the tactics, structure, and/or the ideology of a 
leading organization. In movement spin-off, members of a leading organization leave to form 
new organizations. Lastly, countermovement organizations often adopt similar tactics and 
structures as movement organizations, but use these to pursue opposing goals. 
 In this chapter, I assess MoveOn’s influence by examining each of these areas. I first trace 
the outcomes of policies and candidates supported by MoveOn. Next, I track MoveOn’s attempts 
to influence media narratives through public events and letters to the editor. Lastly, I show how 
MoveOn’s model of online organizing has influenced other progressive and conservative activist 
groups.  
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POLITICAL SUCCESS 
 MoveOn attempted to influence national politics by rallying support for issues and 
candidates through e-mail action requests, and encouraging members to invest time and money 
into selected political campaigns. MoveOn hoped to directly influence legislation via citizen 
lobbying, and indirectly shape legislative decisions by helping elect progressive (or at least 
Democratic) congressional and presidential candidates. 
USING E-MAIL FOR POLITICAL MOBILIZATION 
 Because MoveOn’s primary tool for mobilizing members was its e-mail list, I catalogued 
all of the e-mail action requests I received between 2006 and 2009. I chose this time period 
because it included two election years and two non-election years, and was thus a good 
representation of MoveOn’s issue and election work. Of the 813 MoveOn e-mails I received over 
the four years, three-quarters (601) included at least one form of action request. The number of 
requests was surprisingly consistent, ranging from 144 in 2008 to 154 in 2007. This meant that 
MoveOn requested some sort of action of me every two to three days, not including the requests 
I received as a member of my local MoveOn council (278) or during my eight-month stint as a 
regional coordinator in 2008 (599 additional messages). Because MoveOn was able to parse its 
e-mail list by level of activity, region, issue interest, and other factors, each member received a 
slightly different set of action requests. More active members like myself were contacted more 
frequently, and received more requests to host or attend offline events. Nonetheless, my catalog 
of e-mails represented a thorough list of the actions requested by MoveOn during this four-year 
period. 
 MoveOn’s most common request (22.6%) was for donations for advertisements, 
candidates, or its get-out-the-vote programs. Invitations to host or attend events were second 
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highest (21.1%). I suspect this figure was disproportionately high in my case because I had a 
history of participation in offline events, and therefore was targeted for recruitment more 
frequently than less active members. Requests to call congressional offices or voters ranked third 
(17.3%), while petition signature requests—once MoveOn’s bread and butter—came in fourth 
(16.6%). Feedback and voting requests (11.5%), letter-writing solicitations (6.2%) and requests 
to forward messages or post them to Facebook or Twitter (4.7%) rounded out the list. 
 To trace the outcomes of issues and candidates, I searched election results and 
Congressional records available online through OpenCongress.org, the Center for Responsive 
Politics, and Wikipedia. It was difficult to track the progress of relevant legislation for several 
reasons. First, because MoveOn rarely specified bill numbers or titles in its action requests, I had 
to use my best judgment to ascertain what pieces of legislation MoveOn supported. Secondly, 
there were often multiple bills pertaining to a single issue, only some of which made it through 
Congress. Determining which of these similar bills MoveOn supported was difficult and 
sometimes impossible. Thirdly, so many legislators, lobbyists, and interest groups shaped the 
bills that did pass that it was impossible to tease out MoveOn’s unique influence (if any) upon 
the final legislation. In short, there was no way to determine a causal relationship between 
MoveOn’s citizen lobbying and legislative outcomes. Fortunately, determinations of electoral 
outcomes were much easier, although causation could still not be determined. 
 Rather than making causal claims, I defined “success” as a correlation between MoveOn’s 
goals and legislative or electoral outcomes, and “failure” as an absence of such correlations. I 
established five codes for success and failure, which are listed below in Table 1. As their names 
imply, “Unambiguous Wins” and “Unambiguous Losses” were clear-cut. An example of the 
former was the 2008 passage of federal funding for AIDS prevention in poor nations 
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(OpenCongress.org 2010a), while MoveOn’s failure to prevent Maine from repealing its same-
sex marriage law in 2009 was an example of the latter (Cover 2009). Results in the “Majority” 
categories included some but not all outcomes desired by MoveOn. For example, when Congress 
restored full funding to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in 2007 but did not make this 
funding permanent as MoveOn had hoped, I categorized the result as a “Majority Win” 
(Corporation for Public Broadcasting 2010). As would be expected, the “Evenly Split” category 
included a mixture of outcomes such that I could not determine whether the results constituted 
failure or success for MoveOn. A prime example was progressive candidate Ned Lamont’s 
victory over Joe Lieberman in the Democratic primary in Connecticut in 2006, which was 
followed by his defeat by Lieberman (who ran as an Independent) in the general election.  
Table 1: Outcomes of MoveOn E-mail Action Requests, 2006-2009 
Outcome 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % TOTAL % 
Unambiguous Win 6 17.6% 9 25% 11 39.3% 5 17.2% 31 23.1% 
Majority Win 3 8.8% 2 5.6% 0 0% 2 6.9% 7 5.2% 
Evenly Split 2 5.9% 1 2.8% 2 7.1% 1 3.4% 6 4.5% 
Majority Loss 2 5.9% 1 2.8% 1 3.6% 3 10.3% 7 5.2% 
Unambiguous 
Loss 6 17.6% 13 36.1% 6 21.4% 4 13.8% 29 21.6% 
Indeterminate* 7 20.6% 2 5.6% 4 14.3% 9 31% 22 16.4% 
Symbolic/Message 8 23.5% 8 22.2% 4 14.3% 12 41.3% 32 23.9% 
TOTAL 34  36  28  29  134  
* “Indeterminate” results included outcomes that could not be determined due to lack of specificity in 
MoveOn’s goals or (especially in 2009) legislative decisions that were still pending. 
  
 To assess MoveOn’s success, I condensed the “Unambiguous” and “Majority” categories 
into general “Success” and “Failure” categories, and omitted “Indeterminate” and 
“Symbolic/Message” action requests from consideration. This analysis revealed that MoveOn 
achieved success in thirty-eight (47.5%) and failed in thirty-six (45%) of eighty cases over four 
years. This trend generally held in each year, although there was some variation in 2007 and 
2008. Although a rough 50/50 record may not seem admirable at first, it was a respectable record 
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for an organization that relied upon citizen action instead of lobbyists and insider deals to 
influence national politics. Indeed, in their meta-analysis of scholarship on policy change, 
Burstein and Linton (2002) also reported that political organizations, including social movement 
organizations, affected public policy no more than half of the time. These results should not be 
read as unambiguous evidence that MoveOn caused these results; the most that can be said is that 
MoveOn may have been part of the reason for the successes. 
 In addition to assessing MoveOn’s success, I examined the cases in which it requested 
strictly symbolic or message-oriented actions. Requests categorized as “Symbolic/Message” 
focused on increasing public attention for issues or targeting certain people for their actions or 
comments. Symbolic action requests, like a petition demanding that Vice President Dick Cheney 
participate fully in an investigation of his role in leaking the name of a CIA agent, gave members 
an outlet for their frustrations and had the potential to raise the public visibility of issues (7/3/07 
e-mail). Message requests were designed to spread MoveOn’s version of a story by, for example, 
calling senators to say that Obama’s tax increase on the wealthy was the right decision (3/16/09 
e-mail) or forwarding a list of reasons Sonia Sotomayor was a good choice for the Supreme 
Court (5/26/09 e-mail). As Table 1 shows, nearly a quarter (23.9%) of MoveOn’s action requests 
fell into this category. I was initially surprised by this fact, but upon reflection I began to 
understand the dual value of such actions. Symbolic and message-driven actions raised public 
awareness of issues, thus potentially increasing chances for success in explicit lobbying and 
election work. Perhaps more importantly, they allowed members to feel efficacious even when 
they could not have any real influence over issue outcomes, as in the Cheney case mentioned 
above. By directing members to engage in these symbolic actions, MoveOn allowed members to 
vent their frustrations in a way that maintained their enthusiasm and primed them for future 
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action. 
MOBILIZING MONEY AND MEMBERS FOR ELECTIONS 
 Between 2000 and 2008, MoveOn raised millions of dollars and mobilized thousands of 
volunteers for Democratic congressional and presidential candidates. To assess MoveOn’s 
influence, I tracked MoveOn’s donations and volunteer mobilization for each election. To 
understand these results in context, I examined public opinion polls during election cycles and 
compared MoveOn’s mobilization efforts to those of four other prominent progressive political 
action committees. 
Congressional Elections  
 Between 2000 and 2008, MoveOn contributed over $10.5 million to Democratic candidates 
in 204 congressional elections (Center for Responsive Politics 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2010a; 
MoveOn.org 2006). In addition to funding, some candidates received help in the form of 
MoveOn-created television ads and volunteer hours from MoveOn members. Table 2 
summarizes MoveOn’s fundraising and results over these five elections. 
Table 2: Congressional Candidates Supported by MoveOn, 2000-2008 
Year Candidates Supported Funds Raised Won Lost Win % 
2000 28 $66,000 12 16 42.9% 
2002 28 $118,089 10 18 35.7% 
2004 53 $242,413 17 36 32.1% 
2006 64 $6,040,420^ 38 26 59.4% 
2008 31 $4,122,727 22 9 71.0% 
TOTAL 204 $10,589,649 99 105 48.5% 
All from Center for Responsive Politics (2002, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2010a) except ^ (MoveOn.org 2006) 
 
 MoveOn’s fundraising in 2000 was driven by its “We Will Not Forget” campaign, in 
which 18,500 members pledged $12.6 million to candidates running against members of 
Congress who had voted to impeach President Clinton in 1998 (Healy 1999). By the time the 
2000 election season was over, however, MoveOn actually raised only $66,000 for twenty-eight 
 177 
candidates, only twelve of which were victorious. In 2002, MoveOn again supported twenty-
eight candidates (not all the same as in 2000), but bumped its contributions up to $118,089. This 
increase in funding did not lead to more wins, though; in fact, eighteen of MoveOn’s candidates 
lost their races that year. This trend continued in 2004, when MoveOn’s $242,413 in funds 
helped only seventeen of fifty-five supported candidates win their congressional election battles. 
Overall, this poor performance suggested that the presence or absence of MoveOn’s support did 
not matter much as an indicator of candidates’ likely success in these three elections. 
 A potential reason for MoveOn’s low win percentage (35.8%) over these elections may 
have been that it tended to support candidates who were facing close races. To see if this was a 
contributing factor, I compared MoveOn’s performance to the results of competitive House and 
Senate races (decided by 10% or less of the popular vote) in which candidates were not 
supported by MoveOn. This sample included 29 House and 6 Senate seats in 2000, 27 House and 
7 Senate seats in 2002, and 9 House and no Senate seats in 2004. Across all three elections, 
MoveOn-supported House candidates underperformed relative to non-supported candidates, 
winning only 28% of races versus 62% won by non-supported candidates. Senate candidates 
supported by MoveOn in 2000 and 2002 were marginally more likely to win than those not 
supported (no comparison was possible in 2004, as there were no competitive Senate races in 
which MoveOn did not provide support), but the number of Senate candidates in each 
category—between five and seven—was so low that the results would have been different if a 
single election would have turned out differently. Given the dramatic difference between 
MoveOn- and non-supported House candidates and the inconclusive evidence from Senate races, 
it does not appear that MoveOn’s poor performance in these congressional elections was simply 
a result of its support for candidates facing competitive races. 
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 This lackluster record may have resulted from larger political trends during the first half of 
the 2000s. As political opportunity theory shows, a movement’s chances of success are largely 
influenced by factors beyond the movement’s control, including the structure of the political 
system, the dominant political party, and public opinion (Diani 1996; King and Husting 2003; 
Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; McAdam 1999). With a strong economy and no wars going on 
in 2000, voters were disengaged from the election, and many thought that “things will pretty 
much be the same” regardless of whether George W. Bush or Al Gore was elected president 
(Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2000). Gore’s image suffered from his 
connection to the scandal-ridden Clinton administration (Pew Research Center for the People and 
the Press 1999), and this opened the door for Bush’s contentious victory in 2000. The 2002 
election occurred under the shadow of 9/11, when Bush’s approval rating hit 90% and 
Americans supported a military response to the terrorist attacks. This support carried over to the 
congressional elections, where a majority of Republicans said they voted as a show of support 
for Bush (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2002). Even in 2004, when 
casualties in Iraq were rising and the economy was shaky, majorities of likely voters supported 
the Iraq war and believed the Bush administration was making America safer (Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press 2004). During these years, the Democrats were fighting an 
uphill battle, and MoveOn’s losing record reflected the political and cultural context of these 
challenging times. 
 Public opinion and political fortunes began to shift in the Democrats’ favor in the latter 
half of the decade. With rising gas prices, the worsening situation in Iraq, and the Bush 
administration’s failed response to Hurricane Katrina fresh in their minds, voters went to the 
polls in 2006 blaming Republicans for the nation’s ills (Pew Research Center for the People and 
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the Press 2006a, b). This anti-Republican sentiment resulted in a sweeping victory for 
Democrats, who won thirty-one seats in the House and six in the Senate. In 2008, increasing 
disapproval of Bush’s handling of the Iraq war, combined with excitement over the presidential 
candidacy of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, stoked enthusiasm among Democrats (Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press 2008a, b). Obama’s unprecedented campaign 
inspired many Democrats and progressives to get involved, and drove an election cycle in which 
Democrats gained twenty-one House seats and eight Senate seats. 
 These favorable conditions were reflected in MoveOn’s results in the 2006 and 2008 
elections. In 2006, MoveOn provided over $6 million in support to sixty-four congressional 
candidates, and also ran television advertisements and its “Call for Change” get-out-the-vote 
program for many candidates. These efforts resulted in thirty-eight victories, or a winning 
percentage of 59.4%, much better than its 32.1% record in 2004. Not too surprisingly, candidates 
who received more money were more likely to win, as were those who benefitted from 
MoveOn’s ads and the “Call for Change” program. When compared with competitive races in 
which MoveOn did not provide support (eighteen in the House and three in the Senate), these 
results proved even more impressive. While MoveOn-supported candidates won 55.6% of their 
House races and 90% of their Senate races, non-supported Democratic candidates in competitive 
races only won 44.4% of House and 33.3% of Senate races. These differences appeared to 
indicate that MoveOn’s support increased candidates’ chances of winning relative to candidates 
without such support. 
 A similar pattern emerged in 2008, when MoveOn provided $4.1 million to thirty-one 
congressional candidates. Of these, twenty-two won their elections, a 71% winning percentage. 
Again, there was some evidence that candidates who received higher amounts of money were 
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more likely to win, but regardless of the level of support received, candidates supported by 
MoveOn had a higher winning percentage than non-supported candidates. MoveOn-supported 
candidates won 76.2% of their House races, compared to only 43.9% of non-supported 
Democrats in competitive races. Likewise, six of ten MoveOn-supported Senate candidates were 
victorious, as compared to one of two non-supported candidates.  
 Aside from considering the political and cultural context in which MoveOn was working, I 
also wanted to evaluate its election work in comparison to other prominent progressive 
organizations. I compared MoveOn’s electoral contributions to those made to the same 
candidates by four organizations: Democracy for America (DFA), EMILY’s List, the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU), and ActBlue. I chose EMILY’s List, SEIU, and ActBlue 
because, along with MoveOn, they were consistently among the top six PACs in the country that 
supported Democrats (Center for Responsive Politics 2010b). DFA, which grew out of Howard 
Dean’s 2004 presidential campaign, did not raise as much money as the other groups (including 
MoveOn), but it organized get-out-the-vote programs like MoveOn. 
 I found that MoveOn’s fundraising was generally on par with these organizations, but it 
was occasionally overshadowed. In 2006, for example, MoveOn spent $28.1 million on election 
work ($6.5 of which was directly donated to candidates), while EMILY’s List spent $34.3 
million (Center for Responsive Politics 2007a, b). Likewise, in 2008, MoveOn’s $38.1 million in 
expenditures was trumped by the $47.4 million spent by SEIU and $54.4 million donated 
through ActBlue (Center for Responsive Politics 2010a, c, d). Furthermore, candidates supported 
by MoveOn often received comparable or even superior amounts of financial support from these 
organizations, not to mention individuals and groups not in my sample.  
 Thus, while MoveOn’s increased fundraising and election work corresponded to a higher 
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winning percentage among Democrats in 2006 and 2008, the increase cannot be traced back 
solely to MoveOn. The correlation between MoveOn’s work and electoral outcomes resulted 
from a combination of favorable public opinion and the efforts of multiple organizations 
functioning in the context of a progressive movement that was maturing and becoming more 
influential in the latter half of the twenty-first century (Kerbel 2009). 
Presidential Elections  
 The 2004 and 2008 presidential elections presented new challenges in terms of defining 
success. Was success defined only by the outcome of the race, or by an organization’s ability to 
mobilize great numbers of people who otherwise may not have been involved in the political 
process? MoveOn’s election work for Kerry and Obama showed the value of measuring success 
by both of these standards. 
 For the 2004 presidential election, MoveOn wanted to mobilize members for on-the-
ground campaign work. It developed the “Leave No Voter Behind” (LNVB) program, which 
enabled members to download lists of targeted voters in their neighborhoods so they could 
conduct door-to-door voter outreach drives in their own communities. Through this program, 
MoveOn members contacted nearly 2.7 million voters who were unlikely to be contacted by the 
Democratic Party, and increased voter turnout among Kerry supporters in battleground states by 
9% relative to voters in the same category who were not contacted through LNVB (Middleton 
and Green 2008). In total, MoveOn spent $10.8 million in support of Kerry and another $1.5 
million against Bush (Center for Responsive Politics 2006). It also raised almost $14 million 
through MoveOn Voter Fund, a 527 organization that MoveOn created to be able to accept 
multi-million dollar donations from progressive philanthropists like George Soros (Federal 
Election Commission 2004). It ran television ads criticizing President Bush, and organized 
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events ranging from bake sales to a concert tour to raise money for Kerry (MoveOn.org 2010).  
 Despite these efforts, Bush was re-elected in November 2004. His victory stemmed in part 
from a massive get-out-the-vote drive planned by Karl Rove for the final 72 hours before the 
election (York 2005), but it was also helped by ads run by the ostensibly non-partisan 527 
organization Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT). This organization outspent MoveOn in 
television ad buys by $5 million dollars, and received an inordinate amount of press attention for 
its ads claiming that John Kerry was lying about his service in Vietnam. SBVT’s ads caused 
many voters to doubt Kerry’s record in Vietnam (Malone 2004), and undercut MoveOn’s 
attempts to shape public opinions about Bush and Kerry. Although it raised millions of dollars 
and increased voter turnout, MoveOn ultimately failed in its goal to get Kerry elected (or perhaps 
more accurately, to prevent Bush from getting re-elected). 
 The 2008 election was a different story. Democrats were riding high after their sweep of 
Congress in 2006, and this enthusiasm was stoked by a Democratic primary that was truly 
historic. When Barack Obama finally secured the Democratic nomination in the early summer of 
2008, his campaign used the internet to raise unprecedented amounts of donations and organize 
millions of supporters (Vargas 2008). A report published two weeks before the election noted 
that “liberal Democrats” (aka “progressives”) were far more engaged in the election and more 
likely to volunteer than any other group, including their counterparts on the right, conservative 
Republicans (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2008b). In this environment, it 
was not difficult for MoveOn to mobilize dollars and people for the Obama campaign.  
 Because the Obama campaign had already established a system that in many ways 
mimicked MoveOn’s 2004 and 2006 get-out-the-vote programs (see “Campaign Adaptations of 
MoveOn’s Model” below), MoveOn opted to function as a “recruitment engine” for Obama 
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(MoveOn.org 2008b). It recruited volunteers for Obama’s campaign offices, reached out to 
voters in battleground states, and ran a youth voter registration drive that registered nearly half a 
million new voters. By the end of Election Day, MoveOn had recruited 933,800 volunteers who 
worked over 20.8 million hours in Obama campaign offices (MoveOn.org 2008b). It also 
forwarded $1.7 million in earmarked contributions to Obama, spent almost $5 million of its own 
money advocating for the candidate, and spent a little over $1 million on ads attacking John 
McCain (Federal Election Commission 2008).  
 MoveOn undoubtedly contributed to Obama’s victory, but as with the congressional 
elections it was only one of many important players. While MoveOn provided nearly $6.8 
million in support to Obama, SEIU reported a whopping $27.7 million in expenditures (Center 
for Responsive Politics 2010c). It also mobilized members to knock on 3.6 million doors, make 
16.5 million calls to voters, and register nearly a quarter of a million new voters (Service 
Employees International Union 2008). The Obama campaign was also very successful in 
fundraising and volunteer mobilization. It broke multiple fundraising records while raising a total 
of $750 million for the election (Center for Responsive Politics 2008), and used the internet in 
addition to its fifty-state field operation to mobilize millions of volunteers (Vargas 2008).  
 As with the congressional election results, I cannot infer a causal relation between 
MoveOn’s election work in 2008 and Obama’s victory. Given that his margin of victory in the 
national popular vote was over 8.5 million people, it is likely that even without MoveOn’s help 
Obama would have won. Moreover, the Obama campaign and many other groups also 
contributed to this victory with both money and volunteers. Finally, public opinion had shifted in 
the Democrats’ favor by 2008, creating a cultural climate that was ready for the change that 
Obama so often promised. Even though the magnitude of MoveOn’s influence upon Obama’s 
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election cannot be determined in light of these other considerations, by a simple goal-outcome 
definition of success MoveOn was successful in 2008 simply because Obama won the election. 
This is in contrast to 2004, when MoveOn significantly improved voter turnout for Kerry but 
nonetheless lost the election (Middleton and Green 2008). In 2004, then, MoveOn was successful 
in developing demonstrably valuable voter outreach tools but unsuccessful in achieving its 
ultimate goal, while in 2008 MoveOn supported the winning candidate but its specific 
contribution to this victory is unclear. 
MESSAGING SUCCESS 
 Aside from trying to directly influence the legislative and electoral processes, MoveOn 
focused on shaping media coverage of issues. By staging simultaneous local actions, MoveOn 
hoped to place its messages in media markets of all sizes through “earned media,” publicity 
gained by creating newsworthy stories rather than paying for advertising time. MoveOn also 
encouraged members to include its talking points in letters to their local newspapers. Through 
these methods, MoveOn tried to shift public opinion and pressure legislators who, it hoped, 
would interpret these messages as the demands of their constituents. 
 To track media coverage of MoveOn’s public actions, I selected fifteen media markets of 
different sizes and in different regions of the country on the basis of the most recent Nielsen 
television market rankings and 2009 newspaper circulation figures (Audit Bureau of Circulations 
2009; TVJobs.com 2009)6. In terms of Nielsen rankings, which are based on the number of 
households reached in a given market, the selected markets ranged from number one (New York, 
NY) to 195 (Eureka, CA) (TVJobs.com 2009). It was important to include small and mid-sized 
media markets in this analysis because, as the previous chapter showed, one of the central 
                                                
6 A complete list of these media markets is available in the Appendix. 
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components of MoveOn’s strategy was to coordinate media events in small towns as well as big 
cities, and thereby create an “echo chamber” effect wherein local coverage led to national 
coverage. Using Lexis Nexis, I searched newspapers in these media markets for articles about 
MoveOn published between 2006 and 2009.  
 To find letters to the editor (LTEs) written by members at MoveOn’s urging, I selected 
phrases from the twenty-one LTE requests MoveOn made in e-mail messages sent to members 
between 2006 and 2009. Using three internet search engines (Google, Bing, Yahoo) and Lexis 
Nexis, I searched for letters using exact phrases provided by MoveOn within one month after 
each request. Because I searched for exact phrases suggested by MoveOn, this method may have 
missed LTEs that were written in members’ own words. Nonetheless, I captured many examples 
of what some call “astroturf” letters, in which members of political groups use talking points 
verbatim or simply add their names to pre-written letters (Klotz 2007; Reader 2005, 2008). 
COVERAGE OF MOVEON’S ACTIONS 
 Over the four years, 725 articles mentioning MoveOn appeared in the fifteen media 
markets I examined. Of these, only one quarter (182 articles) covered MoveOn’s message, while 
the remaining articles either mentioned MoveOn in passing or were about MoveOn as an 
organization, not about its position on a given issue. Of the 182 that covered MoveOn’s message, 
41 (22.5%) covered a television or print ad, 79 (43.4%) covered an event, and another 26 
(14.3%) announced an upcoming event. Taken together, that means that nearly sixty percent of 
articles covering MoveOn’s messages relied upon real-world events as the sources of those 
messages. Thus, while the majority of coverage did not directly address MoveOn’s messages, the 
articles that did were overwhelmingly driven by local-level events organized by MoveOn 
members. MoveOn’s strategy of training local councils to generate “earned media” was clearly 
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bearing fruit. 
 Reports from small and mid-sized media markets often included descriptions of local 
events, and occasionally quoted local MoveOn members. A representative example was the 
Albuquerque Journal’s coverage of a candlelight vigil in Santa Fe, New Mexico: 
About 200 Santa Feans gathered for a candlelight vigil in front of the Roundhouse 
on Wednesday night, joining peace activists around the United States in marking 
the fifth anniversary of the Iraq war. “Hundreds of vigils like this are happening 
all over the country. We are sending a message to our leaders. We’re saying, 
‘Bring our troops home,’” said Stephanie Roth of MoveOn.org, the political group 
which helped organize the event (Hay 2008). 
Although it was not common, local newspapers occasionally covered MoveOn’s national events 
and advertisements.  
 Such coverage appeared more frequently in larger media markets. For example, The New 
York Times ran several articles quoting MoveOn’s ads and discussing their merits, including 
analysis of the controversial “General Petraeus or General Betray Us?” ad that ran on its own 
pages. It also reported on multiple national events, such as 1,200 vigils attended by 37,000 
people on the fourth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq (Sander 2007). These markets also relied 
more upon official statements than quotes from members. For example, during the struggle in 
2006 between incumbent Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman and his Democratic challenger, 
Ned Lamont, The New York Times quoted MoveOn’s executive director regarding the 
organization’s position on the race: 
“We think it’s outrageous that Lieberman would hold himself above the 
democratic process with a small ‘d,’” Eli Pariser, executive director of the liberal 
 187 
group MoveOn.org, which is backing Mr. Lamont, said in an interview yesterday. 
“Ultimately we read it as a sign that Ned Lamont, and people like him who have 
the support from our members, are breaking into a culture that’s been locked off 
by consultants,” Mr. Pariser said (Healy and Medina 2006). 
Discussion of content created by MoveOn and reliance upon official statements meant that 
MoveOn was able to directly insert its talking points into media narratives without having to rely 
upon inexperienced members to convey these messages.  
 My analysis revealed few clear trends in news coverage of MoveOn’s events and 
advertisements. To my surprise, newspapers in larger media markets did not cover its messages 
more frequently than those in rural areas. For example, the largest media market in the country, 
the New York City market (represented by The New York Times), had the tenth-highest 
percentage of articles covering MoveOn’s messages (21.6%), while the highest percentage of 
message coverage appeared in Spokane, Washington’s Spokesman Review (55.6%). Message 
coverage was also not clearly correlated with the dominant political powers in media markets. 
The top two highest-ranking markets by percentage of message coverage included cities in safe 
Republican districts (Spokane, WA, and Lincoln-Hastings-Kearney, NE), the third 
(Albuquerque-Santa Fe, NM) leaned Democratic, and the fourth (Monterey-Salinas, CA) was 
safely Democratic (Wikipedia.org 2010a).  
 In fact, the only clear trend that emerged was a steady increase in the percentage of articles 
covering MoveOn’s messages between 2006 and 2009. Message coverage across all fifteen 
markets increased from 20.3% of all articles in 2006 to 40.3% in 2009. In other words, the 
likelihood that MoveOn’s message would be covered doubled over the four-year period. The 
yearly increased showed MoveOn’s ability to spread its messages through earned media 
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coverage was not tied to the national election cycle, which would have caused dips in 2007 and 
2009. The best explanation for this increase was that MoveOn’s councils became both more 
numerous and organized during the period I analyzed, potentially resulting in more local events 
and better media relations work on the local level. As the previous chapter showed, MoveOn 
spent a lot of time and energy training councils to hold effective media events. These councils 
became more organized and media savvy, and drummed up increased news coverage in smaller 
media markets. When combined with coverage of official statements and advertisements, this 
created an “echo chamber” effect in which the large number of simultaneous local events caught 
the attention of news outlets in larger markets. The combination of earned and paid media spread 
MoveOn’s messages across the country.  
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 Another example of earned media was MoveOn’s “astroturf” letters to the editor (LTE) 
strategy. Such letters were not unique to MoveOn. They first came to public attention in 2003, 
when the Republican National Committee asked supporters to send identical letters applauding 
President Bush’s economic plan to newspapers around the world (Magee 2003; Tynan 2003). By 
the mid-2000s, mainstream political organizations like the RNC and advocacy groups like 
MoveOn were using such letters to shape public opinion of issues and candidates. Newspaper 
editors and academics derided astroturf LTEs as “propaganda” and “plagiarized participation” 
(Dzwonkowski 2004; Klotz 2007; Lee 2003; Reader 2005, 2008), but leaders of advocacy 
groups, including MoveOn’s executive director, claimed the letters were a legitimate expression 
of the political opinions of people who were too busy to participate in other ways (Glaser 2004; 
Lee 2003; Reader 2008).  
 Despite the outcry among newspaper editors, MoveOn continued to encourage members to 
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include its talking points in LTEs. On August 15, 2006, for example, MoveOn asked members to 
write letters criticizing the Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq war. It included five 
talking points for members, including the statement, “The war in Iraq has diverted attention from 
protecting America from terrorism” (8/15/06 e-mail). A search for this phrase on Google, Bing, 
Yahoo, and Lexis Nexis uncovered thirteen LTEs. Searches for four other talking points from the 
same LTE request revealed twenty-one additional LTEs, for a total of thirty-four LTEs printed 
on the basis of a single request. The average number of printed LTEs per request was twenty, but 
results ranged from zero to sixty-two. Most of these letters appeared in small or mid-sized 
newspapers, although large papers like the Houston Chronicle and USA Today also printed at 
least one letter each over the four years. The number of printed LTEs per year varied from a low 
of 49 in 2008 to a high of 145 in 2009, but there was no discernible trend in frequency or 
location of publication over time. In total, MoveOn succeeded in getting at least 421 LTEs 
printed between 2006 and 2009. This total does not include substantially reworded LTEs or 
letters posted on blogs or elsewhere online.   
 Even though they usually were not entirely identical, letters showed obvious signs of being 
based on the same template. In response to a request in March 2006 to emphasize that “the Bush 
pre-emption doctrine has been a disaster in Iraq” (3/16/06 e-mail), for example, members wrote 
the three letters excerpted below, which were published within four days of one another in 
Vermont, Florida, and Oregon, respectively: 
At this three year anniversary of the war in Iraq, I must remind the country that 
the Bush pre-emption doctrine has been a disaster in Iraq—making America and 
the world less safe (Brattleboro Reformer). 
This is a war with no meaning and no end. The president is trying to distract the 
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public with a ‘new’ policy direction. We must know by now that the Bush pre-
emption doctrine has been a disaster in Iraq, making America and the world less 
safe (St. Petersburg Times). 
The Bush pre-emption doctrine has been a disaster in Iraq, making America and 
the world less safe. Congress has a responsibility to stand up to the president and 
insist on an exit strategy (The Oregonian).  
Sometimes multiple, slightly different versions of the same LTE appeared in the same issue of a 
newspaper. Other times, a paper printed multiple letters over time, as when The North County 
Times in San Diego, California, printed a series of four letters arguing “Senator Russ Feingold is 
standing up to the Bush administration’s attack on our Constitution” between March 30 and 
April 21, 2006. 
 It is impossible to say how many letters sent by MoveOn members were never printed for 
various reasons. Most likely, editors who disdained astroturfing barred a significant proportion of 
these letters from publication. Nonetheless, the publication of at least 421 individual MoveOn 
LTEs over four years proved that this messaging strategy was successful. 
MODELING SUCCESS 
 Along with influencing policy, elections, and public opinion, MoveOn’s very presence 
shaped the political landscape in more fundamental ways. Netroots activists and political 
commentators have repeatedly identified MoveOn as a pioneer of internet activism, but have not 
supported these claims with research (Hayes 2008; Hickey 2004; Stoller 2008). To determine 
more concretely whether MoveOn was a model for other online organizations, I contacted staff 
at thirteen progressive and seven conservative internet-based political organizations. Although 
none of the conservative groups responded to repeated requests for interviews, I interviewed 
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representatives of five progressive groups. I also analyzed the websites of all twenty groups, and 
gathered e-mail messages from eleven progressive and three conservative organizations (the 
other groups did not send any messages during the three months I was subscribed to their lists). 
To assess MoveOn’s influence on political campaigns, I also analyzed Howard Dean and Barack 
Obama’s presidential campaigns.  
PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATIONS MODELED AFTER MOVEON 
 Progressive activists adapted MoveOn’s model for state, national, and international 
organizations. MoveOn’s influence was also apparent in the presidential campaigns of Howard 
Dean and Barack Obama. 
State-Level Progressive Organizations  
 The leading example of state-level adaptation of MoveOn’s model was ProgressNow.org, a 
Colorado-based organization that later developed a network of nine state-level progressive 
groups. Bobby Clark, a veteran of the Dean campaign, formed ProgressNow in 2005. After 
Dean’s campaign ended, Clark returned to Colorado to organize progressives for state issues 
using the techniques he had learned from Joe Trippi, Dean’s campaign manager, and Zack Exley, 
a MoveOn staffer who helped the Dean campaign develop its online tools. When he launched 
ProgressNow in August 2005, MoveOn helped by sending a recruitment message to its Colorado 
members (8/23/05 e-mail). Much like MoveOn, ProgressNow referred to itself as “a year-round, 
never-ending progressive campaign” and “a marketing department for progressive ideas,” 
explicitly acknowledging its business orientation to politics (ProgressNow.org 2010, 
ProgressNowColorado.org 2010). It advocated for many of the same issues as MoveOn (the Iraq 
war and health care reform, to name two), but also carved out a niche for state-specific issues 
like support for legislation that prevented payday loan offices from charging exorbitant interest 
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rates (ProgressNowColorado.org 2010).  
 Like MoveOn, ProgressNow used its e-mail list to shape messages and mobilize support 
for issues. It raised money for ads and candidates, asked members to sign petitions or call 
congressional offices, and organized local media events. The tone of these messages was similar 
to MoveOn as well, with its mixture of informal language and calls to action. In a February 2007 
message about proposed oil drilling in western Colorado, for example, ProgressNow told the 
story of how a local woman “could smell the fumes from her front porch,” and claimed that the 
drilling “could imperil more than a million acres.” It then asked members to “join this public 
outcry” by clicking on a link and signing an online petition (ProgressNowAction.org 2/26/07 e-
mail)7. 
 After developing its own capabilities, ProgressNow reached out to similar groups to form 
the ProgressNow network of state-based online organizations. This network included Courage 
Campaign, a California-based group that was also founded in 2005 by a veteran of Howard 
Dean’s campaign. Courage Campaign advocated for universal health care, environmental 
protection, and other broadly progressive issues; however, with the 2008 passage of Proposition 
8, a law that denied same-sex couples in California the right to marry, it shifted increasingly 
toward being a GLBTQ rights organization first and a general progressive organization second 
(CourageCampaign.org 2010). Despite this shift in issue priorities, Courage Campaign’s 
message style was still very similar to MoveOn’s e-mail rhetoric. In May 2010, Dr. George 
Rekers, a conservative leader who advocated “conversion therapy” to turn homosexuals into 
heterosexuals, was caught with a young man he had contacted through an escort website called 
RentBoy.com. Courage Campaign used this scandal as an opportunity to share the story of a gay 
                                                
7 All referenced e-mail messages from other online activist organizations are listed alphabetically in the References 
section, after the chronological list of MoveOn e-mail messages. 
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man who had undergone conversion therapy. After telling of how the therapy “nearly drove him 
to suicide,” the e-mail asked members to “make sure this doesn’t happen to any more of our 
friends” by signing a letter that would be sent to conservative “pro-family” organizations 
demanding that they disavow conversion therapy (CouageCampaign.org 5/20/10 e-mail). 
 Other groups in the ProgressNow network also reflected MoveOn’s organizing philosophy 
and message style. Fuse, a group based in Washington State, said its power came from “real 
people generating stronger progressive leadership from elected officials,” and listed universal 
health care, environmental protection, protection of civil liberties, and an anti-war stance among 
its issues (FuseWashington.org 2010). The Alliance for a Better Minnesota, which was founded 
in 2008 in the midst of Al Franken’s battle to win the Senate seat held by Republican Norm 
Coleman, said it “provide[d] a unified voice for progressive groups on the issues that matter to 
most Minnesotans” (AllianceMinnesota.org 2010). Like MoveOn, its e-mail messages used 
informal language and an eye-catching subject lines or introductory phrases like “Toxic Sippy 
Cups?” to interest readers (AllianceMinnesota.org 5/10/10 e-mail). They followed this with a 
link, more details about the issue, another link, and a personal sign-off. 
 The leaders of three state-based organizations I interviewed all agreed that, as one put it, 
“everyone on the progressive side was inspired to some degree by MoveOn.” One explained 
MoveOn’s influence by saying, “I don’t know if there’s such a thing as the MoveOn school of 
advocacy, but we’re definitely enrolled in that school.” When I asked him to explain, he 
continued: 
The whole tone of our e-mail is a message from a friend. We don’t heavily format 
it, we don’t have big graphic banners, we keep the language informal, we try to do 
no more than three or four paragraphs before the link.... And then also the same 
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philosophical orientation, that our e-mail is supposed to be a service to our 
members. We should be giving them things they want to do, as opposed to putting 
them to work for us. 
The other two state-level leaders also pointed to the structure and underlying philosophy of 
MoveOn’s e-mail messages as one of the most important things they adopted from its model. 
They understood the importance of e-mail as not just a tool for communicating messages or 
requesting actions, but in some sense as the glue that held together an online activist 
organization. As another leader explained: 
MoveOn realized that doing stuff online is by definition an isolated act, because 
it’s you sitting alone at your computer. So you have to show back out to all those 
people who feel like they’re doing that in isolation that they’re not, that it’s 
collective action. And that inspires them to do more and get more people to do it. 
That’s something that MoveOn drove, and that has been adopted in the left. 
 Of course, there were some departures from MoveOn’s model. All three state-level leaders 
reported working extensively with other progressive groups in their states, something MoveOn 
did only occasionally on the national level. They explained that this practice grew out of 
necessity because their staffs did not have expertise in a wide variety of issues, and also because 
they wanted to mobilize more people than were on their own e-mail lists. Another difference 
reported by two organizational leaders was that they took a less partisan approach to issues in 
order to not alienate people who did not identify as progressives or Democrats but agreed with 
the organization’s position on an issue. Despite these differences, all of the state-level leaders 
acknowledged MoveOn’s importance as a pioneer of online activism, and recognized they were 
part of the MoveOn family tree. 
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National-Level Progressive Organizations 
 By the beginning of the twenty-first century, nearly every national political organization on 
both the left and right had a website and an e-mail list. These things alone did not mean that they 
were based on MoveOn’s model. That being said, closer examination of six well-known national 
progressive organizations revealed that they were indeed using MoveOn’s playbook.  
 Take for instance the following excerpts from messages sent by MoveOn and two other 
progressive organizations in May 2010 (with organizational references omitted). Here is 
Example #1: 
Today, oil is washing over the fragile barrier islands and residents nearby are 
complaining about dead wildlife washing ashore and the stench of crude oil.... 
This disaster should be a wake-up call for Obama—but we must make sure he 
hears the alarm. Sign the petition calling for a ban on drilling today and we’ll help 
stage a high-profile delivery in Washington next week to make sure your voice is 
heard.  
And here is Example #2: 
Bill Halter is running a people-powered campaign and volunteers are working 
non-stop to get out the vote for Election Day.... So we partnered with ______ and 
______ to build a great new online tool that lets you call members in Arkansas 
and ask them to volunteer for Halter’s campaign. Calling is fun and easy, and 
progressives in Arkansas are excited to learn about how they can help defeat Sen. 
Lincoln. Can you sign up to make calls? 
And finally, Example #3: 
Last week, I asked ______ members to help launch one of ______’s most 
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important campaigns ever—to end the stranglehold that big corporations and 
lobbyists have on our democracy.... I won’t lie. This will face enormous 
opposition. And take years. But it’s the only way we’ll ever build the America we 
all know is possible, with real freedom, opportunity, and shared prosperity.... Will 
you make a monthly donation to get it going? 
These messages sound like they came from a single organization, but in fact they were sent by 
True Majority (5/7/10 e-mail), Democracy for America (5/9/10 e-mail), and MoveOn (5/3/10 e-
mail), respectively. This message style and tone was perfected by MoveOn, and quickly adopted 
by many organizations that needed to motivate people in absence of the social network 
connections that helped mobilize people in the pre-internet days (Snow et al. 1980). True 
Majority and Democracy for America both illustrated the “spillover effects” (Meyer and Whittier 
1994) of MoveOn’s model in the progressive movement. 
 True Majority was one of the first progressive organizations after MoveOn to use the 
internet for organizing. Started in 2002 by Ben Cohen, of Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream, True 
Majority’s central objective was to “increase America’s investment in programs that benefit our 
children (like schools, health care, Head Start) by cutting Cold War weapons systems and 
shifting the savings” (TrueMajority.org 2010a). It focused more on international issues like 
world hunger and nuclear disarmament, but shared MoveOn’s concern for clean energy, 
withdrawal of troops from Iraq, and other issues (TrueMajority.org 2010b). In short, True 
Majority used the web tools and e-mail style developed by MoveOn to pursue a distinct yet 
complimentary agenda. 
 The same could be said for Democracy for America (DFA), although its connection to 
MoveOn’s model of activism was more direct. DFA evolved from Howard Dean’s campaign 
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organization, Dean for America, which received hands-on assistance from Zack Exley, 
MoveOn’s Organizing Director at the time (Exley 2008a). Like MoveOn, Democracy for 
America described itself as “a grassroots powerhouse working to change our country and the 
Democratic Party from the bottom-up” (DemocracyforAmerica.com 2010). It supported many of 
the same policies and candidates as MoveOn, and used tactics pioneered by MoveOn, including 
e-mail petitions and online fundraising. The organization distinguished itself from MoveOn by 
endorsing progressive candidates in non-national elections, providing online political training 
through its “DFA Night School” program, and facilitating true online community development 
among members through a blog and an open discussion forum (DemocracyforAmerica.com 
2010). These unique attributes made Democracy for America distinct from other leading online 
progressive groups, and allowed it to carve out a niche among netroots activists that was not 
already filled by MoveOn. 
 Other groups adapted MoveOn’s model to serve populations that were previously 
underrepresented in online political organizing. The first such group was a “spin-off” (McAdam 
1995) organization called ColorofChange.org, which was co-founded by James Rucker, 
MoveOn’s former Director of Grassroots Mobilization. ColorofChange.org formed in 2005 in 
response to the Bush administration’s failure to respond quickly and effectively to the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster in New Orleans. It adapted MoveOn’s basic “tactical repertoire” (Taylor, Rupp, 
and Gamson 2004; Tilly 1979), or set of tools and approaches to activism, to address instances of 
racial discrimination and intolerance. ColorofChange.org used petitions, calls, rallies, and other 
tactics to bring attention to racist comments made by commentators on Fox News Channel, voter 
suppression in black neighborhoods during the 2006 election, and the arrest of six black teens in 
Jena, Louisiana, who it alleged were being treated harshly because of their race 
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(ColorofChange.org 2010). 
 A second spin-off organization, MomsRising.org, was co-founded by MoveOn co-founder 
Joan Blades in 2006. It was designed to represent the concerns of mothers of all political stripes, 
and focused on issues like paid maternity leave, equal wages for women, and funding for after-
school programs (MomsRising.org 2010a). MomsRising.org’s e-mails and tactics were almost 
exactly the same as MoveOn’s, but the organization developed new tactics as well. One 
innovation was its “Power of ONEsie” campaign, in which members decorated “onesies” (one-
piece garments for babies) and mailed them to MomsRising.org, which hung them as a colorful 
and symbolic backdrop during public events (MomsRising.org 2010b). 
 The national-level leader I interviewed said in its early days the organization essentially 
copied MoveOn’s tactics and step-up approach to action requests: 
We started with e-mails where people would take a very simple action, like sign a 
petition, send an e-mail,... and with each campaign we were building the base. It 
was very much like the MoveOn approach to organizing.... Very simple website, 
largely driven by e-mails. People could click on a link in an e-mail and land on a 
page where they were given the opportunity to act. Not a lot of deviation out of 
the box. 
The founders did make some conscious decisions about how they wanted the organization to 
differ from MoveOn. Instead of using a decentralized model in which staff members were spread 
across the country, they “were very intentional about having people, at least for the most part, in 
a single location.... For me, the goal was to build a certain kind of team feel.” Although they used 
MoveOn’s e-mails as an example, they changed the tone and some of the phrasing of the 
messages to give them a “voice” that they felt would be better received by the organization’s 
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members. These changes did not affect the underlying similarity in organizing philosophies 
shared by MoveOn and the organization. Like the leaders of state-level organizations I 
interviewed, the national-level representative shared admiration for MoveOn’s service 
orientation to member mobilization: 
What distinguishes movements like MoveOn and ours from a lot of existing 
advocacy groups is being fundamentally about serving the members. You do have 
a centralized decision-making structure,... but fundamentally we can only go 
where our members want to go.... So we act as the voice of our members, versus 
coming to the table with a preset agenda of issues and trying to find people who 
we can enlist to support our agenda. 
This member-driven approach to organizing was perhaps MoveOn’s biggest contribution to the 
progressive movement in the United States. 
MoveOn’s Model Outside of the United States  
 MoveOn’s model even inspired the creation of online activist organizations outside of the 
United States. In 2005, two Australian graduates of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government 
who were inspired by MoveOn built a successful organization called GetUp. The organization 
portrayed itself as “an independent political movement to build a progressive Australia... [that] 
brings together like-minded people who want to bring participation back into our democracy” 
(GetUp.org.au 2010). It worked on some issues of concern to MoveOn, such as climate change 
and rights for same-sex couples, but understandably focused on Australian national issues like 
aboriginal rights and the closing of immigration detention centers (GetUp.org.au 2010). Early on, 
a MoveOn staff member named Ben Brandzel gave the founders tips on how to build their 
organization through e-mail outreach, and this influence was apparent in the style and structure 
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of GetUp’s messages. In fact, like True Majority and Democracy for America, GetUp’s 
messages read as though MoveOn’s staff wrote them. Likewise, GetUp used MoveOn’s tactical 
repertoire, including petitions, calls, public rallies, house parties, and advertisements. 
 At the international level, a group named Avaaz (which means “voice” in several 
languages) used MoveOn’s model to organize over five million members on three continents. It 
was launched in January 2007 with the help of MoveOn’s then-Executive Director, Eli Pariser, 
and six other activists from around the globe. Offering web pages in fourteen languages, Avaaz 
positioned itself as “a new global online advocacy community” that “empowers its members to 
take action on pressing issues of international concern” (Avaaz.org 2010a). As with GetUp, 
Avaaz’s agenda overlapped with MoveOn’s on global issues like climate change and 
environmental protection, but it also focused on issues outside of MoveOn’s purview, like the 
child sex slave trade and human rights violations in Burma and Tibet (Avaaz.org 2010b). Avaaz 
was run entirely on member donations, and developed its agenda on the basis of member 
feedback, just like MoveOn. Like the other online progressive organizations, Avaaz adapted 
MoveOn’s tactics, rhetoric, and organizational model for slightly different purposes, but the 
family resemblance was undeniable. 
 A representative from an online activist organization based outside the United States said 
that the most important thing his organization learned from MoveOn was:  
the very principle that people want to be engaged in politics in a different way, in 
way that is online, that is issue-oriented, not ideologically-oriented. And that that 
kind of movement can have tremendous power.  
He also described how a MoveOn staff member showed organizational leaders how to construct 
e-mail messages following a formula involving two narratives: the “moment” narrative and the 
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“movement” narrative. The moment narrative described a crisis and an opportunity, which the 
organization’s staff jokingly referred to as the “crisitunity,” and provided a “theory of change” 
that explained to members what they could do and why it was important to act. The movement 
story contextualized the crisis and opportunity within the broader progressive movement: 
We need to frame on a grander scale what’s going on. What are we doing?... 
Where are we going? “If we join together, we have the power to change the way 
our very democracy works,” blah, blah, blah. It’s on a grander scale. 
This message structure not only mimicked MoveOn’s e-mail style; it also perfectly encapsulated 
the processes of “diagnostic,” “prognostic,” and “motivational” framing that Snow and Benford 
(1988) described as critical elements of a movement’s ability to mobilize members. The 
“crisitunity,” for example, diagnosed the problem but also framed it as solvable, while the 
“theory of change” proposed an appropriate remedy and, along with the “movement” narrative, 
motivated members to act. Like state- and national-level progressive organizations, groups 
beyond America’s borders adapted MoveOn’s model for their own purposes while retaining the 
essential elements that made MoveOn’s model so influential in the first place. 
Campaign Adaptations of MoveOn’s Model 
 National political campaigns also began integrating lessons learned from MoveOn into 
their strategies. Two campaigns stood out in this regard.  
 Referred to as “the opening salvo in a revolution” of citizen empowerment through 
technology, Howard Dean’s presidential campaign set the standard for how to run an internet-
savvy national campaign (Trippi 2004:xviii). However, it is a grossly underreported fact that 
many of the innovations attributed to the Dean campaign actually came directly from MoveOn. 
Zack Exley, MoveOn’s Organizing Director, spent two weeks teaching Dean’s staff how to use 
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the internet to harness the campaign’s grassroots energy. The campaign was already using 
Meetup.com, but Exley used MoveOn’s existing event-planning tool as a model to create a 
program that allowed Dean supporters to post events on Dean’s website and find nearby events 
using ZIP codes (Teachout 2008). He also explained how MoveOn’s action requests adhered to a 
simple  “1-2-3 action design,” in which desired actions were prioritized (Mele 2008; Teachout 
2008). If members signed a petition, for example, they would then be asked to forward it to 
friends and family, and later be asked to contribute money to support the campaign. Lastly, 
Exley taught Dean’s staff to write short, punchy e-mails with an informal tone, frequent action 
links, a sense of urgency, and a personal signature at the bottom (Teachout and Streeter 2008). 
Reflecting later, Dean’s former Director of Online Organizing said that MoveOn’s help 
“transformed the way we thought about much of the internet campaign” (Teachout 2008:64). 
 By the time Barack Obama was running for president, many of the things that were 
innovative during Dean’s campaign had “been absorbed and turned into orthodoxies” (Teachout 
and Streeter 2008:239). John McCain, Hillary Clinton, and all other contenders were using the 
internet to build their bases and raise millions of dollars. What the Obama campaign did so 
effectively was combine elements of Dean’s campaign and MoveOn’s get-out-the-vote programs 
with the candidate’s personal knowledge of community organizing. From the beginning, David 
Plouffe, Obama’s campaign manager, planned to rely heavily on internet-based organizing, so he 
hired a veteran of the Dean campaign to run the “New Media” wing of the operation. Like 
MoveOn, Obama for America kept metrics on every person who signed up online or at a 
campaign office, so they could track each volunteer’s actions and adjust their e-mail messages 
accordingly. They also used a step-up approach to action requests much like MoveOn’s “1-2-3 
action design” to convert small donors into active volunteers (Exley 2008b; Plouffe 2009).  
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 Obama’s offline organizing was also clearly influenced by MoveOn. The “Neighbor to 
Neighbor” program, for example, combined elements of MoveOn’s 2004 “Leave No Voter 
Behind” and 2006 “Call for Change” programs. Through Neighbor to Neighbor, Obama 
volunteers accessed lists of undecided voters in their neighborhoods to target, and input the 
outcomes of these contacts into a database, similar to the 2004 “Leave No Voter Behind” 
program. Volunteers in non-battleground states were also provided with lists of voters in 
battleground states to call using an online system that allowed them to make calls anytime from 
anywhere, just like MoveOn’s “liquid phone banking” program in 2006 (MoveOn.org 2006; 
Walls 2008). The campaign also provided supporters with an online event-organizing tool, and 
its field program was structured similarly to MoveOn’s council system, with volunteers filling 
various “coordinator” roles within neighborhood-based teams that were overseen by a field 
organizer (Quinn 2008). MoveOn’s organizing tools and e-mail outreach system perfectly 
complimented the grassroots philosophy of the campaign, which was inspired by Obama’s 
experience with community organizing. This confluence of desire for internet-driven grassroots 
organizing and availability of the MoveOn model ultimately helped Obama win the presidency, 
perhaps more than any work MoveOn did on Obama’s behalf.  
CONSERVATIVE ORGANIZATIONS MODELED AFTER MOVEON 
 Progressives and Democrats were not the only ones using MoveOn’s model. In fact, 
several conservative groups explicitly portrayed themselves as “the MoveOn for the right” (Allen 
2007; Harkinson 2007). These groups tried to replicate MoveOn’s online fundraising and some 
of its tactics, but they usually were usually run by a few well-financed, entrenched Republicans 
instead of a group of political outsiders relying on members’ financial support. 
 One of the first conservative online organizations that formed in direct response to 
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MoveOn was RightMarch.com. It was founded in 2003, shortly after MoveOn helped organize a 
“Virtual March on Washington” to protest the invasion of Iraq. Saying that he wanted to lead the 
“Virtual March from the Right,” organizational leader and conservative activist Dr. William 
Greene founded RightMarch.com “to counter the well-financed antics of radical left-wing groups 
like MoveOn.org by appealing to the grassroots ‘silent majority’” (RightMarch.com 2010). Like 
MoveOn, RightMarch.com used e-mail to spread its message and mobilize members, but its 
rhetoric was much more strident. For example, a message regarding Arizona’s immigration law, 
which allowed law enforcement agents to ask anybody they deemed suspicious to prove they 
were in the country legally, read as follows: 
ALERT: You know, it’s bad enough that, President Barack Hussein Obama is 
trying to SUE Arizona to BLOCK their new law.... Now he’s standing side-by-
side with the President of MEXICO in front of the WHITE HOUSE.... And 
together, they stood there and TRASHED ARIZONA’S AND AMERICA’S 
LAWS! (RightMarch.com 5/21/10 e-mail). 
Moreover, RightMarch.com charged between $19 and $99 to send faxes to members of 
Congress, something MoveOn has never done. RightMarch.com’s aggressive e-mail messages, 
costly lobbying tactics, and one-man leadership structure meant that it functioned more as a 
vehicle for Dr. Greene’s conservative philosophy than as a genuine grassroots online activist 
group. 
 Another group that formed in 2003 was much closer in both tone and tactics to MoveOn. 
GrassfireNation was “a million-strong network of grassroots conservatives who are fighting to 
defend our liberty and freedom” by advocating for “border security” and “traditional marriage,” 
and against health care reform and “cap and tax” legislation to control carbon emissions 
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(Grassfire.com 2010a). Unlike RightMarch.com, GrassfireNation’s e-mails struck a similar tone 
to MoveOn’s: urgent, yet informal and not overly alarmist. One e-mail, for example, asked 
members to “join over 349,000 citizens who have signed the petition opposing the Cap and Tax 
bill,” and signed off with “Your friends at GrassfireNation” (Grassfire.com 5/18/10 e-mail). This 
organization also did not charge to send petitions to Congress, although it occasionally marketed 
conservative books through its e-mail list. Like RightMarch.com, though, GrassfireNation was 
run by one man, Steve Elliot, a conservative internet communications specialist (Grassfire.com 
2010b). Although it did not appear to be a one-man crusade against Obama the way 
RightMarch.com did, the fact that the organization’s agenda was controlled by one man 
distinguished it from MoveOn, which frequently polled members to create its agenda. 
 Two other organizations that claimed to be the conservative answers to MoveOn began 
with much fanfare but did not live up to the hype. Both FreedomsWatch and TheVanguard 
emerged in 2007, in the wake of the Republicans’ loss of both house of Congress in 2006. A 
cadre of wealthy conservatives launched FreedomsWatch as a “permanent political presence to 
do battle with the radical special interest groups and their left-wing allies in government” 
(FreedomsWatch.org 2008). Although it claimed on its website that it was not beholden to any 
one person or group, FreedomsWatch depended upon donations made by Sheldon Adelson, chief 
executive of the Sands casino corporation. When he failed to support a plan or disagreed with the 
organization’s leadership, the group could not act (Luo 2008). As a result, after an initial $15 
million ad campaign supporting President Bush’s requests for more war funding in 2007, the 
group folded. TheVanguard was created by founder of PayPal and religious conservative, Rod D. 
Martin, to “enable a level of conservative activism—both online and offline—previously 
achieved only by MoveOn.org and Obama for America” (TheVanguard.org 2010). Although 
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Martin attempted to mimic MoveOn’s online organizing model, the organization’s strategy was 
driven by a board of conservative activists and former Republican insiders (Dube 2007). It got 
some press for supporting an investigation into allegations of illegal contributions to Hillary 
Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign (Moore 2009), but since that time it has not taken action on 
major issues like health care reform, illegal immigration, or economic stimulus. 
 Ironically, despite multiple attempts to create a conservative MoveOn, the one organization 
I analyzed that seemed capable of mounting a credible grassroots conservative challenge was the 
Tea Party Patriots (TPP), a group that did not appear to be based on MoveOn’s model. TPP was 
one of the leading organizations in the Tea Party movement, a loose coalition of individuals and 
groups that supported “the principles of fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited 
government, and free markets” (TeaPartyPatriots.org 2010). After only one year in existence, 
TPP had organized over 1,000 community-based Tea Party groups, and claimed nearly 100,000 
members (whom it called “patriots”). The organization positioned itself as a non-partisan 
grassroots organization dedicated to empowering “concerned average Americans” to stand up to 
their federal government (TeaPartyPatriots.org 2010). According to its website, TPP shared a 
basic organizing philosophy with MoveOn, including a fundraising model based entirely on 
individual donations and a firm belief that its members, not the organization, were the center of 
the movement (TeaPartyPatriots.org 2010). Indeed, several political commentators compared the 
TPP to MoveOn in its early days (Dorell 2009; Martin 2010).  
 The key difference between TPP and MoveOn was that the former organization used the 
internet as a tool for getting people organized at the local level, not as a platform for activism in 
its own right. Its website was not full of requests for members to sign petitions or call Congress; 
instead, the home page was full of links to community-based Tea Party groups in every state. 
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This focus on local, face-to-face organizing was also reflected in its use of e-mail. Rather than 
using e-mail as a tool for activism, TPP used its e-mail list to update members about upcoming 
Tea Party events and provide links to Tea Party social networking sites. A message from May 
13, 2010, for example, included notices about an activist training in Arizona, a convention in 
Tennessee, a demonstration in favor of Arizona’s recent immigration law (which gave police the 
right to ask anyone they deemed suspicious of illegal immigration to provide proof of legal 
residence), and two speaking events by conservative leaders (TeaPartyPatriots.org 5/13/10 e-
mail). In some ways this was similar to MoveOn’s council system, but TPP seemed more 
concerned with establishing community bonds at the local level. TPP’s model represented a shift 
back toward the traditional community models that Putnam (2000) and Skocpol (2003) argued 
were better for creating long-lasting social networks and strong communities. 
 Although it is too early to say whether TPP’s approach will be successful in the long run, it 
is currently one of the most viable conservative challengers to MoveOn and the progressive 
movement. In the 2010 election, Republicans gained 63 House and 6 Senate seats (Wikipedia 
2010b, c). TPP did not formally endorse any candidates, but other organizations affiliated with 
the broader Tea Party movement endorsed 129 House and 9 Senate candidates, all of whom were 
Republican (Zernike 2010). Of the congressional seats won by Republicans in 2010, 40 House 
and 5 Senate seats were taken by candidates who either self-identified as Tea Partiers or were 
endorsed by one or more Tea Party organizations (Moe 2010). Together, these organizations may 
develop a powerful conservative netroots movement that uses some insights from MoveOn’s 
model but also creates new organizational structures that mix online and offline activism in ways 
that resonate with Tea Party supporters. 
CONCLUSION 
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 As my analysis showed, success can be measured in many ways, and is often difficult to 
define. This was especially true for MoveOn because of the nature of the arenas in which it 
attempts to gain influence. It experienced some success in the realms of policy and elections, but 
public opinion and other features of the political opportunity structure in which MoveOn 
operated influenced the outcomes of these contests (Diani 1996; King and Husting 2003; 
Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; McAdam 1999). MoveOn success in inserting its issue 
messages into media narratives was less ambiguous. Perhaps most striking, though, was the 
undeniable influence of MoveOn’s model upon political organizing across the ideological 
spectrum. I address the greater significance of these effects in the next, final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
In previous chapters, I described how MoveOn attempted to influence national politics 
and maintain a positive public image while mobilizing both old and new progressive activists for 
online and offline activism. I examined the construction and experience of community in 
MoveOn, the effects of participation upon members’ senses of self, the contest to frame 
MoveOn’s organizational identity, MoveOn’s staging and scripting of offline protest events, and 
its attempts to influence national politics and public opinion. This study is the first ethnographic 
examination of MoveOn, and as such, it provides an insider’s perspective on the structures, 
strategies, and experiences that lay below the surface of internet-based political activist 
organizations. It advances scholarly understanding of online activism by shedding light on how 
activists move “from the seats to the streets,” and by uncovering the consequences of their 
activism. In this chapter, I explore the conceptual significance of the data presented in each 
preceding chapter, and then turn to a broader theoretical discussion of these concepts. 
COMMUNITY IN AN ONLINE ACTIVIST ORGANIZATION 
 In the absence of face-to-face social networks that are usually the foundations of activist 
communities (McAdam 1986; Nepstad 2004; Snow et al. 1980), MoveOn rhetorically 
constructed an image of community for online members. It also provided opportunities for 
offline collective action, but factors inherent to MoveOn’s communication structure and strategy 
prevented the formation of long-lasting bonds among participants.  
Manufactured Community 
 MoveOn used its top-down e-mail system to create a sense of community among 
members who were geographically dispersed and often acting in isolation from one another. It 
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created an image of community by vilifying opponents, defining the boundaries of its own 
identity, emphasizing the notion of “membership,” and making members feel both individually 
and collectively efficacious. Ultimately, these efforts were designed to motivate members for 
political activism. This model of community construction has important implications for 
scholarly understanding of community as a social construct, especially in the context of internet-
based community formation. 
 Anderson (1983:6) asserted, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-
face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.” By saying that communities were imagined, 
Anderson did not intend to imply that people who believed they were members of a community 
were suffering from a type of false consciousness. Rather, he was pointing out that community is 
not only a product of physical co-presence, but is largely a matter of perceived commonalities. 
As Willson argued, this “mental/cultural construction binds people through generating a feeling 
of their belonging together even when the majority of the members of that community may never 
meet or know each other” (2006:25). In Anderson’s formulation, imagined communities became 
possible after mass production of literature written in vernacular languages allowed the 
development of a common knowledge base, leading to a sense of shared nationality. Even though 
the people reading this literature may have been quite different from one another in many 
respects, Willson noted that “what holds community together is the perception of 
commonality/similarity” (2006:32).  
Today, people rely upon the internet (as well as the television) to provide easily 
understandable representations of a common “reality” that create feelings of belonging. 
Moreover, Western nations (and, increasingly, developing countries) have shifted from an 
industrial capitalist model of production to a service economy oriented toward consumption. 
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This consumer orientation fundamentally affects all aspects of the social world, creating a social 
system wherein individuals seek products, organizations, and even relationships with an eye 
toward how these will fulfill their perceived needs. Especially with the rise of internet 
communities, people can “shop around” for like-minded others, and supplement (if not entirely 
replace) offline relationships with online communities (Wellman et al. 1996). These online 
communities provide members with a sense of belonging, and can be as personally fulfilling as 
offline communities (Gochenour 2006; Horrigan and Rainie 2001; Scott and Johnson 2005; 
Wellman et al. 2003). However, because of the consumer orientation and physical isolation of 
participants, online communities are less likely to foster committed, caring relationships among 
people with heterogeneous interests or backgrounds (Fernback 2007; Wellman 2001; Wellman et 
al. 2001). 
My analysis of MoveOn confirms Anderson’s (1983) hypothesis that community is as 
much a perception as an experience, and need not be limited to social interactions based on 
physical co-presence. Moreover, it affirms that the internet fosters development of communities 
of interest, especially among people who may feel marginalized in their political or cultural 
context. As several MoveOn members noted, during the Bush era MoveOn’s e-mails provided 
them with a comforting sense of belonging when they felt like they could not openly express 
their progressive political views. By providing members with a sense of power in numbers, 
MoveOn also empowered members to actively oppose the policies of the Bush administration 
and the conservative movement in general.  
Although MoveOn was able to create a sense of community among members, it did so in 
a way that differentiated it from other online communities. In most online communities, people 
create social bonds by communicating with one another. This ability to participate in the 
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definition and reproduction of the community makes members both consumers and producers of 
community. In MoveOn, though, members’ capacity to produce community was hindered by the 
structure of its e-mail system, which did not facilitate horizontal communication between 
members. As a result, MoveOn faced a dilemma: it needed to create a sense of community 
among members to maintain their commitment to the organization and increase their likelihood 
of participation, but its top-down e-mail system prevented members from creating social 
networks that would help maintain their commitment. To solve this dilemma, MoveOn used its 
top-down system to rhetorically construct an image of community, and encouraged members to 
“consume” this image of community. Unlike other online communities, MoveOn members were 
not involved in the construction of this community; they were free only to accept or reject the 
image produced by MoveOn.  
In short, MoveOn offered members a manufactured community. A manufactured 
community is designed by a controlling body, rather than co-created by those who are supposed 
to be its inhabitants. It is consciously constructed for a particular instrumental purpose, and is not 
designed to serve the emotional needs of members, although it may provide some incidental 
emotional benefits. It is a top-down rhetorical formulation, not an emergent grassroots construct. 
Its location is in the words of those who control its formulation, not in the lived experiences or 
even the minds of those it claims to represent.  
The concept of manufactured community expands upon Anderson’s “imagined 
community” by showing how information technologies are no longer simply being used to 
convey ideas that—if widely accepted—can foster development of imagined communities. Now, 
organizations like MoveOn are using such technologies to market images of community itself. 
Just as the development of imagined communities occurred in the economic context of industrial 
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mass production, manufactured community is an outgrowth of its economic and cultural context. 
As the United States and other developed nations become increasingly oriented toward 
consumption instead of production, this “cultural logic” (Jameson 1991) shapes all aspects of 
society, including activism and the development of community. Moreover, the rise of 
technologies that break down spatial and temporal barriers to communication opened the door 
for many new types of communities. Some—perhaps most—are sustained through interpersonal 
communication, but others—like MoveOn—use this communication framework as a direct 
marketing tool for the manufacture of community.  
Ephemeral Community 
 To say that MoveOn manufactured an image of community for consumption by members 
is not to imply that members did not experience a sense of community, or—if they did—that this 
experience was based on a falsehood. In fact, many MoveOn members reported feeling a sense 
of community, although some rejected the idea outright. Some members felt connected to an 
imagined community that they described as existing “out there,” in the ether of cyberspace. 
Others experienced community more directly, through participation in offline events. This sense 
of community was fleeting, though; once members were no longer participating in events or as 
members of their local council groups, they lost their sense of belonging to a community. 
MoveOn’s offline social networks did not facilitate the development of long-term community 
ties. 
 To some extent, the ephemerality of this community experience seems to confirm 
Putnam’s (2000) argument that the internet (and television) inhibited community formation and 
caused “civic disengagement” by preventing social interactions that could lead to bonding and 
bridging social capital. Likewise, Skocpol pointed out that the development of professional 
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advocacy organizations that treated members “not as fellow citizens but as consumers with 
policy preferences” decreased citizens’ need or desire to establish civically active community 
groups (2003:211). Both Putnam (2000) and Skocpol (2003) showed convincingly that strong 
feelings of loyalty and reciprocity developed most readily in groups in which members 
frequently met face-to-face. Indeed, the most active members of MoveOn’s council system 
expressed strong positive feelings about the people they met while participating, and were the 
most likely of my interviewees to say they felt like they belonged to a community. However, 
even MoveOn members who were not frequent participants in offline events often described a 
sense of belonging to a community “out there” that was defined by assumed similarities in 
political values and participation in the same political actions—such as e-petition signing—
despite lack of physical co-presence. This fact challenges Putnam and Skocpol’s arguments 
because it shows that civic engagement and a sense of community can develop even when 
members lack the basic ability to communicate with one another. 
 Moreover, members who participated in a moderate amount of offline action reported 
experiencing almost instant rapport and camaraderie with other members at these events. Yet 
when they were inactive, this strong emotional experience did not translate into an enduring 
sense of belonging. This seemingly contradictory set of experiences resulted from the nature of 
MoveOn’s rhetoric, goals, and strategy. Because MoveOn rhetorically constructed an image of 
community in its e-mails, MoveOn members began to imagine a population of other people just 
like them that existed “out there,” like a cloud of water vapor. MoveOn’s offline events were 
opportunities for this cloud to condense and crystallize for a short time. Members entered these 
events with pre-established expectations about other members’ personalities and political values. 
These positive cognitive frames primed them to perceive other members as comrades, and they 
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acted in ways that confirmed these frames. By acting as though they were all part of a tight-knit 
community, MoveOn members manifested such a community experience, at least for a moment.  
 However, these events were not designed to establish lasting connections. They were 
explicitly oriented toward MoveOn’s political goals, and were often quite short (one to two 
hours). Like Adler and Adler’s (1999) transient resort workers or Gardner’s (2004) bluegrass 
festivalgoers, MoveOn members experienced strong feelings of solidarity while engaged in these 
temporary social environments. This accelerated social bonding was counterbalanced by the 
short and infrequent opportunities members had to interact, the absence of online communication 
tools with which they could build upon offline connections, and the goal-oriented nature of the 
events. MoveOn ultimately needed to mobilize members for political action, and the 
manufactured image of community was important as a means to this end. It used its e-mail 
system to aggregate members’ individual contributions, not to facilitate congregation. To the 
extent that they bought into this image of community and participated in offline action, members 
were able to establish ephemeral communities that thrived momentarily but evaporated after each 
event. 
ACTIVIST IDENTITY AND THE VALUE IDENTITY ACTIVATION PROCESS  
 MoveOn members came to the organization from a variety of backgrounds. 
“Newcomers” got politically involved for the first time through MoveOn, while “veterans” had 
extensive activist histories that they extended by working with MoveOn. Through their 
participation in MoveOn, these two groups either developed or reinforced activist identities. This 
identity development and reinforcement was enabled by members’ abilities to engage in value-
oriented actions through the roles they fulfilled in MoveOn. The connection of values and roles 
to identities was mediated by competing role demands and emotional responses to events. In 
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turn, these factors affected the salience of identities and perceptions of opportunities for identity 
reinforcement. I refer to this complex relationship between values, roles, and identity as the 
value activation process. 
The value activation process involves five elements. These elements are roughly 
chronological, but they also overlap and feedback upon one another.  First, two precipitating 
factors make people predisposed to acting on their values. One factor shared by newcomers and 
veterans in my study was a generalized participatory worldview. According to this worldview, it 
is not enough to simply believe in a set of values; one must also be willing to act on these values. 
A participatory worldview is particularly likely to develop in response to witnessing influential 
others—such as parents or peers—engaging in discussions or actions related to social or political 
issues. This behavior models for witnesses the importance of being socially aware and active. A 
participatory worldview does not have to be oriented toward politics; it may motivate people to 
become active in many forms of social or political activity. Such a worldview is likely to lead to 
political activism when the participatory behavior witnessed is political in nature, and/or when 
government actions upset people and politicize their participatory worldview. Previous 
experience acting on one’s values is a second precipitating factor. Prior participation in activism 
is an important predictor of activist involvement later in life (Downton and Wehr 1998; McAdam 
1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989). This experience reinforces participants’ values, provides roles 
in a network or organization with which they begin to identify, and fosters positive emotions like 
hope when the actions in which they are participating are successful (Reed 2004). 
In reality, though, values are not automatically translated into action. The shift from 
values to value-oriented action is affected by two mediating factors: perceived opportunity and 
urgency. Family responsibilities, jobs, and other factors make some people “biographically 
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unavailable” (McAdam 1986) for certain types of participation, despite their participatory 
worldviews. These people face competing role demands that place limits on the time and energy 
they can commit to value-oriented actions like activism. When other role-based identities are 
more salient to their senses of self, they will curtail their activism and perceive this strain as a 
lack of opportunity. People who do not face as many competing role obligations, such as retirees 
or students, may nevertheless remain uninvolved due to a perceived lack of urgency. Some 
MoveOn members, for example, were not involved in activism until their sense of urgency was 
awakened by the “moral shock” (Jasper 1997, 1998) of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 
restriction of civil liberties and invasion of Iraq. Moral shocks make activism seem more urgent, 
and can increase the salience of an activist identity. This shift in priorities can also convince 
previously inactive people to get involved, and can shape perceptions of opportunity as well. 
Thus, the decision to engage in activism is mediated by role demands and emotional responses 
that shape perceptions of opportunity and urgency, and affect the saliency of activist identity for 
those who already have such an identity. 
If they perceive sufficient opportunity and urgency, people will seek roles that enable 
them to engage in value enactment. In value enactment, people take on roles in which they can 
act in ways that support their values. For some people, participation in a single value-oriented 
organization, like a social movement group, fulfills their desire for value enactment; others may 
achieve fulfillment by participating in multiple groups. Moreover, absolute levels of participation 
are less important than how current levels compare to previous experiences of engaging in value-
oriented action. Some MoveOn members who had never before engaged in activism, for 
example, perceived online activism as a great opportunity for value enactment, while 
experienced activists either participated heavily in MoveOn or supplemented this participation 
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with other activism in order to feel they were sufficiently enacting their values. The key to value 
enactment is that people feel that the roles they fulfill give them sufficient opportunities to 
engage in actions that align with and reinforce their values. 
The roles participants fulfill not only give them opportunities to act in accordance with 
their values; they also provide the context within which participants can engage in value identity 
performance. Through continued performance of roles that support their values, people begin to 
develop value identities. The evaluations of others are also an important part of this process 
(Cooley 1902; Goffman 1959; Mead [1934] 1962). Both newcomers and veterans reported that 
being treated or labeled as an activist by others gave them a sense of pride and reinforced their 
participation. By making their values visible through role performances, participants signify to 
themselves and others that their value identities are salient to their self-concepts (Gecas 1982, 
2000).  
 As Stryker (1968, 1980) suggested and the behavior of veterans in MoveOn and other 
experienced activists showed, people seek roles that reinforce their highly salient identities 
(Downton and Wehr 1998; McAdam 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989). This process of identity 
reinforcement is the final element of the value activation process. In general, once people 
develop value identities they will maintain or even increase their value-oriented activity to 
“feed” this salient identity. However, decisions regarding the performance of identity-reinforcing 
roles are once again mediated by perceived opportunity and urgency. Some people are prevented 
by competing role demands or a loss of urgency from engaging in value-oriented action as fully 
as would be expected given the salience of their value identities. On the other hand, continual 
value enactment will make value identities highly salient, thereby making it more likely that 
participants will maintain a sense of urgency and overcome competing role demands. Thus, 
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perceived opportunities and sufficient emotional investment are critical components in the 
process by which people’s values are translated into action and, consequently, into identities.  
 The value activation process offers a cohesive account of how value identity—and more 
specifically, activist identity—is developed through the interplay of role enactment and value-
oriented action. By explaining how values motivate people to seek out certain roles, it adds 
nuance to the structural symbolic interactionist claim that roles are the locus of identity 
development. In addition, by showing how fundamental values are to identities, this research 
helps explain why identities show continuity over time and across situations despite a lack of 
role continuity. My research revealed that many MoveOn members’ activist identities persisted 
even during periods of inactivity, thus supporting Gecas’s (2000) claim that value identities 
transcend roles and group affiliations. As Stryker (1968, 1980) proposed, MoveOn members 
generally sought roles that supported salient identities. I expand on Stryker’s insight by revealing 
how this role-seeking behavior was mediated by perceptions of opportunity and urgency. People 
will not commit to roles if they do not perceive opportunities to act, even if these roles allow 
them to enact their values. Moreover, circumstances must exist that make such value-oriented 
action seem urgent. 
 This process also contributes to the study of identity in social movements. First, it brings 
attention to the importance of activist identity as a motivator for, and outcome of, movement 
participation. In addition, it specifies the processes by which this identity is developed and 
reinforced. This expands the scope of research on the relationship between identity and activism, 
which has focused overwhelmingly on identities based on social categories, not on activist 
identity in its own right (Armato and Marsiglio 2002; Bernstein 1997; Gamson 1995; Hunt and 
Benford 1994; Snow and McAdam 2000; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Second, the development 
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of activist identity among MoveOn members who engaged primarily or exclusively in online 
activism shows that activist identity can develop among less active social movement participants, 
as long as their current level of participation is high in comparison to previous levels of 
participation (or lack thereof) in such activities. This adds a new twist to research on how activist 
identity contributes to long-term commitment, which has focused on activists involved in 
movements based on face-to-face social networks, rigid ideologies, and/or high-risk protest 
tactics (Downton and Wehr 1998; McAdam 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989). 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY FRAMING 
MoveOn attempted to exert control over its organizational identity by projecting an 
image of itself as an influential progressive organization that was standing up for average 
Americans. This identity frame was then challenged or reinforced by ideologically motivated 
news sources, which engaged in “framing contests” (Ryan 1991) to shape public opinion of 
MoveOn. Members interpreted these competing claims through individual cognitive frames that 
were influenced by their activist experiences (both in and outside of MoveOn) and political 
values. Because MoveOn articulated an ambiguous identity frame, members and news sources 
alike interpreted its identity in ways that confirmed their ideological biases regarding the 
organization. This definitional ambiguity also encouraged MoveOn, progressive blogs, and 
members to reactively frame MoveOn’s identity on the basis of negative claims made by 
conservative news sources. This reactive identity framing process involved a kind of interpretive 
jujitsu, wherein opponent’s attacks were used to frame MoveOn in ways that contradicted the 
attackers’ original intent. 
This analysis links concepts that are empirically related but often analyzed separately. 
Organizational identity, for example, has not traditionally been used in relation to social 
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movement organizations (but see Meyer 2004). Nonetheless, it proved to be a useful, more 
precise alternative to the concept of collective identity, which has been stretched to encompass 
conceptions of identity ranging from the individual to the cultural level (Polletta and Jasper 
2001). Because organizational identity is defined through interactions between organizations, 
their members, and audiences (Brown et al. 2006; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Hatch and Schultz 
1997, 2002), it fits conceptually within the “identity framing” processes social movement 
organizations undertake in the context of “identity fields” populated by allies, opponents, and 
audiences (Hunt et al. 1994; Benford and Hunt 2003). My research extends this analysis by 
showing how ideologically motivated news sources also play important roles in identity framing. 
By focusing on how ideologically opposed news sources react to one another’s identity frames, 
my analysis adds nuance and depth to scholarly examinations of identity framing, which often 
portray “the media” as a monolithic, antagonistic force with which movements begrudgingly 
interact (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 1980; Kruse 2001; Molotch 1988; Ryan 1991). 
Finally, by integrating framing processes occurring at the cultural, organizational, and individual 
levels, this study captures the complex interplay of cognitive and constructed frames more 
completely than existing approaches to identity framing. 
The Consequences of Ambiguous Organizational Identity 
My study of MoveOn also advances understanding of the consequences of definitional 
ambiguity in an organizational identity. Common wisdom among social movement scholars is 
that precisely—even strategically—defined identities are preferable because they give the 
organization more control over how it is perceived by outsiders, and allow insiders to understand 
how the organization’s goals align with their values (Bernstein 1997; Gamson 1996; Kiecolt 
2000; Snow and McAdam 2000; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Whether they are internet-based or 
 222 
traditional, political or apolitical, organizations usually explicate sets of orienting principles and 
goals that help members develop a clear understanding of the organization’s identity (Hatch and 
Schultz 2004; Meyer 2004). Absent this information, members are left to their own devices in 
interpreting this identity. In such cases, members typically develop a shared sense of identity by 
communicating face-to-face (Hunt and Benford 1994; Hunt et al. 1994) or over the internet (Fox 
2004; Pliskin and Romm 1997; Scott and Johnson 2005; Wellman and Gulia 1999). In 
MoveOn’s case, though, both avenues for identity articulation were closed. When combined with 
its lack of a mission statement and the ambiguous meaning of identifying terms like 
“progressive” or “people-powered,” this lack of inter-member communication networks should 
have hindered MoveOn’s ability to control public perceptions and create solidarity among 
members, according to traditional thinking. 
Indeed, MoveOn was frequently attacked by conservatives. These attacks may have 
damaged its reputation among the general public, although such conclusions cannot be drawn 
from my research. Regardless, the attacks increased members’ senses of efficacy and provoked 
other progressive organizations (in this case, blogs) to act in solidarity with MoveOn. Thus, 
while the ambiguity of MoveOn’s organizational identity made it easier for opponents to reframe 
it negatively, these attacks ultimately strengthened the organization.  
By leaving key identifying terms such as “progressive” open for interpretation, MoveOn 
allowed members to read into these terms their own political values and perspectives on 
activism. For example, members who solely participated online and members who were leaders 
of their local councils both saw their participation as “grassroots” activism. The ambiguity 
reduced the likelihood of internal conflicts over MoveOn’s identity by allowing multiple “true” 
interpretations to exist under the umbrella of “progressive,” “people-powered” activism. This 
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challenges conventional wisdom about the necessity of articulating clear identity frames in all 
cases. It also suggests that ambiguous identity frames may be beneficial for multi-issue 
organizations like MoveOn. Members of such organizations are likely to have more diverse issue 
priorities than members of single-issue groups, and without an ambiguous identity that members 
can interpret to fit their perspectives, conflicts over organizational goals would likely increase. 
Ambiguous organizational identity may also be important to online activist organizations 
(especially those organizing on an international level) that aggregate the efforts of individuals 
who may come from diverse cultural backgrounds and might have little if any prior activist 
experience.  
PROTEST AS DRAMA IN A MEDIA-SATURATED CULTURE 
 MoveOn’s strategy was fundamentally shaped by an emphasis on media attention. The 
pace of its activism was determined to a great extent by the speed of the media cycle, and its 
protest events were designed with news values and routines in mind. To control the presentation 
of its messages and its public image, MoveOn carefully scripted members’ actions and emotions. 
This dramaturgical control extended from the preparation of events all the way to post-event 
reports. Such top-down control over protest events also allowed MoveOn to respond rapidly to 
news events while they were still “hot,” and thereby increased its chances of influencing media 
narratives about these issues. 
 Since Goffman (1959) first brought to light the dramaturgical nature of social 
interactions, researchers have applied this analytical approach to a wide variety of social settings. 
Dramaturgical analysis seems particularly applicable to social movements, but relatively few 
scholars have examined dramaturgy in social movements. Benford and Hunt (1992) analyzed 
how social movements scripted and staged protest events to portray themselves as powerful. 
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Snow (1979) and McAdam (1996) showed how movement organizations strategically adjusted 
their public presentations to prevent themselves from being perceived as marginal or dangerous. 
Finally, Kubal (1998) examined the difference between political claims made in back stage 
(interpersonal) and front stage (public) regions. My study adds to this relatively small body of 
work by revealing the communicative and interpersonal avenues through which activists’ 
emotions and actions were dramaturgically controlled. It also shows that such dramaturgical 
control is exerted before, during, and even after protest events. Furthermore, it contextualizes 
these processes by connecting the performance of protest to the accelerating news cycle. 
 The acceleration of the news cycle is part of a larger trend in what Harvey (1989) called 
“time-space compression,” in which new communication technologies have allowed for nearly 
instantaneous mutual experiences across vast geographical distances. This trend has opened up 
new avenues for political mobilization on a global scale using the internet (Rodgers 2003; 
Routledge 2000, 2003). On the other hand, it has caused social movements to feel the need to 
repackage their claims into sound bites to receive attention in a social world where people are 
preoccupied with immediate events and their attention is fragmented by multiple simultaneous 
demands (Gamson et al. 1992; Gergen 1991). Movements adjust to these social circumstances by 
accelerating their claims-making and focusing on short-term “campaigns” instead of long-term 
goals, even though the actual political processes that movements hope to influence—particularly 
legislative decision making—still occur on a much slower time scale (Rorty 1995; Rosa 2003).  
 Movement organizations’ reliance upon dramatic protest tactics and succinct issue frames 
makes sense within this larger cultural context. The careful scripting and staging of protest 
events is a virtual requirement in an age where social movements must break through a wall of 
incessant information and spectacle to get their messages across. Essentially, protest events like 
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the “media events” planned by MoveOn are advertisements. The choreographed actions and 
emotional expressions by participants are designed to convey easily understandable symbolic 
images to audiences, while the carefully worded and professionally produced signs function as 
tag lines for the “product,” which in this case is a political idea. As politicians have moved 
toward a marketing model of campaigning over the past fifty years (McGinniss 1969; Scammell 
2007), so too have social movement organizations increasingly shifted toward an emphasis on 
visuals and message control through both paid and earned media. A marketing approach to the 
analysis of protest unifies insights from the social movement literature on framing (Gamson and 
Modigilani 1989; Hunt et al. 1994; Snow et al. 1986), tactics (McAdam 1983; Tarrow 1998; 
Tilly 1979), and movement-media dynamics (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Gitlin 1980; Ryan 
1991) into a single dramaturgical analysis of movements’ strategic attempts to shape public 
opinion through media-oriented tactical repertoires. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES 
 MoveOn is broadly considered to be one of the leading and most powerful progressive 
organizations in the United States. However, with only one exception (Middleton and Green 
2008), no empirical research has been conducted to verify or refute these claims. My study is the 
first to systematically analyze MoveOn’s influence upon policies, elections, media narratives, 
and models of online political organizing. It provides new insight into the goals, strategies, 
structures, and potential influence of online activist organizations.  
Political Influence as Mediated Opportunity 
 MoveOn mobilized members online and offline for symbolic actions, lobbying, 
donations, and volunteer work to influence policies and elections. It met with some success in 
this regard, at least in terms of correlations between its goals and final outcomes. However, 
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MoveOn’s individual influences upon policies and elections were unclear because of the 
confounding involvement of other organizations and shifts in public opinion. These results offer 
support to both political opportunity and political mediation models of movements’ political 
influence. 
 Political opportunity theory suggests that the likelihood of success for “challengers” like 
social movement organizations is directly tied to the “openness” of the political system, as 
measured by ability to participate in the political system, access to political decision making 
processes, absence of government repression, and the presence of movement allies in positions 
of political power (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). More recently, scholars have expanded the concept 
of political opportunity to include factors in the “opportunity environment,” such as cultural 
attitudes and public opinion, that also affect the likelihood of protest, the selection of tactics, and 
a movement’s chances of success (Diani 1996; King and Husting 2003; Koopmans and 
Duyvendak 1995). Political mediation theory is related to the study of political opportunity, but it 
places more emphasis on the relationship between a movement and institutional actors, such as 
elected political leaders (Amenta and Caren 2004; Amenta et al. 2010). It proposes that 
movements are more likely to be successful when they “engage in collective action that changes 
the calculations of relevant institutional political actors…[such that they] see a challenger as 
potentially facilitating or disrupting their goals” (Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999). In other 
words, political leaders must believe it is worth their efforts (in terms of political capital or votes, 
for example) before they will advocate for a movement’s position. The movement’s success is 
“mediated” by this support, and thus it indirectly influences political outcomes. 
 MoveOn’s choice of tactics was undeniably influenced by the relative openness of the 
political system in the United States. Its decision to rely upon non-confrontational tactics like 
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lobbying of representatives, election of sympathetic leaders, and peaceful public rallies showed 
that MoveOn was confident that a reform-oriented approach would lead to meaningful changes. 
Prior to 2007 (when the Democrats took control of Congress), MoveOn had difficulty achieving 
gains because the Bush administration and Republican-controlled Congress closed off its 
opportunities for meaningful access to decision makers. Moreover, until 2006 public opinion still 
favored Bush and the Republicans. This made it hard for MoveOn to convince elected leaders 
and candidates to openly oppose the Iraq War and other issues, because these people did not see 
the advantage of doing so. In short, during the majority of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the political opportunity structure and the “opportunity environment” were relatively 
closed to MoveOn’s challenges, making a political mediation strategy untenable. This lack of 
opportunity harmed MoveOn’s political effectiveness, but it also allowed the organization to 
recruit literally millions of people who felt that protest was the only option in a hostile political 
environment. This upsurge in membership and protest supports Kitschelt’s (1986) hypothesis 
that protest is most likely to occur when a political system is partially closed. 
 MoveOn faced a different situation after 2006 and especially after Obama became 
president in 2008. Under a Democratically-controlled Congress and sympathetic president, 
MoveOn had greater legitimacy in the eyes of those in power. In many cases, it had helped these 
people get elected, and therefore was able to place a certain amount of pressure on the president 
and Democrats in Congress to “mediate” its agenda by proposing legislation that was in line with 
its goals. In addition, MoveOn profited from a “throw the bums out” mentality in 2006 and 2008, 
which made the public more receptive to its claims. During the four-year period between 2006 
and 2010, the political opportunity structure and its accompanying opportunity environment both 
opened up to progressive political ideas, in part because of MoveOn’s efforts to elect progressive 
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leaders and shape public opinion. In this context, MoveOn was able to achieve moderate success 
in its policy and election work (as shown in Chapter Eight). Although the opportunity structure 
was more favorable during this period, MoveOn’s newfound legitimacy challenged its credibility 
as an “outsider” organization. For some members—in many cases, those who had been most 
active—MoveOn’s connection to so many Democrats undermined its moral position. Thus, 
paradoxically, MoveOn experienced political success and a loss of “outsider” credibility as it 
tried to navigate the middle ground of being a pragmatic progressive organization in a two-party 
representative democracy. 
Institutional Isomorphism in Internet Activist Organizations 
MoveOn also influenced politics by developing a model of online political activism that 
was adapted to all levels of movement organizing. As an “early riser” in the online progressive 
movement, MoveOn was able to influence the underlying structure of online organizing in ways 
that later organizations could not (McAdam 1995). It created a model that integrated top-down 
strategic decision making with bottom-up agenda setting, and developed a decentralized, nimble 
organizing structure in which the necessity of quick action would not be hampered by 
unnecessary bureaucracy.  
Through a process of “institutional isomorphism,” MoveOn’s model became the standard 
by which all other internet activist organizations were measured. Institutional isomorphism 
begins when an innovative organization creates a model that improves the performance of the 
tasks required by an institution (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). As the 
effectiveness of this model is proven through results, organizations within the same or related 
fields begin adopting the model. At some point, though, adoption of the model becomes less 
motivated by rational decisions about improved performance; instead, model adoption becomes 
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an expectation if an organization wishes to be perceived as legitimate. As the initial organization 
is exalted as the only legitimate model, the organizations in a given field (whether business or 
politics) become “isomorphic” with one another (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 
1977). 
Evidence for institutional isomorphism abounds in my analysis of MoveOn’s effects 
upon other political organizations. For the first few years after its initial e-mail petition, MoveOn 
slowly developed a model that integrated online and offline activism, and received increasing 
press attention. Especially after the attacks of September 11th and during the run-up to the 
invasion of Iraq, MoveOn proved that its approach to activism was effective at mobilizing large 
numbers of people and dollars. It also continued to innovate new internet-based tactics, such as 
the “virtual march” it organized in 2003. Its success inspired the creation of True Majority, 
Democracy for America, and other organizations.  
These organization engaged in what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) called “mimetic 
isomorphism.” Mimetic isomorphism is more likely to occur in the midst of uncertainty about 
technologies, goals, or the surrounding environment in which organizations function. In such 
uncertain circumstances, organizations view the leading model as a safe choice, and simply copy 
it. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was great uncertainty about the social and 
political effects of the internet. In this context, the fact that MoveOn was able to show evidence 
of successfully using the internet for political mobilization made its model very attractive to 
people who wished to do the same. Added to this technological uncertainty were the political and 
cultural upheavals of the contentious 2000 presidential election, the terrorist attacks on 
September 11th, and the invasion of Iraq. These events made political mobilization seem more 
urgent to people on both sides of the political spectrum, and led to an explosion of interest in 
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MoveOn’s model. It was no coincidence that True Majority, Democracy for America, 
RightMarch.com, and GrassfireNation all emerged between 2002 and 2004, when MoveOn was 
beginning to really take off. Likewise, after the sweeping Democratic victory in the 
congressional elections of 2006, conservatives were very worried about the increasing strength 
of the progressive netroots. As they both explicitly acknowledged, the founders of 
FreedomsWatch and TheVanguard mimicked MoveOn’s model when developing their 
organizations in the wake of this election. 
A second type of institutional isomorphism, “normative isomorphism,” was also apparent 
in my analysis. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), normative isomorphism occurs when 
individuals entering an institutional field are trained by a handful of leading organizations or 
educational programs (such as prestigious business schools), such that they internalize the same 
basic set of norms and values. This socialization into a prescribed set of norms and values feeds 
isomorphism because leaders who emerge from this pool are likely to develop similar 
organizations, even if they do not do so consciously. In my research, normative isomorphism 
was most apparent in ColorofChange.org and MomsRising.org, two groups that “spun off” 
(McAdam 1995) from MoveOn. In these cases, the organizational structures and other 
organizational elements could be traced to training acquired through direct engagement with 
MoveOn. Further evidence for normative isomorphism appeared in ProgressNow, Democracy 
for America, GetUp, and Avaaz. Leaders of each of these organizations received direct 
assistance and training from MoveOn staff members in their early days. These staff members 
greatly influenced the norms and values that influenced leaders’ decisions about organizational 
structures and perceptions of members. 
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Beyond these considerations, though, I found evidence for what I refer to as rhetorical 
isomorphism. My analysis revealed that isomorphic processes go deeper than organizational 
structures or even norms and values; in fact, the structure and usage of language also becomes 
isomorphic. As shown by the e-mails from both progressive and conservative organizations, the 
structure and tone of MoveOn’s e-mail messages have proliferated among online political 
organizations. Indeed, the rhetorical structure of these e-mail messages—the framing of 
“moment” and “movement” narratives, as one leader explained—may be the aspect of 
MoveOn’s model that has been most broadly mimicked. Snow and Benford (1992) suggested 
that the similarity in issue framing across multiple social movement organizations was due to the 
presence of a “master frame,” such as the “rights” master frame in the 1960s and 1970s. My 
analysis does not refute this point, but it adds another layer to potential explanations of this 
similarity in framing. I show how these similarities may also be due to mimetic processes 
occurring at the institutional level that ultimately affect the rhetorical structures underlying issue 
frames. Furthermore, I show how similar frames may also be partially explained by similarities 
in values and goals across social movement organizations that result from processes of normative 
isomorphism.  
CONSUMING ACTIVISM 
 Underlying many of the processes I observed in MoveOn was a fundamental consumerist 
orientation to politics. Scholars examining the relationship of politics to consumption have 
typically focused on “political consumerism.” The basic premise of this research is that, in post-
industrial consumer economies, the new location for political expression is the marketplace. By 
purchasing certain products—such as organic food (Klintman 2006)—consumers make political 
statements and encourage businesses to invest in these products (Holzer 2006; Stolle, Hooghe, 
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and Micheletti 2005). Analysts of political consumerism have examined the emergence of 
“lifestyle politics” based upon certain consumption patterns (Bennett 1998; Shah et al. 2007), 
boycotts of corporations that engage in inhumane or environmentally harmful practices (Jenkins 
and Perrow 1977; Kozinets and Handelman 2004), and “buycotts” that reward companies for 
humane or environmentally friendly practices (Balsiger 2010; Friedman 1996; Minton and Rose 
1997). These studies are related to my analysis of MoveOn to the extent that they call attention to 
the importance of consumerism as both a tactic and target of current social movements. 
However, rather than focusing on how consumption can be political, or how activism may target 
certain aspects of consumerism, my study reveals how activism is increasingly becoming a 
consumable product.  
Many members I interviewed were drawn to MoveOn because it gave them the ability to 
participate in activism quickly and without having to invest time researching the issues. One 
member explained that she liked MoveOn because it was a “one-stop shop” where she could “get 
all [her] progressive needs met in one place.” Members liked MoveOn’s online format because it 
facilitated convenient, point-and-click activism in which they could engage during lunch breaks, 
a child’s naptime, or any other moment of temporary freedom from competing demands. Like 
fast food, MoveOn’s online activism was successful not because it was necessarily the most 
“nutritious” (in terms of providing deep understanding of issues) but because it was cheap, fast, 
and convenient (Ritzer 1996). In fact, MoveOn explicitly positioned itself as a “service” 
organization that allowed “busy but concerned citizens” to participate in politics (MoveOn.org 
2011). Like a fast food employee passing a pre-cooked meal through a drive-thru window, 
MoveOn delivered pre-packaged and easily digestible political messages to members who did 
not have the time—or would not set aside the time—to engage in other types of activism, but still 
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wanted to feel like they were doing something. This conscious orientation toward a consumer 
model of activism served the needs of busy people who otherwise may have been 
“biographically unavailable” (McAdam 1986) for activism due to the competing demands of 
family, work, or other responsibilities. 
MoveOn’s offline activism also fulfilled members’ appetites, though in different ways. 
Unlike online activists, who liked MoveOn because it made activism quick and convenient, 
offline activists participated precisely because such activism required a greater commitment. A 
sense of sacrifice was central to offline activists’ definitions of activism, and by dedicating time 
and energy to MoveOn they were able to feel they had sacrificed for what they believed. More so 
than online activism, offline activism allowed members to act on their values, and thereby 
develop or reinforce activist identities. Whereas online activism—like fast food—fulfilled 
desires for convenience, offline activism produced feelings of accomplishment among 
participants that—to stick with the food metaphor—might be more akin to the experience of 
cooking a meal. MoveOn’s flexible, opt-in model of political organizing provided many possible 
levels of participation, and thereby served the needs of a variety of progressive activists. 
By giving both online and offline activists the tools they needed to feel politically 
fulfilled, MoveOn facilitated “personalized politics,” which Lichterman (1996) described as a 
trend toward self-focused activist experiences. In personalized politics, activists prioritize 
fulfillment of their own value commitments over loyalty to fellow activists or a particular 
organization. MoveOn’s online tactics (petitions, donations, etc.) individualized collective action 
and gave members a sense of personal efficacy. Its offline events were also ultimately 
individualized in nature, given that the organization put little effort into facilitating long-term 
community bonds and often emphasized the personally empowering experience of participating 
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in such activism. Furthermore, the fact that some offline activists left MoveOn to pursue their 
value commitments through other organizations is also indicative of a personalized approach to 
politics. This “shopping around” behavior reflected a consumerist orientation to activism, in that 
these members viewed MoveOn as one of many purveyors of the product (activist experience) 
that they wished to consume in order to fulfill their personal value commitments. 
Future research on social movements should more thoroughly examine how the tactics, 
frames, goals, and even the experiences of activists are fundamentally shaped by the economic 
and cultural context in which protest take place. In Western societies, movement organizations—
and perhaps especially online activist organizations like MoveOn—have adapted to consumerism 
by manufacturing a consumable image of community, choreographing dramatic 
“advertisements” for their messages, and providing multiple styles and levels of activism to serve 
the needs of their “customers.” They have also acclimated to the acceleration of “time-space 
compression” (Harvey 1989) by pre-packaging both online and offline activism for rapid 
response to “hot” issues. These adaptations serve the needs of members and the news media, and 
move social movement organizations further toward their goals of influencing public opinion and 
politics. 
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APPENDIX: MEDIA MARKETS 
 
Media Market Market Rank Newspaper(s) Analyzed Avg. Weekly Circulation 
New York, NY 1 The New York Times 928,000 
Denver, CO 16 The Denver Post 341,000 
Pittsburgh, PA 23 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 184,000 
Columbus, OH 34 Columbus Dispatch 184,000 
Albuquerque-Santa Fe, 
NM 
44 Albuquerque Journal;  
Santa Fe New Mexican 
94,000 (AJ);  
23,000 (SFNM) 
Little Rock-Pine Bluff, AR 56 Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 169,000 
Tulsa, OK 61 Tulsa World 102,000 
Spokane, WA 75 Spokesman-Review 80,000 
Madison, WI 85 Capital Times;  
Wisconsin State Journal 
26,000 (CT); 
92,000 (WSJ) 
El Paso, TX 98 El Paso Times 69,000 
Lincoln-Hastings-
Kearney, NE 
105 Lincoln Journal Star 72,000 
Augusta, GA 114 Augusta Chronicle 61,000 
Monterey-Salinas, CA 124 Monterey County Herald 26,000 
Bangor, ME 154 Bangor Daily News 53,000 
Eureka, CA 195 Eureka Times-Standard 18,000 
 
